

## Module 6

### Assignment

1. How to Read the Summa – Supplemental
2. How to Cite the Summa – Supplemental
3. Summa Contra Gentiles – Book 1: Chapters 1 to 10; Book IV: Chapters 1-4  
Summa Theologiae - *ST* I, Q. 1, Art. 1 & 6; Q.16, Art.1-6; Q.17, Art. 4
4. Proverbs; Chapter 4
5. *From the Constitution of the Order*; Chapter III, On Study; Article I – On the Importance of Study and its Sources

## How to Read the Summa

### Assignment

Read, **in this order**, the following sections from St. Thomas Aquinas, *Treatise on Happiness*, John A. Oesterle, trans. (Notre Dame Press):

- Question V, Article 8
- Question II (all)
- Question III, Article 5 and Article 8

### Overall Structure of Aquinas' Argument

The *Treatise on Happiness* is a section in a much longer work, the *Summa Theologiae*. The *Summa* is written in a very distinctive style. Aquinas tries to answer every major question you can think of on the topic he is discussing, and to respond to every major objection to the conclusions he reaches. Consequently, the text is organized around general issues, called "Questions" (e.g., Question II is "In What Man's Happiness Consists"). These "Questions" are further subdivided into "Articles" (e.g., the First Article under Question II is "Does Man's Happiness Consist in Wealth?"). For the purposes of this class, if you are writing a paper and wanted to cite Article 1 of Question II, you would simply identify it as "*Summa* II.1."

Aquinas thinks that **part of what is distinctive about rational creatures like human beings is that they can act for an "end" that they choose to pursue.** (I.1-2) "End" is a technical term in Aristotelian philosophy, which just refers to one's purpose or goal. In other words, it makes sense to ask a rational creature, "**Why** did you do that?" and to expect an answer of the form, "I did it in order to achieve such-and-such a goal." Aquinas admits that humans sometimes do something without any conscious end, like absent-mindedly playing with your hair while you talk. But he says that you are not acting characteristically like a human when you do things like that. (I.1, Objection and Reply 3) One way of understanding what Aquinas is saying is this: If you went through life without choosing ends, you would be acting like a zombie or an object rather than like a human being.

**Aquinas also thinks that you choose an "end" only if you regard it as good in some respect.**

The goodness of an end does not have to be what we might call "moral goodness." The end you pursue just has to be something that is "good" in some broad sense. In order to understand why this is a plausible claim, consider the following example. Suppose we knew someone who was collecting lots of pins. We asked him what he wanted all the pins for, and he said, "I just want pins." We ask him if he plans to use the pins for something else, like sewing. He says, No. We ask him if he is a collector (the way some people collect baseball cards or beanie babies), and he says, "No. I just want pins." I think we would say that, if it is even possible for there to be a person like this, he would be fundamentally irrational, unless he could explain to us what was **good** about having lots of pins.

Among your ends, you want some things only as a means to something else. For example, if you have a job that you don't particularly enjoy, and I ask you why you stay at it, you might say, "I need to work in order to make money for food, rent, books, and stuff like that." So working, in this case, is only a means to some further end. Is it possible that everything you do is like that? In other words, is it possible that every end you have, you seek only as a means to some further end? Aquinas says that it is **not** possible. Aquinas thinks that **there must be some ends that you choose for their own sake, and not for the sake of any further ends.** Why? The whole point of an "end" is that it explains why you do something intentionally. Now suppose that everything you do intentionally you do for the sake of something else. Then there would be an infinite series of things that you are pursuing. ("I do A for the sake of B, but B for the sake of C, and C for the sake of ....") But then there would never be any real explanation for why you do something intentionally, because we could never point to anything and say, "Okay. **This** is what she is trying to get through her actions." (I.4)

Something that you want for its own sake, Aquinas calls an "ultimate end." How many ultimate ends do you have? You might think that you can have several, but **Aquinas will argue that, whether you know it or not, you can really only have one ultimate end.** Aquinas gives several arguments for this conclusion, but the argument you will probably find easiest to understand is the following. Suppose you think you have two ultimate ends: pleasure and virtue. Since you think these are ultimate ends, you want each for its own sake. Now, Aquinas will argue that neither one of these, by itself, could be an ultimate end. Because if you had **only** pleasure, you would want something else: virtue. But then pleasure **and** virtue is a more ultimate end for you than pleasure by itself. So you don't really have two ultimate ends, pleasure and virtue individually; instead, you have one ultimate end, pleasure and virtue together. Another way of putting the same point is that pleasure and virtue are not distinct ultimate ends, but are rather **constituents** of your one ultimate end. (I.5) (Note that Aquinas is here assuming that any two things you could genuinely want for their own sake individually could be combined into a greater end. Are there any counterexamples to this claim?)

So Aquinas thinks he has proven that each person has one ultimate end. **He next argues that all humans, whether they realize it or not, have the same ultimate end. He calls this ultimate end *beatitudo*, which literally means "blessedness," but is rendered in your translation as "happiness."** The translation of this particular term seems unsatisfactory to me, because the English "happiness" is more specific than the Latin *beatitudo*. We tend to think of happiness as a pleasant psychological state. However, *beatitudo* is more general: it is whatever it is that is the

ultimate end for humans. So, in a way, the statement that humans seek *beatitudo* is, by itself, almost trivially true. (Saying that humans seek *beatitudo* is like saying, "Everyone wants to live well," where "living well" does not necessarily mean living morally. Who would disagree with this?) Nonetheless, although all humans agree in wanting *beatitudo*, they disagree about what *beatitudo* consists in. (I.8, V.8) (This is why "happiness" is a little misleading as a translation of *beatitudo*, because "a pleasant psychological state" is one specific **answer** to the question, "What is *beatitudo*?") But Aquinas' argument in the *Summa* is by no means trivial, because **he tries to prove that there is really only one thing that *beatitudo* could be for humans**. In other words, people in life pursue many different things -- wealth, fame, power, sex -- believing that possessing that thing will give them the best life (what we might call "a charmed life"). But there is really only one goal that would give you the best life if you get it.

What Aquinas does in Questions II and III is to try to show that certain things people commonly pursue cannot be the highest good, and something else (that some people do pursue, and everyone should pursue) is the highest good. Question II, Article 1 tries to convince you that possessing wealth is not what makes you "happy." In Articles 2 and 3, he tries to convince you that neither honor nor fame will make you happy. In Article 4, he argues that happiness is not just possessing power. In the 5th and 6th Articles, he argues that happiness is neither having any good of the body nor is it physical pleasure. Article 7 is a little tricky. He says there that "happiness does not consist in any good **of** the soul" (II.7) However, Aquinas clarifies what he means by this by saying that happiness "is a good inhering in the soul. But that ... which makes man happy, is something outside the soul" (II.7, Reply 3). In other words, your soul is what is happy, but it is made happy by something outside of it. Finally, in Article 8, Aquinas tries to convince you that there is nothing created (i.e., nothing in **this** world) that can give you happiness.

So what **can** give you happiness? Aquinas answers this in Question III, "What Is Happiness." In Article 5, Aquinas discusses whether happiness is an activity of the "speculative or practical intellect." In other words, is happiness using your mind to contemplate theoretical truths, or is happiness using your mind to figure out how to solve practical problems? Aquinas argues that it must be the former. In Article 8, "Does the Happiness of Man Consist in the Vision of the Divine Essence?" Aquinas argues that happiness consists in a certain kind of theoretical knowledge: the experience of God that we achieve after death (if we go to Heaven).

## ***How to Read the Summa***

Every "article" in the *Summa* has the same basic structure. Every section of the article opens with a particular phrase, and has a particular purpose.

- **"It seems that...."** In this section Aquinas first states **the position he will end up disagreeing with**, and then gives what he thinks are the three best **arguments against his own position**.
- **"On the contrary...."** This section states **Aquinas' own position**, and usually cites some authoritative text in support of his position.
- **"Response"** This part presents **Aquinas' argument in favor of his own position**.
- **"Reply to...."** Here, Aquinas gives **a reply to each of the arguments against his own position** that he presented in the first part of the article. Often, the replies are **counterarguments**, but sometimes Aquinas simply tries to show that the apparent objections and his own position **can be reconciled with one another**, if both are properly understood.

This structure might seem forced and artificial to you, but Aquinas uses it for several reasons. He wants to make sure that he has given serious consideration to every objection to his own view, and that he has clearly stated his argument for believing in his own position, and that he has clearly stated his response to the major objections to his own position. However, **sometimes it is easier to understand an article if you read the parts in the following order:**

1. Read the Question heading and the Article heading so that you know what topic is under discussion.
2. Read the "On the contrary," so that you know what Aquinas' answer is to the question posed in the Article heading.
3. Read the "Response," so that you know what Aquinas' argument is for his answer to the question.
4. Go back and read the first argument **against** Aquinas' position in the "It seems that" section.
5. Now read the "Reply" to the first argument.
6. Go back and read the **second** argument in the "It seems that" section, followed by Aquinas' reply to that argument. Repeat this for the **third** argument and reply.

Let's apply what we've learned. Go to pp. 15-16 in your translation, and take a look at II.1. As we saw, the general topic of this question in the *Summa* is, "In What Man's Happiness Consists," and the specific issue that this article examines is "Does Man's Happiness Consist in Wealth?" We go to the "On the contrary" section, and see that Aquinas' view is that "...happiness does not consist in wealth." He cites Boethius, an earlier philosopher, as an authority on this point.

Next, we read Aquinas' argument for this conclusion in the "Response." Basically, Aquinas argues that wealth is only good as a means to other things, and is not worth pursuing in itself, so it cannot be an "ultimate end." More specifically, Aquinas begins by distinguishing two kinds of wealth: "natural wealth," like "food, drink, clothing," and "artificial wealth," "such as money." He argues that human happiness cannot consist in artificial wealth, because we want money, for example, only to buy other things like food and drink. And human happiness cannot consist in

natural wealth either, because you want things like food and drink, not for their own sake, but only "for human sustenance." In other words, you want food only in order to satisfy the needs of your body. So even if you need food in order to be happy, having food cannot, by itself, be human happiness, because all the value food has depends on something more important: the health of your body. (I know what you are thinking now: "But I also want food and drink because of the pleasure they give me. Isn't bodily pleasure happiness?" Aquinas considers this possibility in II.6 [Question II, Article 6]. You may not agree with Aquinas, but **almost** every possibility and objection you can think of is dealt with by Aquinas somewhere in the *Summa*.)

Now you should go back and read each objection to Aquinas' position, followed by the corresponding "Reply." I'll walk you through the first Objection and Reply, and leave the second and third pairs for you to think through on your own. The first Objection basically argues that wealth "has the greatest hold on [our] affections" (indeed, Aquinas notes that a Bible passage seems to say this!), so wealth must be what our happiness consists in. In his Reply, Aquinas admits that there are some people "who are conscious only of goods which can be acquired with money," but suggests that such people are "foolish," and that "our judgment about human goods should be taken, not from the foolish but from the wise, just as we should take our judgments about taste from those with a well-ordered sense of taste." This reply is challenging to our 20th-century perspectives, because we often assume that there are not experts or "wise" people in matters of either taste or human goods. But this is precisely what Aquinas questions. I think Aquinas would also say that, in his Response in this Article (and in other Articles in this Question), he has established by argument that goods acquired by money cannot be the only goods.

## ***Conclusion***

This document is designed to help you read part of the *Summa* with understanding and appreciation. But the most important thing is that you think about what Aquinas is saying, and decide whether you agree with him or not. Are his arguments rationally compelling? Why or why not? If Aquinas goes wrong, where does he go wrong? (Many philosophers would agree with the basic structure of his argument, but disagree with his conclusion about what *beatitudo* is.)

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## How to Cite the Summa

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<http://dougbeaumont.org/2010/09/21>

Having struggled with this issue for some time, I thought I would attempt to get a final answer as to how Thomas Aquinas's *Summa Theologiae*\* is to be cited in academic writing. What I discovered is that there seems to be no authoritative answer. This does not mean, however, that there are no wrong ways to do so. Below I present my findings (all subject to change as Thomists from around the blogosphere send in corrections! [please submit sources if you send in corrections]).

**Citing the *Summa* is based on its structure, so let's begin with that.**

The *Summa* has three main divisions called *Parts*:

- Part I (*Prima Pars*) deals with God
- Part II (*Prima / Secunda Secundæ*) deals with Humanity and Morals
- Part III (*Tertia Pars*) deals with Christ

Each *Part* is composed of *Questions*:

- Part I has 119 Questions
- Part II is divided into two parts:
  - The First Part of Part II has 114 Questions
  - The Second Part of Part II has 189 Questions
- Part III has 90 Questions

Each *Question* is dealt with in *Articles* made up of five sections:

- The issue of the article is given in the form a question.
- Several plausible responses are listed.
- A contrary response (reflecting Thomas's thinking) from some authority is cited (the *sed contra* – "On the contrary").
- Arguments are given for Thomas's response (the *respondeo* – "I answer that").
- Brief replies are given to objections based on the initial responses (the *adversus* – "Objections").

When citing passages from the *Summa*, do not use page numbers. Standard notation procedure is to list the above elements in a consistent manner . . . However, convention varies widely (see examples from scholarly sources below). So check with your school / professor for preferences, and be consistent.

- Part number
  - First Part: "I" or "Ia"
  - First Part of Second Part: "I-II" or "Ia-IIæ"

- Second Part of the Second Part: “II-II” or “IIa-IIæ”
- Third Part: “III” or “IIIa”
- \*\*Supplement: “Suppl.” or “Suppl. IIIae”
- Question number
- Article number
  - If it is a Reply to an objection, abbreviate *adversus* as “ad” followed by its number

**Examples:**

- *Sum* I-II, 2, ii, ad. 1.
- *ST* I-II, Q. 3, Art. 2, ad. 1.
- *ST* I-II, Q 3, A 2, ad. 1.
- *S.T.* I-II, 2, ii, a.1.
- Ia.22.2
- Ia.I: 19, 34, 193(53)
- Ia. 3, 2 ad 3.
- 2a2ae. 180, 10. 3a 35, 8.

**Other Considerations:**

- \* The title of Aquinas’s work is *Summa Theologiae* (Lt. for “Summary of Theology”), but it is sometimes titled *Summa Theologica* (e.g., [NewAdvent.com](http://NewAdvent.com) and the popular [Benziger Brothers 1947 translation](#)). If you are not referencing a translation with “Theologica” in the title, stick with *Summa Theologiae*.
  - To make the æ character in MS Word use character code 00E6 under INSERT.
  - To make it in HTML type “&aelig;” where “æ” would have gone (e.g., “Summa Theologi&aelig;”).
- \*\*Aquinas never finished the *Summa*, but there is a *Supplement* compiled from his work on the Sentences attached to part three.
- Thomas’s “last name” derives from his family’s place of origin in Aquino, Italy – so, Thomas of Aquino. Thus, his name is rendered Thomas D’Aquino in Italian, and Thomæ Aquinatis in Latin. For an English source citation or bibliography entry, his name is typically listed as “Aquinas, Thomas.” (*Thanks to Prof. R. Howe for this insight!*)
- Full bibliographic information on the *Summa* should only be included in its first citation and in the bibliography. After that, just use standard notation.

**The Summa Contra Gentiles**  
**of**  
**Saint Thomas Aquinas**

LITERALLY TRANSLATED BY THE ENGLISH DOMINICAN  
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## TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE

FIFTEEN years ago the English Dominican Fathers embarked on what was considered by many the hazardous and even useless venture of translating the *Summa Theologica* of the Angelic Doctor. Yet although there were critics adverse to the project, there were others, not a few, who approved and encouraged; these and the favour with which the effort, notwithstanding its many deficiencies, was received, heartened the translators to persevere, and enabled them to bring their work to a happy conclusion. For the venture has proved a success beyond the most sanguine expectations; and already the work has entered into a second edition.

During the progress of translating the *Summa Theologica* the translators were frequently asked why they had given preference to this work over the *Summa Contra Gentiles*. The reason is a simple one. The Latin text of the latter work, edited by P. A. Uccelli in 1857, was extremely defective, owing to the editor's inability to read St. Thomas's handwriting correctly. Father Peter Paul Mackey, who has been on the staff of the editors of the Leonine Edition of St. Thomas's works for forty years, told the writer of this preface that it took him over two years to learn how to read St. Thomas's autograph. It was not till 1918 that the above editors published the first two books of the *Summa Contra Gentiles*. Hence the delay in the translation. It is hoped that the English translation will receive the same indulgence and favour as that which has been accorded to the translation of the *Summa Theologica*.

E. L. S.

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## FIRST BOOK

### CHAPTER I

#### IN WHAT CONSISTS THE OFFICE OF A WISE MAN

*My mouth shall meditate truth, and my lips shall hate wickedness.*—PROV. 8:7.

THE general use which, in the Philosopher's opinion, should be followed in naming things, has resulted in those men being called *wise* who direct things themselves and govern them well. Wherefore among other things which men conceive of the wise man, the Philosopher reckons that *it belongs to the wise man to direct things*. Now the rule of all things directed to the end of government and order must needs be taken from their end: for then is a thing best disposed when it is fittingly directed to its end, since the end of everything is its good. Wherefore in the arts we observe that the art which governs and rules another is the one to which the latter's end belongs: thus the medical art rules and directs the art of the druggist, because health which is the object of medicine is the end of all drugs which are made up by the druggist's art. The same may be observed in the art of sailing in relation to the art of ship-building, and in the military art in relation to the equestrian art and all warlike appliances. These arts which govern others are called *master-arts* (*architectonicæ*), that is *principal arts*, for which reason their craftsmen, who are

called *master-craftsmen (architectores)*, are awarded the name of wise men. Since, however, these same craftsmen, through being occupied with the ends of certain singular things, do not attain to the universal end of all things, they are called wise about this or that, in which sense it is said (1 Cor. 3:10): *As a wise architect, I have laid the foundation*; whereas the name of being wise simply is reserved to him alone whose consideration is about the end of the universe, which end is also the beginning of the universe: wherefore, according to the Philosopher, it belongs to the wise man to consider the *highest causes*.

Now the last end of each thing is that which is intended by the first author or mover of that thing: and the first author and mover of the universe is an intellect, as we shall prove further on. Consequently the last end of the universe must be the good of the intellect: and this is truth. Therefore truth must be the last end of the whole universe; and the consideration thereof must be the chief occupation of wisdom. And for this reason divine Wisdom, clothed in flesh, declares that He came into the world to make known the truth, saying (Jo. 18:37): *For this was I born, and for this cause came I into the world, that I should give testimony to the truth*. Moreover the Philosopher defines the First Philosophy as being the *knowledge of truth*, not of any truth, but of that truth which is the source of all truth, of that, namely, which relates to the first principle of being of all things; wherefore its truth is the principle of all truth, since the disposition of things is the same in truth as in being.

Now it belongs to the same thing to pursue one contrary and to remove the other: thus medicine which effects health, removes sickness. Hence, just as it belongs to a wise man to meditate and disseminate truth, especially about the first principle, so does it belong to him to refute contrary falsehood.

Wherefore the twofold office of the wise man is fittingly declared from the mouth of Wisdom, in the words above quoted; namely, to meditate and publish the divine truth, which antonomastically is *the truth*, as signified by the words, *My mouth shall meditate truth*; and to refute the error contrary to truth, as signified by the words, *and my lips shall hate wickedness*, by which is denoted falsehood opposed to divine truth, which falsehood is contrary to religion that is also called *godliness*, wherefore the falsehood that is contrary thereto receives the name of *ungodliness*.

## CHAPTER II

### THE AUTHOR'S INTENTION IN THIS WORK

NOW of all human pursuits, that of wisdom is the most perfect, the most sublime, the most profitable, the most delightful. It is the most perfect, since in proportion as a man devotes himself to the pursuit of wisdom, so much does he already share in true happiness: wherefore the wise man says (Ecclus. 14:22): *Blessed is the man that shall continue in wisdom*. It is the most sublime because thereby especially does man approach to a likeness to God, Who *made all things in wisdom*: wherefore since likeness is the cause of love, the pursuit of wisdom especially unites man to God by friendship: hence it is said (Wis. 7:14) that *wisdom is an infinite treasure to men: which they that use, become the friends of God*. It is the most profitable, because by wisdom itself man is brought to the kingdom of immortality, for *the desire of wisdom bringeth to the everlasting kingdom* (Wis. 6:21). And it is the most delightful because *her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company any tediousness, but joy and gladness* (Wis. 8:16).

Wherefore, taking heart from God's lovingkindness to assume the office of a wise man, although it surpasses our own powers, the purpose we have in view is, in our own weak way, to

declare the truth which the Catholic faith professes, while weeding out contrary errors; for, in the words of Hilary, *I acknowledge that I owe my life's chief occupation to God, so that every word and every thought of mine may speak of Him*. But it is difficult to refute the errors of each individual, for two reasons. First, because the sacrilegious assertions of each erring individual are not so well known to us, that we are able from what they say to find arguments to refute their errors. For the Doctors of old used this method in order to confute the errors of the heathens, whose opinions they were able to know, since either they had been heathens themselves, or had lived among heathens and were conversant with their teachings. Secondly, because some of them, like the Mohammedans and pagans, do not agree with us as to the authority of any Scripture whereby they may be convinced, in the same way as we are able to dispute with the Jews by means of the Old Testament, and with heretics by means of the New: whereas the former accept neither. Wherefore it is necessary to have recourse to natural reason, to which all are compelled to assent. And yet this is deficient in the things of God.

And while we are occupied in the inquiry about a particular truth, we shall show what errors are excluded thereby, and how demonstrable truth is in agreement with the faith of the Christian religion.

## CHAPTER III

### IN WHAT WAY IT IS POSSIBLE TO MAKE KNOWN THE DIVINE TRUTH

SINCE, however, not every truth is to be made known in the same way, *and it is the part of an educated man to seek for conviction in each subject, only so far as the nature of the subject allows*, as the Philosopher most rightly observes as quoted by Boethius,<sup>2</sup> it is necessary to show first of all in what way it is possible to make known the aforesaid truth.

Now in those things which we hold about God there is truth in two ways. For certain things that are true about God wholly surpass the capability of human reason, for instance that God is three and one: while there are certain things to which even natural reason can attain, for instance that God is, that God is one, and others like these, which even the philosophers proved demonstratively of God, being guided by the light of natural reason.

That certain divine truths wholly surpass the capability of human reason, is most clearly evident. For since the principle of all the knowledge which the reason acquires about a thing, is the understanding of that thing's essence, because according to the Philosopher's teaching the principle of a demonstration is *what a thing is*, it follows that our knowledge about a thing will be in proportion to our understanding of its essence. Wherefore, if the human intellect comprehends the essence of a particular thing, for instance a stone or a triangle, no truth about that thing will surpass the capability of human reason. But this does not happen to us in relation to God, because the human intellect is incapable by its natural power of attaining to the comprehension of His essence: since our intellect's knowledge, according to the mode of the present life, originates from the senses: so that things which are not objects of sense cannot be comprehended by the human intellect, except in so far as knowledge of them is gathered from sensibles. Now sensibles cannot lead our intellect to see in them what God is, because they are effects unequal to the power of their cause. And yet our intellect is led by sensibles to the divine knowledge so as to know about God that He is, and other such truths, which need to be ascribed to the first principle. Accordingly some divine truths are attainable by human reason, while others altogether surpass the power of human reason.

Again. The same is easy to see from the degrees of intellects. For if one of two men perceives a thing with his intellect with greater subtlety, the one whose intellect is of a higher degree understands many things which the other is altogether unable to grasp; as instanced in a yokel who is utterly incapable of grasping the subtleties of philosophy. Now the angelic intellect surpasses the human intellect more than the intellect of the cleverest philosopher surpasses that of the most uncultured. For an angel knows God through a more excellent effect than does man, for as much as the angel's essence, through which he is led to know God by natural knowledge, is more excellent than sensible things, even than the soul itself, by which the human intellect mounts to the knowledge of God. And the divine intellect surpasses the angelic intellect much more than the angelic surpasses the human. For the divine intellect by its capacity equals the divine essence, wherefore God perfectly understands of Himself what He is, and He knows all things that can be understood about Him: whereas the angel knows not what God is by his natural knowledge, because the angel's essence, by which he is led to the knowledge of God, is an effect unequal to the power of its cause. Consequently an angel is unable by his natural knowledge to grasp all that God understands about Himself: nor again is human reason capable of grasping all that an angel understands by his natural power. Accordingly just as a man would show himself to be a most insane fool if he declared the assertions of a philosopher to be false because he was unable to understand them, so, and much more, a man would be exceedingly foolish, were he to suspect of falsehood the things revealed by God through the ministry of His angels, because they cannot be the object of reason's investigations.

Furthermore. The same is made abundantly clear by the deficiency which every day we experience in our knowledge of things. For we are ignorant of many of the properties of sensible things, and in many cases we are unable to discover the nature of those properties which we perceive by our senses. Much less therefore is human reason capable of investigating all the truths about that most sublime essence.

With this the saying of the Philosopher is in accord (*2 Metaph.*) where he says that *our intellect in relation to those primary things which are most evident in nature is like the eye of a bat in relation to the sun.*

To this truth Holy Writ also bears witness. For it is written (Job 11:7): *Peradventure thou wilt comprehend the steps of God and wilt find out the Almighty perfectly?* and (36:26): *Behold God is great, exceeding our knowledge,* and (1 Cor. 13:9): *We know in part.*

Therefore all that is said about God, though it cannot be investigated by reason, must not be forthwith rejected as false, as the Manicheans and many unbelievers have thought.

## CHAPTER IV

THAT THE TRUTH ABOUT DIVINE THINGS WHICH IS ATTAINABLE BY REASON IS FITTINGLY PROPOSED  
TO MAN AS AN OBJECT OF BELIEF

WHILE then the truth of the intelligible things of God is twofold, one to which the inquiry of reason can attain, the other which surpasses the whole range of human reason, both are fittingly proposed by God to man as an object of belief. We must first show this with regard to that truth which is attainable by the inquiry of reason, lest it appears to some, that since it can be attained by reason, it was useless to make it an object of faith by supernatural inspiration. Now three disadvantages would result if this truth were left solely to the inquiry of reason. One is that few men would have knowledge of God: because very many are hindered from gathering the fruit of diligent inquiry, which is the discovery of truth, for three reasons. Some indeed on account of an

indisposition of temperament, by reason of which many are naturally indisposed to knowledge: so that no efforts of theirs would enable them to reach to the attainment of the highest degree of human knowledge, which consists in knowing God. Some are hindered by the needs of household affairs. For there must needs be among men some that devote themselves to the conduct of temporal affairs, who would be unable to devote so much time to the leisure of contemplative research as to reach the summit of human inquiry, namely the knowledge of God. And some are hindered by laziness. For in order to acquire the knowledge of God in those things which reason is able to investigate, it is necessary to have a previous knowledge of many things: since almost the entire consideration of philosophy is directed to the knowledge of God: for which reason metaphysics, which is about divine things, is the last of the parts of philosophy to be studied. Wherefore it is not possible to arrive at the inquiry about the aforesaid truth except after a most laborious study: and few are willing to take upon themselves this labour for the love of a knowledge, the natural desire for which has nevertheless been instilled into the mind of man by God.

The second disadvantage is that those who would arrive at the discovery of the aforesaid truth would scarcely succeed in doing so after a long time. First, because this truth is so profound, that it is only after long practice that the human intellect is enabled to grasp it by means of reason. Secondly, because many things are required beforehand, as stated above. Thirdly, because at the time of youth, the mind, when tossed about by the various movements of the passions, is not fit for the knowledge of so sublime a truth, whereas *calm gives prudence and knowledge*, as stated in *7 Phys.* Hence mankind would remain in the deepest darkness of ignorance, if the path of reason were the only available way to the knowledge of God: because the knowledge of God which especially makes men perfect and good, would be acquired only by the few, and by these only after a long time.

The third disadvantage is that much falsehood is mingled with the investigations of human reason, on account of the weakness of our intellect in forming its judgments, and by reason of the admixture of phantasms. Consequently many would remain in doubt about those things even which are most truly demonstrated, through ignoring the force of the demonstration: especially when they perceive that different things are taught by the various men who are called wise. Moreover among the many demonstrated truths, there is sometimes a mixture of falsehood that is not demonstrated, but assumed for some probable or sophistical reason which at times is mistaken for a demonstration. Therefore it was necessary that definite certainty and pure truth about divine things should be offered to man by the way of faith.

Accordingly the divine clemency has made this salutary commandment, that even some things which reason is able to investigate must be held by faith: so that all may share in the knowledge of God easily, and without doubt or error.

Hence it is written (Eph. 4:17, 18): *That henceforward you walk not as also the Gentiles walk in the vanity of their mind, having their understanding darkened:* and (Isa. 54:13): *All thy children shall be taught of the Lord.*

## CHAPTER V

THAT THOSE THINGS WHICH CANNOT BE INVESTIGATED BY REASON ARE FITTINGLY PROPOSED TO  
MAN AS AN OBJECT OF FAITH

It may appear to some that those things which cannot be investigated by reason ought not to be proposed to man as an object of faith: because divine wisdom provides for each thing according

to the mode of its nature. We must therefore prove that it is necessary also for those things which surpass reason to be proposed by God to man as an object of faith.

For no man tends to do a thing by his desire and endeavour unless it be previously known to him. Wherefore since man is directed by divine providence to a higher good than human frailty can attain in the present life, as we shall show in the sequel, it was necessary for his mind to be bidden to something higher than those things to which our reason can reach in the present life, so that he might learn to aspire, and by his endeavours to tend to something surpassing the whole state of the present life. And this is especially competent to the Christian religion, which alone promises goods spiritual and eternal: for which reason it proposes many things surpassing the thought of man: whereas the old law which contained promises of temporal things, proposed few things that are above human inquiry. It was with this motive that the philosophers, in order to wean men from sensible pleasures to virtue, took care to show that there are other goods of greater account than those which appeal to the senses, the taste of which things affords much greater delight to those who devote themselves to active or contemplative virtues.

Again it is necessary for this truth to be proposed to man as an object of faith in order that he may have truer knowledge of God. For then alone do we know God truly, when we believe that He is far above all that man can possibly think of God, because the divine essence surpasses man's natural knowledge, as stated above. Hence by the fact that certain things about God are proposed to man, which surpass his reason, he is strengthened in his opinion that God is far above what he is able to think.

There results also another advantage from this, namely, the checking of presumption which is the mother of error. For some there are who presume so far on their wits that they think themselves capable of measuring the whole nature of things by their intellect, in that they esteem all things true which they see, and false which they see not. Accordingly, in order that man's mind might be freed from this presumption, and seek the truth humbly, it was necessary that certain things far surpassing his intellect should be proposed to man by God.

Yet another advantage is made apparent by the words of the Philosopher (10 *Ethic.*). For when a certain Simonides maintained that man should neglect the knowledge of God, and apply his mind to human affairs, and declared that *a man ought to relish human things, and a mortal, mortal things*: the Philosopher contradicted him, saying that *a man ought to devote himself to immortal and divine things as much as he can*. Hence he says (11 *De Animal.*) that though it is but little that we perceive of higher substances, yet that little is more loved and desired than all the knowledge we have of lower substances. He says also (2 *De Cælo et Mundo*) that when questions about the heavenly bodies can be answered by a short and probable solution, it happens that the hearer is very much rejoiced. All this shows that however imperfect the knowledge of the highest things may be, it bestows very great perfection on the soul: and consequently, although human reason is unable to grasp fully things that are above reason, it nevertheless acquires much perfection, if at least it hold things, in any way whatever, by faith.

Wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 3:25): *Many things are shown to thee above the understanding of men*, and (1 Cor. 2:10, 11): *The things ... that are of God no man knoweth, but the Spirit of God: but to us God hath revealed them by His Spirit*.

## CHAPTER VI

THAT IT IS NOT A MARK OF LEVITY TO ASSENT TO THE THINGS THAT ARE OF FAITH, ALTHOUGH THEY ARE ABOVE REASON

Now those who believe this truth, of *which reason affords a proof*, believe not lightly, as though *following foolish<sup>5</sup> fables* (2 Pet. 1:16). For divine Wisdom Himself, Who knows all things most fully, deigned to reveal to man *the secrets of God's wisdom*: and by suitable arguments proves His presence, and the truth of His doctrine and inspiration, by performing works surpassing the capability of the whole of nature, namely, the wondrous healing of the sick, the raising of the dead to life, a marvellous control over the heavenly bodies, and what excites yet more wonder, the inspiration of human minds, so that unlettered and simple persons are filled with the Holy Ghost, and in one instant are endowed with the most sublime wisdom and eloquence. And after considering these arguments, convinced by the strength of the proof, and not by the force of arms, nor by the promise of delights, but—and this is the greatest marvel of all—amidst the tyranny of persecutions, a countless crowd of not only simple but also of the wisest men, embraced the Christian faith, which inculcates things surpassing all human understanding, curbs the pleasures of the flesh, and teaches contempt of all worldly things. That the minds of mortal beings should assent to such things, is both the greatest of miracles, and the evident work of divine inspiration, seeing that they despise visible things and desire only those that are invisible. And that this happened not suddenly nor by chance, but by the disposition of God, is shown by the fact that God foretold that He would do so by the manifold oracles of the prophets, whose books we hold in veneration as bearing witness to our faith. This particular kind of proof is alluded to in the words of Heb. 2:3, 4: *Which, namely the salvation of mankind, having begun to be declared by the Lord, was confirmed with us by them that heard Him, God also bearing witness by signs and wonders, and divers ... distributions of the Holy Ghost.*

Now such a wondrous conversion of the world to the Christian faith is a most indubitable proof that such signs did take place, so that there is no need to repeat them, seeing that there is evidence of them in their result. For it would be the most wondrous sign of all if without any wondrous signs the world were persuaded by simple and lowly men to believe things so arduous, to accomplish things so difficult, and to hope for things so sublime. Although God ceases not even in our time to work miracles through His saints in confirmation of the faith.

On the other hand those who introduced the errors of the sects proceeded in contrary fashion, as instanced by Mohammed, who enticed peoples with the promise of carnal pleasures, to the desire of which the concupiscence of the flesh instigates. He also delivered commandments in keeping with his promises, by giving the reins to carnal pleasure, wherein it is easy for carnal men to obey: and the lessons of truth which he inculcated were only such as can be easily known to any man of average wisdom by his natural powers: yea rather the truths which he taught were mingled by him with many fables and most false doctrines. Nor did he add any signs of supernatural agency, which alone are a fitting witness to divine inspiration, since a visible work that can be from God alone, proves the teacher of truth to be invisibly inspired: but he asserted that he was sent in the power of arms, a sign that is not lacking even to robbers and tyrants. Again, those who believed in him from the outset were not wise men practised in things divine and human, but beastlike men who dwelt in the wilds, utterly ignorant of all divine teaching; and it was by a multitude of such men and the force of arms that he compelled others to submit to his law.

Lastly, no divine oracles of prophets in a previous age bore witness to him; rather did he corrupt almost all the teaching of the Old and New Testaments by a narrative replete with fables, as one may see by a perusal of his law. Hence by a cunning device, he did not commit the reading of the Old and New Testament Books to his followers, lest he should thereby be convicted of falsehood. Thus it is evident that those who believe his words believe lightly.



## CHAPTER VII

### THAT THE TRUTH OF REASON IS NOT IN OPPOSITION TO THE TRUTH OF THE CHRISTIAN FAITH

NOW though the aforesaid truth of the Christian faith surpasses the ability of human reason, nevertheless those things which are naturally instilled in human reason cannot be opposed to this truth. For it is clear that those things which are implanted in reason by nature, are most true, so much so that it is impossible to think them to be false Nor is it lawful to deem false that which is held by faith, since it is so evidently confirmed by God. Seeing then that the false alone is opposed to the true, as evidently appears if we examine their definitions, it is impossible for the aforesaid truth of faith to be contrary to those principles which reason knows naturally.

Again. The same thing which the disciple's mind receives from its teacher is contained in the knowledge of the teacher, unless he teach insincerely, which it were wicked to say of God. Now the knowledge of naturally known principles is instilled into us by God, since God Himself is the author of our nature. Therefore the divine Wisdom also contains these principles. Consequently whatever is contrary to these principles, is contrary to the divine Wisdom; wherefore it cannot be from God. Therefore those things which are received by faith from divine revelation cannot be contrary to our natural knowledge.

Moreover. Our intellect is stayed by contrary arguments, so that it cannot advance to the knowledge of truth. Wherefore if conflicting knowledges were instilled into us by God, our intellect would thereby be hindered from knowing the truth. And this cannot be ascribed to God.

Furthermore. Things that are natural are unchangeable so long as nature remains. Now contrary opinions cannot be together in the same subject. Therefore God does not instil into man any opinion or belief contrary to natural knowledge.

Hence the Apostle says (Rom. 10:8): *The word is nigh thee even in thy heart and in thy mouth. This is the word of faith which we preach.* Yet because it surpasses reason some look upon it as though it were contrary thereto; which is impossible.

This is confirmed also by the authority of Augustine who says (*Gen. ad lit. ii*): *That which truth shall make known can nowise be in opposition to the holy books whether of the Old or of the New Testament.*

From this we may evidently conclude that whatever arguments are alleged against the teachings of faith, they do not rightly proceed from the first self-evident principles instilled by nature. Wherefore they lack the force of demonstration, and are either probable or sophistical arguments, and consequently it is possible to solve them.

## CHAPTER VIII

### IN WHAT RELATION HUMAN REASON STANDS TO THE TRUTH OF FAITH

IT would also seem well to observe that sensible things from which human reason derives the source of its knowledge, retain a certain trace of likeness to God, but so imperfect that it proves altogether inadequate to manifest the substance itself of God. For effects resemble their causes according to their own mode, since like action proceeds from like agent; and yet the effect does not always reach to a perfect likeness to the agent. Accordingly human reason is adapted to the knowledge of the truth of faith, which can be known in the highest degree only by those who see the divine substance, in so far as it is able to put together certain probable arguments in support thereof, which nevertheless are insufficient to enable us to understand the aforesaid truth as

though it were demonstrated to us or understood by us in itself. And yet however weak these arguments may be, it is useful for the human mind to be practised therein, so long as it does not pride itself on having comprehended or demonstrated: since although our view of the sublimest things is limited and weak, it is most pleasant to be able to catch but a glimpse of them, as appears from what has been said.

The authority of Hilary is in agreement with this statement: for he says (*De Trin.*) while speaking of this same truth: *Begin by believing these things, advance and persevere; and though I know thou wilt not arrive, I shall rejoice at thy advance. For he who devoutly follows in pursuit of the infinite, though he never come up with it, will always advance by setting forth. Yet pry not into that secret, and meddle not in the mystery of the birth of the infinite, nor presume to grasp that which is the summit of understanding: but understand that there are things thou canst not grasp.*

## CHAPTER IX

### OF THE ORDER AND MODE OF PROCEDURE IN THIS WORK

ACCORDINGLY, from what we have been saying it is evident that the intention of the wise man must be directed to the twofold truth of divine things and to the refutation of contrary errors: and that the research of reason is able to reach to one of these, while the other surpasses every effort of reason. And I speak of a twofold truth of divine things, not on the part of God Himself Who is Truth one and simple, but on the part of our knowledge, the relation of which to the knowledge of divine things varies.

Wherefore in order to deduce the first kind of truth we must proceed by demonstrative arguments whereby we can convince our adversaries. But since such arguments are not available in support of the second kind of truth, our intention must be not to convince our opponent by our arguments, but to solve the arguments which he brings against the truth, because, as shown above, natural reason cannot be opposed to the truth of faith. In a special way may the opponent of this kind of truth be convinced by the authority of Scripture confirmed by God with miracles: since we believe not what is above human reason save because God has revealed it. In support, however, of this kind of truth, certain probable arguments must be adduced for the practice and help of the faithful, but not for the conviction of our opponents, because the very insufficiency of these arguments would rather confirm them in their error, if they thought that we assented to the truth of faith on account of such weak reasonings.

With the intention then of proceeding in the manner laid down, we shall first of all endeavour to declare that truth which is the object of faith's confession and of reason's researches, by adducing arguments both demonstrative and probable, some of which we have gathered from the writings of the philosophers and of holy men, so as thereby to confirm the truth and convince our opponents. After this, so as to proceed from the more to the less manifest, we shall with God's help proceed to declare that truth which surpasses reason, by refuting the arguments of our opponents, and by setting forth the truth of faith by means of probable arguments and authority.

Seeing then that we intend by the way of reason to pursue those things about God which human reason is able to investigate, the first object that offers itself to our consideration consists in those things which pertain to God in Himself; the second will be the procession of creatures from Him; and the third<sup>4</sup> the relation of creatures to Him as their end. Of those things which we need to consider about God in Himself, we must give the first place (this being the necessary

foundation of the whole of this work), to the question of demonstrating that there is a God: for unless this be established, all questions about divine things are out of court.

## CHAPTER X

OF THE OPINION OF THOSE WHO AVER THAT IT CANNOT BE DEMONSTRATED THAT THERE IS A GOD,  
SINCE THIS IS SELF-EVIDENT

POSSIBLY it will seem to some that it is useless to endeavour to show that there is a God: they say that it is self-evident that God is, so that it is impossible to think the contrary, and thus it cannot be demonstrated that there is a God. The reasons for this view are as follow. Those things are said to be self-evident which are known as soon as the terms are known: thus as soon as it is known what is a whole, and what is a part, it is known that the whole is greater than its part. Now such is the statement *God is*. For by this word *God* we understand a thing a greater than which cannot be thought of: this is what a man conceives in his mind when he hears and understands this word *God*: so that God must already be at least in his mind. Nor can He be in the mind alone, for that which is both in the mind and in reality is greater than that which is in the mind only. And the very signification of the word shows that nothing is greater than God. Wherefore it follows that it is self-evident that God is, since it is made clear from the very signification of the word.

Again. It is possible to think that there is a thing which cannot be thought not to exist: and such a thing is evidently greater than that which can be thought not to exist. Therefore if God can be thought not to exist, it follows that something can be thought greater than God: and this is contrary to the signification of the term. Therefore it remains that it is self-evident that God is.

Further. Those propositions are most evident in which the selfsame thing is predicated of itself, for instance: *Man is man*; or wherein the predicate is included in the definition of the subject, for instance: *Man is an animal*. Now, as we shall show further on, in God alone do we find that His being is His essence, as though the same were the answer to the question, *What is He?* as to the question, *Is He?* Accordingly when we say, *God is*, the predicate is either identified with the subject, or at least is included in the definition of the subject. And thus it will be self-evident that God is.

Moreover. Things that are known naturally are self-evident, for it is not by a process of research that they become evident. Now it is naturally known that God is, since man's desire tends naturally to God as his last end, as we shall show further on. Therefore it is self-evident that God is.

Again. That whereby all things are known must needs be self-evident. Now such is God. For just as the light of the sun is the principle of all visual perception, so the divine light is the principle of all intellectual knowledge, because it is therein that first and foremost intellectual light is to be found. Therefore it must needs be self-evident that God is.

On account of these and like arguments some are of opinion that it is so self-evident that God is, that it is impossible for the mind to think the contrary.

# BOOK FOUR: SALVATION

## FIRST PART

### PROLOGUE

BECAUSE the Master of Catholic Truth ought not only to teach the proficient, but also to instruct beginners (according to the Apostle: As Unto Little Ones in Christ, I Gave You Milk to Drink, Not Meat—1 Cor. 3:1, 2), we purpose in this book to treat of whatever belongs to the Christian Religion, in such a way as may tend to the instruction of beginners. We have considered that students in this Science have not seldom been hampered by what they have found written by other authors, partly on account of the multiplication of useless questions, articles, and arguments; partly also because those things that are needful for them to know are not taught according to the order of the subject-matter, but according as the plan of the book might require, or the occasion of the argument offer; partly, too, because frequent repetition brought weariness and confusion to the minds of the readers.

Endeavoring to avoid these and other like faults, we shall try, by God's help, to set forth whatever is included in this Sacred Science as briefly and clearly as the matter itself may allow.

### Chapter 1

translated by  
Charles J. O'Neil

### FOREWORD

Lo, these things are only outlines of His ways: and how small a whisper we hear of Him. The thunder of his power who can understand? (Job 26:14).

[Douay, altered:] Lo, these things are said in part of His ways: and seeing we have heard scarce a little drop of His word, who shall be able to behold the thunder of His greatness?

[1] The human intellect, to which it is connatural to derive its knowledge from sensible things, is not able through itself to reach the vision of the divine substance in itself, which is above all sensible things and, indeed, improportionately above all other things. Yet, because man's perfect

good is that he somehow know God, lest such a noble creature might seem to be created to no purpose, as being unable to reach its own end, there is given to man a certain way through which he can rise to the knowledge of God: so that, since the perfections of things descend in a certain order from the highest summit of things—God—man may progress in the knowledge of God by beginning with lower things and gradually ascending. Now, even in bodily movements, the way of descending is the same as the way of ascending, distinguished by beginning and end.

[2] There is a twofold account of the descent of perfections from God just mentioned. One account looks to the first origin of things: for divine Wisdom, to put perfection in things, produced them in such order that the universe of creatures should embrace the highest of things and the lowest. The other account comes from the things themselves. For, since causes are more noble than their effects, the very first caused things are lower than the First Cause, which is God, and still stand out above their effects. And so it goes until one arrives at the lowest of things. And because in the highest summit of things, God, one finds the most perfect unity—and because everything, the more it is one, is the more powerful and more worthy—it follows that the farther one gets from the first principle, the greater is the diversity and variation one finds in things. The process of emanation from God must, then, be unified in the principle itself, but multiplied in the lower things which are its terms. In this way, according to the diversity of things, there appears the diversity of the ways, as though these ways began in one principle and terminated in various ends.

[3] Through these ways our intellect can rise to the knowledge of God. But because of the weakness of the intellect we are not able to know perfectly even the ways themselves. For the sense, from which our knowledge begins, is occupied with external accidents, which are the proper sensibles—for example, color, odor, and the like. As a result, through such external accidents the intellect can scarcely reach the perfect knowledge of a lower nature, even in the case of those natures whose accidents it comprehends perfectly through the sense. Much less will the intellect arrive at comprehending the natures of those things of which we grasp few accidents by sense; and it will do so even less in the case of those things whose accidents cannot be grasped by the senses, though they may be perceived through certain deficient effects. But, even though the natures of things themselves were known to us, we can have only a little knowledge of their order, according as divine Providence disposes them in relation to one another and directs them to the end, since we do not come to know the plan of divine Providence. If, then, we imperfectly know the ways themselves, how shall we be able to arrive at a perfect knowledge of the source of these ways? And because that source transcends the above-mentioned ways beyond proportion, even if we knew the ways themselves perfectly we would yet not have within our grasp a perfect knowledge of the source.

[4] Therefore, since it was a feeble knowledge of God that man could reach in the ways mentioned—by a kind of intellectual glimpse, so to say—out of a superabundant goodness, therefore, so that man might have a firmer knowledge of Him, God revealed certain things about Himself that transcend the human intellect. In this revelation, in harmony with man, a certain order is preserved, so that little by little he comes from the imperfect to the perfect—just as happens in the rest of changeable things. First, therefore, these things are so revealed to man as, for all that, not to be understood, but only to be believed as heard, for the human intellect in this state in which it is connected with things sensible cannot be elevated entirely to gaze upon things which exceed every proportion of sense. But, when it shall have been freed from the connection with sensibles, then it will be elevated to gaze upon the things which are revealed.

[5] There is, then, in man a threefold knowledge of things divine. Of these, the first is that in which man, by the natural light of reason, ascends to a knowledge of God through creatures. The second is that by which the divine truth—exceeding the human intellect—descends on us in the manner of revelation, not, however, as something made clear to be seen, but as something spoken in words to be believed. The third is that by which the human mind will be elevated to gaze perfectly upon the things revealed.

[6] It is this threefold cognition which Job suggests in the words set down. The words, “Lo, these things are said in part of His ways,” refer to that knowledge by which our intellect ascends to a knowledge of God by the ways of creatures. And because we know these ways imperfectly, he rightly added: “in part.” “For we know in part,” as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 23:9).

[7] What is added, however, “and seeing we have heard scarce a little drop of His word,” refers to the second knowledge, in that the divine things we are to believe are revealed to us in, speech; “faith then,” as Romans (10:17) says, “comes by hearing; and hearing by the word of God.” Of this John (17:17) also says: “sanctify them in truth. Thy word is truth.” Thus, then, since the revealed truth is proposed not about divine things to be seen, but to be believed, Job rightly says: “we have heard.” But, since this imperfect knowledge flows down from that perfect knowledge wherein the divine Truth is seen in itself, while God reveals it to us through the ministry of angels who “see the face of the Father” (Mat. 18:10), Job rightly names it “a drop.” Hence, Joel (3:18) also says: “In that day the mountains shall drop down sweetness.” Since not all the mysteries known in the vision of the First Truth by the angels and the other blessed, but a certain few are revealed to us, Job adds significantly: “a little.” For Sirach (43:35-36) says: “Who shall magnify Him as He is from the beginning? There are many things hidden from us that are greater than these: for we have seen but a few of His words” And our Lord says to the disciples in John (11:12): “I have yet many things to say to you: but you cannot hear them now.” The few things also which are revealed to us are set forth in similitudes and the obscurities of words—as a result, only the studious arrive at any sort of grasp of them at all. Others, however, venerate them as things hidden, and unbelievers cannot attack them; hence, the Apostle says: “We see now through a glass in a dark manner” (1 Cor. 13:12). Significantly, then, does Job add “scarce” to bring out the difficulty.

[8] But this addition, “Who shall be able to behold the thunder of His greatness,” refers to the third kind of knowledge, in which the First Truth will be known, not as believed, but as seen; “We shall see Him as He is,” we read (1 John 3:2). So Job adds: “to behold.” Nor will one perceive some measure of the divine mysteries: the divine majesty itself will be seen and all the perfection of goods; hence, the Lord said to Moses: “I will shew you all good” (Ex. 33:19). Rightly, then, does Job say “greatness.” Nor will the truth be set before man hidden under any veils, but will be entirely manifest; hence, our Lord says to His disciples: “The hour cometh when I will no more speak to you in proverbs; but will shew you plainly of the Father” (John 16:25). Significantly, therefore, does Job speak of “the thunder” to suggest the manifestation.

[9] Now, the words set down fit our purpose. In what has preceded we have dealt with divine things according as the natural reason can arrive at the knowledge of divine things through creatures. This way is imperfect, nevertheless, and in keeping with the reason’s native capacity. That is why we can say with Job (26:14): “These things are said in part of His ways.” We must now deal with those divine things that have been divinely revealed to us to be believed, since they transcend the human intellect.

[10] And the manner of proceeding in such matters the words set down do teach us. For, since we have hardly heard the truth of this kind in sacred Scripture as a little drop descending upon us, and since one cannot in the state of this life behold the thunder of the greatness, this will be the method to follow: What has been passed on to us in the words of sacred Scripture may be taken as principles, so to say; thus, the things in those writings passed on to us in a hidden fashion we may endeavor to grasp mentally in some way or other, defending them from the attacks of the infidels. Nonetheless, that no presumption of knowing perfectly may be present, points of this kind must be proved from sacred Scripture, but not from natural reason. For all that, one must show that such things are not opposed to natural reason, in order to defend them from infidel attack. This was also the method fixed upon in the beginning of this work.

[11] But, since natural reason ascends to a knowledge of God through creatures and, conversely, the knowledge of faith descends from God to us by a divine revelation—since the way of ascent and descent is still the same—we must proceed in the same way in the things above reason which are believed as we proceeded in the foregoing with the investigation of God by reason. First, to be specific, we must treat of the things about God Himself which surpass reason and are proposed for belief: such is the confession of the Trinity; second, of course, the things which surpass reason that have been done by God, such as the work of the Incarnation and what follows thereon; third, however, the things surpassing reason which are looked for in the ultimate end of man, such as the resurrection and glorification of bodies, the everlasting beatitude of souls, and matters related to these.

## **Chapter 2**

### **THAT THERE IS GENERATION, PATERNITY, AND SONSHIP IN THE DIVINITY**

[1] Let us take the beginning of our study from the secret of the divine generation, and first set down what one must hold about it according to the testimonies of sacred Scripture. Then we may set out the arguments against the truth of the faith which unbelief has invented; by achieving the solution of these we will be pursuing the purpose of this study.

[2] Sacred Scripture, then, hands on to us the names of “paternity” and “sonship” in the divinity, insisting that Jesus Christ is the Son of God. One finds this most frequently in the books of the New Testament. Thus, Matthew (1: 27): “No one knows the Son but the Father: neither doth any one know the Father but the Son.” With this Mark begins his Gospel, saying: “The beginning of the gospel of Jesus Christ, the Son of God.” John the Evangelist also frequently points to this, for he says: “The Father loves the Son and He hath given all things into His hand” (3:35) and “As the Father raises up the dead, and gives life: so the Son also gives life to whom He will” (5:21). Paul the Apostle also frequently inserts these words, for he calls himself in Romans (1:1-3) “separated unto the gospel of God, which He had promised before by His prophets in the holy scriptures concerning His Son”; and says in Hebrews (1:1): “God, who, at sundry times and in divers manners, spoke in times past to the fathers by the prophets, last of all in these days hath spoken to us by His Son.”

[3] This is also given us, although more rarely, in the books of the Old Testament. Thus, Proverbs (30:4) says: “What is His name, and what is the name of His Son, if you know?” One reads it also in the Psalms (2:7; 88:27): “The Lord said to me: You are My Son”; and again: “He shall cry out to Me: You are My Father.”

[4] To be sure, some would like to twist these last two sayings into another sense, so as to refer “The Lord hath said to Me: You are My Son” to David; and so as to ascribe “He shall cry out to Me: You are My Father” to Solomon. Nevertheless, the additions in each instance show that this cannot be quite the case. For David cannot be fitted into this addition: “This day have I begotten You” (Ps. 2:7); nor into this one: “I will give You the Gentiles for your inheritance, and the utmost parts of the earth for your possession” (2:8); since David’s kingdom was not extended to the utmost parts of the earth, as the history of the Book of Kings shows. No more is the saying: “He shall cry out to Me: You are My Father” fitting to Solomon, since there follows: “I will make His rule to endure for evermore: and His throne as the days of heaven” (Ps. 88:30). Hence, one is given to understand that because some of the things joined to the texts mentioned are suitable to David and Solomon, some absolutely unsuitable, what is said of David and Solomon in these words is said, as customarily in Scripture, figuratively of that other in whom the whole is fulfilled.

[5] However, since the names of “Father” and “Son” follow on a generation, Scripture has not been silent about the very name of “divine generation.” For in the Psalm (2:7), as was said, one reads: “This day have I begotten You.” And Proverbs (8:24-25): “The depths were not as yet and I was already conceived: before the hills I was brought forth”; or, according to another reading: “Before all the hills did the Lord beget me.” And Isaiah (66:9, 8) also says: “Shall not I that make others to bring forth... Myself bring forth, saith the Lord? Shall I that give generation to others be barren, says the Lord your God?” We grant that one can say that this text must be related to the multiplication of the children of Israel returning from captivity into their own country, because earlier this is said: “Zion has been in labour and has brought forth her children.” But this does not defeat our purpose. For, however the essence of it be adapted, the essence of it which is given from the voice of God remains fixed and stable thus: If He Himself grants generation to others, He is not sterile. Nor would it become Him who makes others generate truly to generate Himself not truly but by a likeness. For a thing must be more nobly in its cause than in that which is caused, as was shown. Again, it says in John (1:14): “We saw His glory, the glory as it were of the only-begotten of the Father”; and later: “The only-begotten Son who is in the bosom of the Father, He has declared him” (1:18). And Paul says: “And again when He brings his first-begotten into the world He says: ‘And let all the angels of God adore Him’” (Heb. 1:6).

### **Chapter 3**

#### **THAT THE SON OF GOD IS GOD**

[1] Consideration must, of course, be given to the fact that the names mentioned are used by the divine Scripture in its exposition of the creation of things, for in Job (38:28-29) it says: “Who is the father of rain? Or who begot the drops of dew? Out of whose womb came the ice; and the frost from heaven who engendered it!” Therefore, lest nothing more be understood by the words for “paternity,” “sonship,” and “generation” than the efficacy of creation, the authority of Scripture added something: When it was naming Him “Son” and “begotten”, it was not silent about His being God, so that the generation mentioned might be understood as something more than creation. For John (1:1) says: “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.” That by the name “Word” one should understand Son is made plain in the sequel, for he adds: “The Word was made flesh and dwelt among us, and we saw His glory,



the glory as it were of the only-begotten of the Father” (1:14). And Paul says: “The goodness and kindness of God our Savior appeared” (Titus 3:4).

[2] Neither was the writing in the Old Testament silent about this; it named Christ God. For a Psalm (44:7-8) says: “Your throne, O God, is for ever and ever: the sceptre of your kingdom is a sceptre of uprightness. You loved justice, and hated iniquity.”—That this is spoken to Christ is clear from what follows: “Therefore God, your God, has anointed You with the oil of gladness above your fellows.” And Isaiah (9:6) says: “A Child is born to us, and a son is given to us, and the government is upon His shoulder: and His name shall be called, Wonderful, Counsellor, God the Mighty, the Father of the world to come, the Prince of peace.”

[3] Thus, then, are we taught from sacred Scripture that the Son of God, begotten of God, is God. And Peter confessed that Jesus Christ is the Son of God. He said: “You are Christ, the Son of the living God” (Mat. 16:16). He Himself, therefore, is both the Only-begotten and God.

## **Chapter 4**

### **THE OPINION OF PROTINUS ON THE SON OF GOD, AND ITS REFUTATION**

[1] Now, certain men, who perversely presumed to measure the truth of this doctrine by their own comprehension of it, conceived on the points just mentioned opinions both vain and various.

[2] Some among these took into consideration Scripture’s custom of calling those who are justified by divine grace “sons of God,” as in John (1:12): “He gave them power to be made the sons of God, to them that believe in His name.” And Romans (8:16) says: “The Spirit Himself gives testimony to our spirit, that we are the sons of God.” And 1 John (3: 1) : “Behold what manner of charity the Father has bestowed upon us, that we should be called, and should be the sons of God.” And Scripture does not hesitate to call these “begotten of God,” for it says in James (1:18): “For of His own will bath He begotten us by the word of truth”; and 1 John (3:9) says: “Whosoever is born of God commits not sin: for His seed abides in him.” Also, to the same men, which is more marvelous, the name of “divinity” is applied. For the Lord said to Moses: “I have appointed you the God of Pharaoh” (Ex. 7:1); and the Psalmist says: “I have said: You are gods and all of you the sons of the most High” (Ps. 81:6); and, as our Lmd ms: “He called them gods, to whom the word of God was spoken” (John 10:35).

[3] After this fashion, therefore, they formed the opinion that Jesus Christ was pure man, that He had had a beginning from the Virgin Mary, that by the merit of His blessed life He had received the honor of divinity above all others; and they thought that He was, like other men, a son of God by the spirit of adoption, begotten of God by grace, and by a kind of likeness to God called God in Scripture not by nature, but by partaking in the divine goodness, just as it says of the saints in 2 Peter (1:4): “That by these you may be made partakers of the divine nature: flying the corruption of that concupiscence which is in the world.”

[4] Such was the position they were trying to establish by the authority of sacred Scripture.

[5] For our Lord says in Matthew (28:18): “All power is given to Me in heaven and in earth.” But, if He were God before all times, He would not have received power in time.

[6] Again, Romans (1:34) says of the Son: “Who was made to Him,” to God, namely, “of the seed of David according to the flesh”; and says that He was “predestinated the Son of God in power.” But what was predestinated and was made seems not to be eternal.

[7] The Apostle also says (Phil. 2:8): “He humbled Himself, becoming obedient unto death, even to the death of the cross. For which cause God also bath exalted Him, and bath given Him a name which is above all names.” From this it appears clear that by the merit of His obedience and passion He was given divine honor and was exalted above all things.

[8] Peter also says: “Therefore let all the house of Israel know most certainly, that God bath made both Lord and Christ, this same Jesus, whom you crucified” (Acts 2:36). Therefore, it seems that He was made God in time, not born before time.

[9] They also bring in to shore up their opinion whatever Scripture says which seems to imply a defect in Christ: that He was carried in a woman’s womb, that He progressed in age, that He suffered hunger, was wearied with fatigue, and was subject to death; that He advanced in wisdom, confessed He did not know the day of judgment; that He was stricken with the fear of death; and other things of this sort which could not be in agreement with a God existing by His nature. Hence their conclusion: that by merit Christ acquired divine honor through grace and that He was not by nature divine.

[10] Now, this position was first invented by certain ancient heretics, Cerinthus and Ebion. later, Paul of Samosata renewed it; and later it was strengthened by Photinus, so that those who dogmatize thus are called Photinian.

[11] However, those who diligently examine the words of sacred Scripture do not find in them the meaning which these men have by their own opinion constructed. For, when Solomon says: “The depths were not as yet, and I was already conceived,” (Prov. 8:24), he makes it clear enough that this generation existed before all bodily things. Hence, it follows that the Son begotten by God received no beginning of being from Mary. To be sure, they endeavored to debase these and other like testimonies by their perverse exposition. These, they said, should be understood after the manner of predestination: that before the foundation of the world it was arranged that a Son of God should be born of the Virgin Mary, not that the Son of God had been before the world. But they are refuted by this: Not only in predestination, but in reality as well, He had been before Mary. For after the words of Solomon just quoted this is added: “When He balanced the foundations of the earth: I was with Him forming all things” (Prov. 8:29-30); but if He had been present in predestination only, He would have been able to do nothing. One gets this also from the words of John the Evangelist, for, when he had first set down: “In the beginning was the Word” (by which name the Son is understood as was shown) to keep anyone from taking this as predestination, he adds: “All things were made by Him: and without Him was made nothing” (1:1, 3); and this could not be true if He had not really existed before the world. Again, the Son of God says in John (3:13): “No man has ascended to heave except He who descended fro heaven, the Son of man who is in heaven”; again in John (6:38): “I came down from heaven, not to do my own will, but the will of Him who sent me.” Clearly, therefore, he was before He descended from heaven.

[12] There is more. According to the position described above, a man by the merit of his life advanced to being God. The Apostle shows, on the contrary, that when He was God He became man. For he says: ‘Who being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God:

but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men, and in habit found as a man” (Phil. 2:6). Therefore, the position described is in conflict with apostolic teaching.

[13] Furthermore, among all the rest of those who had the grace of God, Moses had it in abundance; it says of him in Exodus (33:11) : “The Lord spoke to Moses face to face, as a man speaks to his friend.” If, therefore, Jesus Christ is not said to be a son of God except by the grace of adoption, like other saints, on the same grounds Moses should be called son and Christ, even though Christ was endowed with more abundant grace: among the other saints, also, one is endowed with greater grace than another, but all are called sons of God on the same ground. But Moses is not called son on the same ground that Christ is so called, for the Apostle distinguishes Christ from Moses as the Son from the servant. He says in Hebrews (3:5-6): “Moses indeed was faithful in all His house as a servant, for a testimony of those things which were to be said: But Christ as the Son in His own house.” Manifestly, then, Christ is not called the Son of God by the grace of adoption, as other saints are.

[14] One can gather a similar understanding from several other places in Scripture, in which Christ is named in some singular way and prior to others as the Son of God. Sometimes singularly and without others He is named “Son”: as the voice of the Father thundered at the baptism: “This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased” (Mat. 3:17). Sometimes He is named “Only-begotten” as in John: “We saw His glory, the glory as it were of the only-begotten of the Father”; and again: “The only-begotten Son who is in the bosom of the Father, He has declared Him” (1:14, 18). If He were to be called son in some common fashion like others, He could not be called the Only-begotten. Sometimes, also, He is named “First-begotten” to show an overflowing of sonship from Him to others: as in Romans (8:29): ‘Whom He foreknew, He also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of His Son; that He might be the first-born amongst many brethren’; and Galatians (4:4-5) says: “God sent His Son that we might receive the adoption of sons. On another ground, therefore, is He a Son, through likeness to whose sonship others are called sons.

[15] In sacred Scripture, moreover, certain works are properly attributed to God, and in such wise that they cannot be assigned to another: such are the sanctification of souls and the remission of sins; for it is said in Leviticus (20:8): “I am the Lord that sanctify you”; and in Isaiah (45:25): “I am He that blot out your iniquities for My own sake.” Yet Scripture attributes each of these to Christ, for we read in Hebrews (2:11; 13:12): “Both he that sanctifies, and they who are sanctified, are all of one”; and again: “Jesus also, that He might sanctify the people by His own blood, suffered without the gate.” Our Lord Himself insisted that He had the “power to forgive sins,” and confirmed this by a miracle as is told in Matthew (9:16). This is also what the angel foretold of Him when he said: “He shall save His people from their sins” (Mat. 1:21). Christ, therefore, who both sanctifies and forgives sins, is not called God as they are called gods who are sanctified, and whose sins are forgiven, but as one who has the power and the nature of divinity.

[16] The Scriptural testimonies by which they tried to show that Christ was not God by nature are useless for establishing their proposition. For it is our confession that in Christ the Son of God, after the mystery of the Incarnation, there were two natures; namely, human and divine. And so, things are said of Him which are proper to God by reason of the divine nature, and things are also said which seem to involve deficiency by reason of the human nature, as will be

more fully explained later. But now, for the present consideration of the divine generation, let it suffice to have pointed out in accord with the Scriptures that Christ the Son of God is also called God, not only as a pure man is by the grace of adoption, but by reason Of the nature of divinity.

# SUMMA THEOLOGICA

## QUESTION I

### THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF SACRED DOCTRINE

(*In Ten Articles.*)

To place our purpose within proper limits, we first endeavor to investigate the nature and extent of this sacred doctrine. Concerning this there are ten points of inquiry:—

(1) Whether it is necessary? (2) Whether it is a science? (3) Whether it is one or many? (4) Whether it is speculative or practical? (5) How it is compared with other sciences? (6) Whether it is the same as wisdom? (7) Whether God is its subject-matter? (8) Whether it is a matter of argument? (9) Whether it rightly employs metaphors and similes? (10) Whether the Sacred Scripture of this doctrine may be expounded in different senses?

### FIRST ARTICLE

#### WHETHER, BESIDES PHILOSOPHY, ANY FURTHER DOCTRINE IS REQUIRED?

*We proceed thus to the First Article:—*

*Objection 1.* It seems that, besides philosophical science, we have no need of any further knowledge. For man should not seek to know what is above reason: *Seek not the things that are too high for thee* (Ecclus. 3:22). But whatever is not above reason is fully treated of in philosophical science. Therefore any other knowledge besides philosophical science is superfluous.

*Obj. 2.* Further, knowledge can be concerned only with being, for nothing can be known, save what is true; and all that is, is true. But everything that is, is treated of in philosophical science—even God Himself; so that there is a part of philosophy called theology, or the divine science, as Aristotle has proved (*Metaph. vi*). Therefore, besides philosophical science, there is no need of any further knowledge.

*On the contrary,* It is written (2 Tim. 3:16): *All Scripture inspired of God is profitable to teach, to reprove, to correct, to instruct in justice.* Now Scripture, inspired of God, is no part of philosophical science, which has been built up by human reason. Therefore it is useful that besides philosophical science there should be other knowledge—*i.e.*, inspired of God.

*I answer that,* It was necessary for man's salvation that there should be a knowledge revealed God, besides philosophical science built up by human reason. Firstly, indeed, because man is directed to God, as to an end that surpasses the grasp of his reason: *The eye hath not seen, O God, besides Thee, what things Thou hast prepared for them that wait for Thee* (Isa. 66:4). But the end must first be known by men who are to direct their thoughts and actions to the end. Hence it was necessary for the salvation of man that certain truths which exceed human reason should be made known to him by divine revelation. Even as regards those truths about God which human reason could have discovered, it was necessary that man should be taught by a divine revelation; because the truth about God such as reason could discover, would only be known by a few, and that after a long time, and with the admixture of many errors. Whereas man's whole salvation, which is in God, depends upon the knowledge of this truth. Therefore, in order that the salvation of men might be brought about more fitly and more surely, it was

necessary that they should be taught divine truths by divine revelation. It was therefore necessary that, besides philosophical science built up by reason there should be a sacred science learned through revelation.

*Reply Obj. 1.* Although those things which are beyond man's knowledge may not be sought for by man through his reason, nevertheless, once they are revealed by God they must be accepted by faith. Hence the sacred text continues, *For many things are shown to thee above the understanding of man* (Ecclus. 3:25). And in this the sacred science consists.

*Reply Obj. 2.* Sciences are differentiated according to the various means through which knowledge is obtained. For the astronomer and the physicist both may prove the same conclusion—that the earth, for instance, is round: the astronomer by means of mathematics (*i.e.*, abstracting from matter), but the physicist by means of matter itself. Hence there is no reason why those things which may be learned from philosophical science, so far as they can be known by natural reason, may not also be taught us by another science so far as they fall within revelation. Hence theology included in sacred doctrine differs in kind from that theology which is part of philosophy.<sup>1</sup>

## SIXTH ARTICLE

### WHETHER THIS DOCTRINE IS THE SAME AS WISDOM?

*We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—*

*Objection 1.* It seems that this doctrine is not the same as wisdom. For no doctrine which borrows its principles is worthy of the name of wisdom; seeing that the wise man directs, and is not directed (*Metaph.* i). But this doctrine borrows its principles. Therefore this science is not wisdom.

*Obj. 2.* Further, it is a part of wisdom to prove the principles of other sciences. Hence it is called the chief of sciences, as is clear in *Ethic.* vi. But this doctrine does not prove the principles of other sciences. Therefore it is not the same as wisdom.

*Obj. 3.* Further, this doctrine is acquired by study, whereas wisdom is acquired by God's inspiration; so that it is numbered among the gifts of the Holy Spirit (Isa. 11:2). Therefore this doctrine is not the same as wisdom.

*On the contrary,* It is written (Deut. 4:6): *This is your wisdom and understanding in the sight of nations.*

*I answer that,* This doctrine is wisdom above all human wisdom; not merely in any one order, but absolutely. For since it is the part of a wise man to arrange and to judge, and since lesser matters should be judged in the light of some higher principle, he is said to be wise in any one order who considers the highest principle in that order: thus in the order of building he who plans the form of the house is called wise and architect, in opposition to the inferior laborers who trim the wood and make ready the stones: *As a wise architect I have laid the foundation* (1 Cor. 3:10). Again, in the order of all human life, the prudent man is called wise, inasmuch as he directs his acts to a fitting end: *Wisdom is prudence to a man* (Prov. 10:23). Therefore he who considers absolutely the highest cause of the whole universe, namely God, is most of all called wise. Hence wisdom is said to be the knowledge of divine things, as Augustine says (*De Trin.*

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<sup>1</sup> Thomas Aquinas, S., & Fathers of the English Dominican Province. (2009). *Summa theologica* (Complete English ed.). Bellingham, WA: Logos Research Systems, Inc.

xii. 14). But sacred doctrine essentially treats of God viewed as the highest cause—not only so far as He can be known through creatures just as philosophers knew Him—*That which is known of God is manifest in them* (Rom. 1:19)—but also so far as He is known to Himself alone and revealed to others. Hence sacred doctrine is especially called wisdom.

*Reply Obj.* 1. Sacred doctrine derives its principles not from any human knowledge, but from the divine knowledge, through which, as through the highest wisdom, all our knowledge is set in order.

*Reply Obj.* 2. The principles of other sciences either are evident and cannot be proved, or are proved by natural reason through some other science. But the knowledge proper to this science comes through revelation, and not through natural reason. Therefore it has no concern to prove the principles of other sciences, but only to judge of them. Whatsoever is found in other sciences contrary to any truth of this science, must be condemned as false: *Destroying counsels and every height that exalteth itself against the knowledge of God* (2 Cor. 10:4, 5).

*Reply Obj.* 3. Since judgment appertains to wisdom, the twofold manner of judging produces a twofold wisdom. A man may judge in one way by inclination, as whoever has the habit of a virtue judges rightly of what concerns that virtue by his very inclination towards it. Hence it is the virtuous man, as we read, who is the measure and rule of human acts. In another way, by knowledge, just as a man learned in moral science might be able to judge rightly about virtuous acts, though he had not the virtue. The first manner of judging divine things belongs to that wisdom which is set down among the gifts of the Holy Ghost: *The spiritual man judgeth all things* (1 Cor. 2:15). And Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* ii.): *Hierotheus is taught not by mere learning, but by experience of divine things*. The second manner of judging belongs to this doctrine, which is acquired by study, though its principles are obtained by revelation.<sup>2</sup>

## QUESTION XVI

### OF TRUTH (In Eight Articles.)

SINCE knowledge is of things that are true, after the consideration of the knowledge of God, we must inquire concerning truth. About this there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether truth resides in the thing, or only in the intellect? (2) Whether it resides only in the intellect composing and dividing? (3) On the comparison of the true to being. (4) On the comparison of the true to the good. (5) Whether God is truth? (6) Whether all things are true by one truth, or by many? (7) On the eternity of truth. (8) On the unchangeableness of truth.

### FIRST ARTICLE

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<sup>2</sup> Thomas Aquinas, S., & Fathers of the English Dominican Province. (2009). *Summa theologiae* (Complete English ed.). Bellingham, WA: Logos Research Systems, Inc.

## WHETHER TRUTH RESIDES ONLY IN THE INTELLECT?

*We proceed thus to the First Article:—*

*Objection 1.* It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect, but rather in things. For Augustine (*Soliloq.* ii. 5) condemns this definition of truth, *That is true which is seen*; since it would follow that stones hidden in the bosom of the earth would not be true stones, as they are not seen. He also condemns the following, *That is true which is as it appears to the knower, who is willing and able to know*, for hence it would follow that nothing would be true, unless someone could know it. Therefore he defines truth thus: *That is true which is*. It seems, then, that truth resides in things, and not in the intellect.

*Obj. 2.* Further, whatever is true, is true by reason of truth. If, then, truth is only in the intellect, nothing will be true except in so far as it is understood. But this is the error of the ancient philosophers, who said that whatever seems to be true is so. Consequently mutual contradictories can be true at the same time, since contradictories seem to be true as seen by different persons at the same time.

*Obj. 3.* Further, *that, on account of which a thing is so, is itself more so*, as is evident from the Philosopher (*Poster.* i). But it is from the fact that a thing is or is not, that our thought or word is true or false, as the Philosopher teaches (*Prædicam.* iii). Therefore truth resides rather in things than in the intellect.

*On the contrary,* The Philosopher says (*Metaph.* vi), *The true and the false reside not in things, but in the intellect.*

*I answer that,* As the good denotes that towards which the appetite tends, so the true denotes that towards which the intellect tends. Now there is this difference between the appetite and the intellect, or any knowledge whatsoever, that knowledge is according as the thing known is in the knower, whilst appetite is according as the desirer tends towards the thing desired. Thus the term of the appetite, namely good, is in the object desirable, and the term of the intellect, namely true, is in the intellect itself. Now as good exists in a thing so far as that thing is related to the appetite—and hence the aspect of goodness passes on from the desirable thing to the appetite, in so far as the appetite is called good if its object is good; so, since the true is in the intellect in so far as it is conformed to the object understood, the aspect of the true must needs pass from the intellect to the object understood, so that also the thing understood is said to be true in so far as it has some relation to the intellect. Now a thing understood may be in relation to an intellect either essentially or accidentally. It is related essentially to an intellect on which it depends as regards its essence; but accidentally to an intellect by which it is knowable; even as we may say that a house is related essentially to the intellect of the architect, but accidentally to the intellect upon which it does not depend.

Now we do not judge of a thing by what is in it accidentally, but by what is in it essentially. Hence, everything is said to be true absolutely, in so far as it is related to the intellect from which it depends; and thus it is that artificial things are said to be true as being related to our intellect. For a house is said to be true that expresses the likeness of the form in the architect's mind; and words are said to be true so far as they are the signs of truth in the intellect. In the same way natural things are said to be true in so far as they express the likeness of the species that are in the divine mind. For a stone is called true, which possesses the nature proper to a stone, according to the preconception in the divine intellect. Thus, then, truth resides primarily in the intellect, and secondarily in things according as they are related to the intellect as their principle. Consequently there are various definitions of truth. Augustine says (*De Vera Relig.* xxxvi), *Truth is that whereby is made manifest that which is*; and Hilary says (*De Trin.* v) that *Truth makes*



*being clear and evident*: and this pertains to truth according as it is in the intellect. As to the truth of things in so far as they are related to the intellect, we have Augustine's definition (*loc. cit.*), *Truth is a supreme likeness without any unlikeness to a principle*: also Anselm's definition (*De Verit.* xii), *Truth is rightness, perceptible by the mind alone*; for that is right which is in accordance with the principle; also Avicenna's definition (*Metaph.* viii. 6), *The truth of each thing is a property of the essence which is immutably attached to it*. The definition that *Truth is the equation of thought and thing* is applicable to it under either aspect.

*Reply Obj.* 1. Augustine is speaking about the truth of things, and excludes from the notion of this truth, relation to our intellect; for what is accidental is excluded from every definition.

*Reply Obj.* 2. The ancient philosophers held that the species of natural things did not proceed from any intellect, but were produced by chance. But as they saw that truth implies relation to intellect, they were compelled to base the truth of things on their relation to our intellect. From this, conclusions result that are inadmissible, and which the Philosopher refutes (*Metaph.* iv). Such, however, do not follow, if we say that the truth of things consists in their relation to the divine intellect.

*Reply Obj.* 3. Although the truth of our intellect is caused by the thing, yet it is not necessary that truth should be there primarily, any more than that health should be primarily in medicine, rather than in the animal: for the virtue of medicine, and not its health, is the cause of health, for here the agent is not univocal. In the same way the being of the thing, not its truth, is the cause of truth in the intellect. Hence the Philosopher says that a thought or word is true *from the fact that a thing is, not because a thing is true*.<sup>3</sup>

## QUESTION 17: FALSITY

### FOURTH ARTICLE

#### WHETHER TRUE AND FALSE ARE CONTRARIES?

*We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—*

*Objection* 1. It seems that true and false are not contraries. For true and false are opposed, as that which is to that which is not; for *truth*, as Augustine says (*Soliloq.* ii. 5), *is that which is*. But that which is and that which is not are not opposed as contraries. Therefore true and false are not contrary things.

*Obj.* 2. Further, one of two contraries is not in the other. But falsity is in truth, because, as Augustine says, (*Soliloq.* ii. 10), *A tragedian would not be a false Hector, if he were not a true tragedian*. Therefore true and false are not contraries.

*Obj.* 3. Further, in God there is no contrariety, for *nothing is contrary to the Divine Substance*, as Augustine says (*De civ. Dei.* xii. 2). But falsity is opposed to God, for an idol is called in Scripture a lie, *They have laid hold on lying* (Jer. 8:5), that is to say, *an idol*, as a gloss says. Therefore false and true are not contraries.

*On the contrary*, The Philosopher says (*Peri Herm.* ii), that a false opinion is contrary to a true one.

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<sup>3</sup> Thomas Aquinas, S., & Fathers of the English Dominican Province. (2009). *Summa theologica* (Complete English ed.). Bellingham, WA: Logos Research Systems, Inc.

*I answer that,* True and false are opposed as contraries, and not, as some have said, as affirmation and negation. In proof of which it must be considered that negation neither asserts anything nor determines any subject, and can therefore be said of being as of not-being, for instance not-seeing or not-sitting. But privation asserts nothing, whereas it determines its subject, for it is *negation in a subject*, as stated in *Metaph.* iv. 4: v. 27; for blindness is not said except of one whose nature it is to see. Contraries, however, both assert something and determine the subject, for blackness is a species of color. Falsity asserts something, for a thing is false, as the Philosopher says (*Metaph.* iv. 27), inasmuch as something is said or seems to be something that it is not, or not to be what it really is. For as truth implies an adequate apprehension of a thing, so falsity implies the contrary. Hence it is clear that true and false are contraries.

*Reply Obj.* 1. What is in things is the truth of the thing; but what is apprehended, is the truth of the intellect, wherein truth primarily resides. Hence the false is that which is not as apprehended. To apprehend being, and not-being, implies contrariety; for, as the Philosopher proves (*Peri Herm.* ii), the contrary of this statement *Good is good* is, *Good is not good*.

*Reply Obj.* 2. Falsity is not founded in the truth which is contrary to it, just as evil is not founded in the good which is contrary to it, but in that which is its proper subject. This happens in either, because true and good are universals, and convertible with being. Hence, as every privation is founded in a subject, that is a being, so every evil is founded in some good, and every falsity in some truth.

*Reply Obj.* 3. Because contraries, and opposites by way of privation, are by nature about one and the same thing, therefore there is nothing contrary to God, considered in Himself, either with respect to His goodness or His truth, for in His intellect there can be nothing false. But in our apprehension of Him contraries exist, for the false opinion concerning Him is contrary to the true. So idols are called lies, opposed to the divine truth, inasmuch as the false opinion concerning them is contrary to the true opinion of the divine unity.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Thomas Aquinas, S., & Fathers of the English Dominican Province. (2009). *Summa theologiae* (Complete English ed.). Bellingham, WA: Logos Research Systems, Inc.

## Proverbs:

### Chapter 4

- <sup>1</sup> Hear, O children, a father's instruction,  
be attentive, that you may gain understanding!
- <sup>2</sup> Yes, excellent advice I give you;  
my teaching do not forsake.
- <sup>3</sup> When I was my father's child,  
frail, yet the darling of my mother,
- <sup>4</sup> He taught me, and said to me:  
"Let your heart hold fast my words:  
keep my commands, that you may live!"
- <sup>5</sup> "Get wisdom, get understanding!  
Do not forget or turn aside from the words I utter.
- <sup>6</sup> Forsake her not, and she will preserve you;  
love her, and she will safeguard you;
- <sup>7</sup> The beginning of wisdom is: get wisdom;  
at the cost of all you have, get understanding.
- <sup>8</sup> Extol her, and she will exalt you;  
she will bring you honors if you embrace her;
- <sup>9</sup> She will put on your head a graceful diadem;  
a glorious crown will she bestow on you."
- <sup>10</sup> Hear, my son, and receive my words,  
and the years of your life shall be many.
- <sup>11</sup> On the way of wisdom I direct you,  
I lead you on straightforward paths.
- <sup>12</sup> When you walk, your step will not be impeded,  
and should you run, you will not stumble.
- <sup>13</sup> Hold fast to instruction, never let her go;  
keep her, for she is your life.
- <sup>14</sup> The path of the wicked enter not,  
walk not on the way of evil men;
- <sup>15</sup> Shun it, cross it not,  
turn aside from it, and pass on.
- <sup>16</sup> For they cannot rest unless they have done evil;  
to have made no one stumble steals away their sleep.
- <sup>17</sup> For they eat the bread of wickedness  
and drink the wine of violence.
- <sup>19</sup> The way of the wicked is like darkness;  
they know not on what they stumble.
- <sup>18</sup> But the path of the just is like shining light,  
that grows in brilliance till perfect day.
- <sup>20</sup> My son, to my words be attentive,

to my sayings incline your ear;  
21 Let them not slip out of your sight,  
keep them within your heart;  
22 For they are life to those who find them,  
to man's whole being they are health.  
23 With closest custody, guard your heart,  
for in it are the sources of life.  
24 Put away from you dishonest talk,  
deceitful speech put far from you.  
25 Let your eyes look straight ahead  
and your glance be directly forward.  
26 Survey the path for your feet,  
and let all your ways be sure.  
27 Turn neither to right nor to left,  
keep your foot far from evil.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Confraternity of Christian Doctrine. Board of Trustees, Catholic Church. National Conference of Catholic Bishops, & United States Catholic Conference. Administrative Board. (1996). *The New American Bible: Translated from the original languages with critical use of all the ancient sources and the revised New Testament* (Pr 4:1–27). Confraternity of Christian Doctrine.

# Constitution of the Order

## Chapter III

### ON STUDY

#### Art. I. -- On the Importance of Study and its Sources

76. St. Dominic included study, ordained to the ministry of salvation, as an essential part of his plan for the Order: in this was no small innovation.<sup>26</sup> He, who himself always carried with him the Gospel of St. Matthew and the Epistles of Saint Paul,<sup>27</sup> directed the brethren to schools,<sup>28</sup> and sent them to the major cities "so that they might study, preach, and establish a convent."<sup>29</sup>

77. I. Hence "before all else, our study should aim principally and ardently at this that we might be able to be useful to the souls of our neighbors."<sup>30</sup>

II. By study the brethren consider in their heart the manifold wisdom of God and prepare themselves for the doctrinal service of the Church and of all mankind. It is all the more fitting that they should devote themselves to study, because from the tradition of the Order they are more specially called to cultivate mankind's inclination toward truth.

III. Study of this kind must be pursued according to the different requirements of each subject; it requires strict discipline and the application of all one's abilities.

78. The light and source of our study is God, who spoke in former times and in different ways, and last of all speaks in Christ, through whom the mystery of the Father's will, after the sending of the Spirit, is fully revealed in the Church and enlightens the minds of all people.

79. The brethren should contemplate and study divine revelation of which Sacred Scripture and Tradition constitute a single sacred deposit, and from the perennial instructional value of its overall plan, they should learn to discover the many paths of gospel truth, even in created things, in human works and institutions, as well as in different religions.

80. In all things the brethren should think with the Church and exhibit allegiance to the varied

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exercise of the Magisterium to which is entrusted the authentic interpretation of the word of God. Furthermore, faithful to the Order's mission, they should always be prepared to provide with special dedication cooperative service to the Magisterium in fulfilling their doctrinal obligations.

81. The brethren should study attentively the writings of the Fathers of the Church and distinguished witnesses of Christian thought who, with the help of different cultures and the wisdom of the philosophers, labored to understand the word of God more fully. Following their thinking, the brethren should respectfully listen to the living tradition of the Church, seek dialogue with the learned, and open their mind to contemporary discoveries and problems.

82. The best teacher and model in fulfilling this duty is St. Thomas, whose teaching the Church commends in a unique way and the Order receives as a patrimony which exercises an enriching influence on the intellectual life of the brethren and confers on the Order a special character.

Consequently, the brethren should develop a genuine familiarity with his writings and thought, and, according to the needs of the time and with legitimate freedom, they should

renew and enrich his teaching with the continually fresh riches of sacred and human wisdom.

83. Continuous study nourishes contemplation, encourages fulfillment of the counsels with shining fidelity, constitutes a form of asceticism by its own perseverance and difficulty, and, as an essential element of our whole life, it is an excellent religious observance.

