

Novice Class Module 4

Theme: The Means - *The Evangelical Counsels*

Assignment

1. Mt. 6:24, 19:1-30
2. Supplemental: *Treatise on Divine Love*, St. Francis de Sales, Book VIII, Chapters V-IX (Not required but St. Francis provides an excellent introduction to the commandments and counsels.
3. St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologia* Part 1 of 2, Question 108, Article 4; Part 2 of 2, Question 19, Article 12, Question 104, Question 151 to 154, Article 5

24 "No one can serve two masters; for either he will hate the one and love the other, or he will be devoted to the one and despise the other. You cannot serve God and mammon. Mt 6:24, RSV

1 Now when Jesus had finished these sayings, he went away from Galilee and entered the region of Judea beyond the Jordan;

2 and large crowds followed him, and he healed them there.

3 And Pharisees came up to him and tested him by asking, "Is it lawful to divorce one's wife for any cause?"

4 He answered, "Have you not read that he who made them from the beginning made them male and female,

5 and said, 'For this reason a man shall leave his father and mother and be joined to his wife, and the two shall become one flesh'?

6 So they are no longer two but one flesh. What therefore God has joined together, let not man put asunder."

7 They said to him, "Why then did Moses command one to give a certificate of divorce, and to put her away?"

8 He said to them, "For your hardness of heart Moses allowed you to divorce your wives, but from the beginning it was not so.

1 When Jesus had finished saying these things, he left Galilee and went into the region of Judea to the other side of the Jordan.

2 Large crowds followed him, and he healed them there.

3 Some Pharisees came to him to test him. They asked, "Is it lawful for a man to divorce his wife for any and every reason?"

4 "Haven't you read," he replied, "that at the beginning the Creator 'made them male and female,'

5 and said, 'For this reason a man will leave his father and mother and be united to his wife, and the two will become one flesh' ?

6 So they are no longer two, but one. Therefore what God has joined together, let man not separate."

7 "Why then," they asked, "did Moses command that a man give his wife a certificate of divorce and send her away?"

8 Jesus replied, "Moses permitted you to divorce your wives because your hearts were hard. But it was not this way from the beginning.

9 And I say to you: whoever divorces his wife, except for unchastity, and marries another, commits adultery."

10 The disciples said to him, "If such is the case of a man with his wife, it is not expedient to marry."

11 But he said to them, "Not all men can receive this saying, but only those to whom it is given.

12 For there are eunuchs who have been so from birth, and there are eunuchs who have been made eunuchs by men, and there are eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs for the sake of the kingdom of heaven. He who is able to receive this, let him receive it."

13 Then children were brought to him that he might lay his hands on them and pray. The disciples rebuked the people;

14 but Jesus said, "Let the children come to me, and do not hinder them; for to such belongs the kingdom of heaven."

15 And he laid his hands on them and went away.

16 And behold, one came up to him, saying, "Teacher, what good deed must I do, to have eternal life?"

17 And he said to him, "Why do you ask me about what is good? One there is who is good. If you would enter life, keep the commandments."

18 He said to him, "Which?" And Jesus said, "You shall not kill, You shall not commit adultery, You shall not steal, You shall not bear false witness,

19 Honor your father and mother, and, You

9 I tell you that anyone who divorces his wife, except for marital unfaithfulness, and marries another woman commits adultery."

10 The disciples said to him, "If this is the situation between a husband and wife, it is better not to marry."

11 Jesus replied, "Not everyone can accept this word, but only those to whom it has been given.

12 For some are eunuchs because they were born that way; others were made that way by men; and others have renounced marriage because of the kingdom of heaven. The one who can accept this should accept it."

13 Then little children were brought to Jesus for him to place his hands on them and pray for them. But the disciples rebuked those who brought them.

14 Jesus said, "Let the little children come to me, and do not hinder them, for the kingdom of heaven belongs to such as these."

15 When he had placed his hands on them, he went on from there.

16 Now a man came up to Jesus and asked, "Teacher, what good thing must I do to get eternal life?"

17 "Why do you ask me about what is good?" Jesus replied. "There is only One who is good. If you want to enter life, obey the commandments."

18 "Which ones?" the man inquired. Jesus replied, " 'Do not murder, do not commit adultery, do not steal, do not give false testimony,

19 honor your father and mother,' and 'love

shall love your neighbor as yourself."

20 The young man said to him, "All these I have observed; what do I still lack?"

21 Jesus said to him, "If you would be perfect, go, sell what you possess and give to the poor, and you will have treasure in heaven; and come, follow me."

22 When the young man heard this he went away sorrowful; for he had great possessions.

23 And Jesus said to his disciples, "Truly, I say to you, it will be hard for a rich man to enter the kingdom of heaven.

24 Again I tell you, it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of God."

25 When the disciples heard this they were greatly astonished, saying, "Who then can be saved?"

26 But Jesus looked at them and said to them, "With men this is impossible, but with God all things are possible."

27 Then Peter said in reply, "Lo, we have left everything and followed you. What then shall we have?"

28 Jesus said to them, "Truly, I say to you, in the new world, when the Son of man shall sit on his glorious throne, you who have followed me will also sit on twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel.

29 And every one who has left houses or brothers or sisters or father or mother or children or lands, for my name's sake, will receive a hundredfold, and inherit eternal life.

30 But many that are first will be last, and the last first.

your neighbor as yourself.' "

20 "All these I have kept," the young man said. "What do I still lack?"

21 Jesus answered, "If you want to be perfect, go, sell your possessions and give to the poor, and you will have treasure in heaven. Then come, follow me."

22 When the young man heard this, he went away sad, because he had great wealth.

23 Then Jesus said to his disciples, "I tell you the truth, it is hard for a rich man to enter the kingdom of heaven.

24 Again I tell you, it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of God."

25 When the disciples heard this, they were greatly astonished and asked, "Who then can be saved?"

26 Jesus looked at them and said, "With man this is impossible, but with God all things are possible."

27 Peter answered him, "We have left everything to follow you! What then will there be for us?"

28 Jesus said to them, "I tell you the truth, at the renewal of all things, when the Son of Man sits on his glorious throne, you who have followed me will also sit on twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel.

29 And everyone who has left houses or brothers or sisters or father or mother or children or fields for my sake will receive a hundred times as much and will inherit eternal life.

30 But many who are first will be last, and many who are last will be first.

Treatise of the Love of God
St. Francis de Sales

Book VIII

***OF THE LOVE OF CONFORMITY, BY WHICH WE UNITE OUR WILL TO
THE WILL OF GOD, SIGNIFIED UNTO US BY HIS COMMANDMENTS,
COUNSELS AND INSPIRATIONS.***



CHAPTER V.

***OF THE CONFORMITY OF OUR WILL TO THAT WILL OF GOD'S
WHICH IS SIGNIFIED TO US BY HIS COMMANDMENTS.***

The desire which God has to make us observe his commandments is extreme, as the whole Scripture witnesses. And how could he better express it, than by the great rewards which he proposes to the observers of his law, and the awful punishments with which he threatens those who shall violate the same! This made David cry out: O Lord, thou hast commanded thy Commandments to be kept most diligently. [360]

Now the love of complacency, beholding this divine desire, wills to please God by observing it; the love of benevolence which submits all to God, consequently submits our desires and wills to that will which God has signified to us; and hence springs not only the observance, but also the love of the commandments, which David extraordinarily extols in Psalm cxviii., which he seems only to have composed for this object: O how have I loved thy law, O Lord! It is my meditation all the day Therefore have I loved thy commandments above gold and the topaz How sweet are thy words to my palate, more than honey to my mouth. [361]

But to stir up in us this holy and salutary love of the commandments, we must contemplate their admirable beauty: for, as there are works which are bad because they are prohibited, and others which are prohibited because they are bad; so there are some that are good, because they are commanded, and others that are commanded because they are good and very useful. So that all of them are exceeding good and worthy of love, because the commandment gives goodness to such as were not otherwise good, and gives an increase of goodness to those others which even if not commanded would not cease to be good. We do not take good in good part, when it is presented by an enemy's hand. The Lacedæmonians would not follow solid and wholesome advice coming from a wicked person, till it was repeated to them by a good man. On the contrary, a friend's present is always grateful. The sweetest commandments become bitter when they are imposed by a tyrannical and cruel heart; and they become most amiable when ordained

by love. Jacob's service seemed a royalty unto him, because it proceeded from love. O how sweet and how much to be desired is the yoke of the heavenly law, established by so amiable a king!

Many keep the commandments as sick men take medicines, more from fear of dying in a state of damnation, than from love of living according to our Saviour's pleasure. But as some persons have an aversion for physic, be it never, so agreeable, only because it bears the name of physic, so there are some souls who abhor things commanded simply because they are commanded: and there was a certain man, 'tis said, who, having lived quietly in the great city of Paris for the space of fourscore years without ever going out of it, as soon as it was enjoined him by the king that he should remain there the rest of his days, went abroad to see the country, which in his whole lifetime before he had not desired.

On the contrary, the loving heart loves the commandments; and the harder they are, the more sweet and agreeable it finds them, because it more perfectly pleases the beloved, and gives him more honour. It pours forth and sings hymns of joy when God teaches it his commandments and justifications. And as the pilgrim who merrily sings on his way adds indeed the exertion of singing to that of walking, and yet actually, by this increase of labour, unwearies himself, and lightens the hardship of the way; even so the sacred lover finds such sweetness in the commandments, that nothing so much eases and refreshes him, as the gracious load of the precepts of his God. Whereupon the holy Psalmist cries out: O Lord, thy justifications, or commandments, were the subject of my song in the place of my pilgrimage. [362] It is said that mules and horses laden with figs presently fall under their burden and lose all their strength: more sweet than figs is the law of our Lord, but brutal man who is become as the horse and the mule which have no understanding, loses courage and finds not strength to bear this dear burden. But as a branch of Agnus Castus keeps the traveller that bears it about him from being weary, so the cross, the mortification, the yoke, the law of our Saviour, who is the true Chaste Lamb, is a burden which unwearies, refreshes and recreates the hearts that love his divine Majesty. There is no labour where love is, or if there be any, it is a beloved labour. Labour mixed with love is a certain bitter-sweet, more pleasant to the palate than a thing purely sweet.

Thus then does heavenly love conform us to the will of God, and make us carefully observe his commandments, as being the absolute desire of his divine Majesty whom we will to please. So that this complacency with its sweet and amiable violence, foreruns that necessity of obeying which the law imposes upon us, converting this necessity into the virtue of love, and every difficulty into delight.

Book VIII

OF THE LOVE OF CONFORMITY, BY WHICH WE UNITE OUR WILL TO THE WILL OF GOD, SIGNIFIED UNTO US BY HIS COMMANDMENTS, COUNSELS AND INSPIRATIONS.



CHAPTER VI. OF THE CONFORMITY OF OUR WILL TO THAT WILL OF GOD WHICH IS SIGNIFIED UNTO US BY HIS COUNSELS.

A Commandment testifies a most entire and absolute will in him who gives it, but counsel only represents a will of desire: a commandment obliges us, counsel only invites us; a commandment makes the transgressors thereof culpable; counsel only makes such as do not follow it less worthy of praise; those who violate commandments deserve damnation, those who neglect counsels deserve only to be less glorified. There is a difference between commanding and recommending: in commanding we use authority to oblige, but in recommending we use friendliness to induce and incite: a commandment imposes necessity, counsel and recommendation induce to what is of greater utility: commandments correspond to obedience, counsels to credence: we follow counsel with intention to please, and commandments lest we should displease. And thence it is that the love of complacency which obliges us to please the beloved, consequently urges us to follow his counsels, and the love of benevolence, which desires that all wills and affections should be subjected unto him, causes that we not only will what he ordains, but also what he counsels and exhorts to: as the love and respect which a good child bears to his father make him resolve to live not only according to the commandments which his father imposes, but also according to the desires and inclinations which he manifests.

A counsel is indeed given for the benefit of him who receives it, to the end that he may become perfect: If thou wilt be perfect, said our Saviour, go sell all that thou hast, give it to the poor, and come, follow me. [363] But the

loving heart does not receive a counsel for its utility, but to conform itself to the desire of him who gives the counsel, and to render him the homage due to his will. And therefore it receives not counsels but in such sort as God desires, nor does God desire that every one should observe all counsels, but such only as are suitable, according to the diversity of persons, times, occasions, strengths, as charity requires: for she it is who, as queen of all the virtues, of all the commandments, of all the counsels, and, in short, of all Christian laws and works, gives to all of them their rank, order, season and worth.

If your assistance be truly necessary to your father or mother to enable them to live, it is no time then to practise the counsel of retiring into a monastery, for charity ordains that you presently put into execution its command of honouring, serving, aiding and succouring your father or your mother. You are perhaps a prince, by whose posterity the subjects of your crown are to be preserved in peace, and assured against tyranny, sedition, civil wars: the effecting, therefore, of so great a good, obliges you to beget lawful successors in a holy marriage. It is either not to lose chastity, or at least to lose it chastely, when for love of charity it is sacrificed to the public good. Are you weak and uncertain in your health, and does it require great support? Do not then voluntarily undertake actual poverty, for this is forbidden you by charity. Charity not only forbids fathers of families to sell all and give it to the poor, but also commands them honestly to gather together what is requisite for the support and education of wife, children and servants: as also it commands kings and princes to lay up treasures, which, being acquired by a laudible frugality, and not by tyrannical measures, serve as wholesome defences against visible enemies. Does not S. Paul counsel such as are married, that, the time of prayer being ended, they should return to the well-ordered course of their married life? [364]

The counsels are all given for the perfection of the Christian people, but not for that of each Christian in particular. There are circumstances which make them sometimes impossible, sometimes unprofitable, sometimes perilous, sometimes hurtful to some men, which is one of the reasons why Our Saviour said of one of the counsels, what he would have to be understood of them all: He that can receive it, let him receive it: [365] as though he had said, according to S. Jerome's exposition: he that can win and bear away the honour of chastity as a prize of renown, let him take it, for it is proposed to such as shall run valiantly. Not every one then is able, that is, it is not expedient for every one, to observe always all the counsels, for as they are granted in favour of charity, so is this the rule and measure by which they are put in practice.

When, therefore, charity so orders, monks and religious are drawn out of their cloisters to be made cardinals, prelates, parish-priests, yea sometimes

they are even joined in matrimony for a kingdom's repose, as I have already said. And if charity make those leave their cloister that bad bound themselves thereto by solemn vow,â€”for better reason, and upon less occasion, one may by the authority of the same charity, counsel many to live at home, to keep their means, to marry, yea to turn soldiers and go to war, which is so perilous a profession.

Now when charity draws some to poverty and withdraws others from it, when she directs some to marriage and others to continence, when she shuts one up in a cloister and makes another quit it, she is not bound to give account thereof to any one: for she has the plenitude of power in Christian laws, as it is written: charity can do all things; she has the perfection of prudence, according to that: charity does nothing wrongly. [366] And if any would contest, and demand why she so does, she will boldly make answer: The Lord hath need of it. [367] All is made for charity, and charity for God. All must serve her and she none: no, she serves not her well-beloved, whose servant she is not, but his spouse, whom she does not serve, but love: for which cause we are to take our orders from her how to exercise counsels. To some she will appoint chastity without poverty, to others obedience and not chastity, to others fasting but not alms-deeds, to others alms-deeds and fasting, to others solitude and not the pastoral charge, to others intercourse with men and not solitude. In fine she is a sacred water, by which the garden of the church is fertilized, and though she herself have no colour that can be called colour, yet the flowers which she makes spring have each one its particular colour. She makes Martyrs redder than the rose, Virgins whiter than the lily; some she dyes with the fine violet of mortification, others with the yellow of marriage-cares, variously employing the counsels, for the perfection of the souls who are so happy as to live under her conduct.

[363] Matt. xix. 21.

[364] 1 Cor. vii. 5.

[365] Matt. xix. 11.

[366] 1 Cor. xiii.

[367] Matt. xxi. 3.

Book VIII

OF THE LOVE OF CONFORMITY, BY WHICH WE UNITE OUR WILL TO THE WILL OF GOD, SIGNIFIED UNTO US BY HIS COMMANDMENTS, COUNSELS AND INSPIRATIONS.



CHAPTER VII. THAT THE LOVE OF GOD'S WILL SIGNIFIED IN THE COMMANDMENTS MOVES US TO THE LOVE OF THE COUNSELS.

O Theotimus! how amiable is this Divine will! O how amiable and desirable it is! O law all of love and all for love! The Hebrews by the word, peace, understand the collection and perfection of all good things, that is, happiness: and the Psalmist cries out: Much peace have they that love thy law; and to them there is no stumbling-block: [368] as though he would say: O Lord! what delights are in the love of thy sacred commandments! The heart that is possessed with the love of thy law is possessed of all delicious sweetness. Truly that great king whose heart was made according to the heart of God, did so relish the perfect excellence of the divine commandments, that he seems to be a lover captivated with the beauty of this law as with the chaste spouse and queen of his heart; as appears by his continual praises thereof.

When the heavenly spouse would express the infinite sweetness of her divine lover's perfumes: Thy name, says she unto him, is as oil poured out: [369] as though she said: thou art so excellently perfumed, that thou seemest to be all perfume, and thou art more fitly termed ointment and perfume, than anointed and perfumed. So the soul that loves God is so transformed into the divine will, that it merits rather to be called, God's will, than to be called, obedient and subject to his will. Whence God says by Isaias, that he will call the Christian church by a new name, which the mouth of the Lord will pronounce, imprint, and engrave, in the hearts of his faithful; and then, explaining this name, he says it shall be: My will in her: [370] as though he had said, that among such as are not Christians every one has his own will in the midst of his heart, but among the true children of our Saviour, every one shall forsake his own will, and shall have only one master-will, dominant and universal, which shall animate, govern and direct all souls, all hearts and all wills: and the name of honour amongst Christians shall be no other than God's will in them, a will which shall rule over all wills, and transform them all into itself; so that the will of Christians and the will of Our Lord may be but one single will. This was perfectly verified in the primitive Church, when, as says the glorious S. Luke: In the multitude of the faithful there was but one heart and one soul: [371] for he means not there to speak of the heart

that keeps alive our bodies, nor of the soul which animates hearts with a human life, but he speaks of the heart which gives our souls heavenly life, and of the soul that animates our hearts with the supernatural life; the one, the singularly one heart and soul of true Christians, which is no other thing than the will of God. Life, says the Psalmist, is in the will of God, [372] not only because our temporal life depends on the divine pleasure, but also because our spiritual life consists in the execution of it, by which God lives and reigns in us, making us live and subsist in him. On the contrary, the wicked from of old (that is, always) have broken the yoke of the law of God, and have said: I will not serve. [373] Wherefore God says that he named them transgressors and rebels from the womb; [374] and speaking to the king of Tyre, he reproaches him for having set his heart as the heart of God: [375] for the spirit of revolt will have its heart to be its own master, and its own will to be sovereign like the will of God; it would not have the divine will to reign over it, but would be absolute and without any dependence. O eternal Lord! suffer not this,â€”but effect that not my will but thine be done. Yes, we are in this world not to do our own will, but the will of thy goodness which has placed us here. It was written of thee, O Saviour of my soul, that thou didst the will of thy Eternal Father, [376] and by the first act of the will of thy human soul, at the instant of thy conception, thou didst lovingly embrace this law of the divine will, and didst place it in the midst of thy heart there to reign and have dominion for ever. Ah! who will give my soul the grace of having no will save the will of her God!

Now when our love is exceeding great towards God's will, we are not content to do only the Divine will which is signified unto us by the commandments, but we also put ourselves under the obedience of the counsels, which are only given us for a more perfect observing of the commandments, to which also they have reference, as S. Thomas says excellently well. O how well does he observe the prohibition of unlawful pleasures who has even renounced the most just and legitimate delights! How far is he from coveting another man's goods who rejects even such as he might holily have kept! How far is he from preferring his own will before God's, who, to do God's will, submits himself to that of a man!

David upon a day was in his camp, and the Philistine garrison in Bethlehem. [377] And David longed, and said: Oh! that some man would give me a drink of the water out of the cistern that is in Bethlehem, by the gate! And behold, he had no sooner said the word than three valiant men set out, hand and head lowered, break through the hostile camp, go to the cistern of Bethlehem, draw water, and bring it to David, who, seeing the hazard which these three knightly men had run to gratify his longing, would not drink the water obtained at the peril of their blood and life, but poured it out in sacrifice to the eternal God. Ah! mark, I beseech you, Theotimus, how great the ardour of these cavaliers in the service and satisfaction of their master! They fly, they break through the ranks of their enemies, they incur a thousand dangers of destruction, to gratify only one simple desire, which their king expresses before them. Our Saviour when he was in this world declared his will in some cases by way of commandment, and in many others he only signified it by way of desire: for he did highly commend chastity, poverty, obedience and perfect resignation, the abnegation of one's own will, widowhood, fasting, continual prayer; and what he said of chastity, that he who could win the prize should win it, he said sufficiently of all the other counsels. At this desire, the most valiant Christians have entered on the race, and overcoming all repugnances, concupiscences and difficulties, they have arrived at holy perfection, keeping themselves to the strict observance of their King's desires, and by this means bearing away the crown of glory.

Verily, as witnesses the divine Psalmist, God hears not only the prayers of his faithful, but even their very desire and the mere preparation of their hearts for prayer; [378] so inclined and forward is he to do the will of those who love him. And why shall not we then in return be so zealous in following God's holy will, as to do not only what he orders, but also what we know he likes and wishes. Noble souls need no other spur to the undertaking of a design than to know that their beloved desires it: My soul, said one of them, melted when he spoke. [379]

[368] Ps. cxviii. 165.

[369] Cant. i. 2.

[370] Is. lxii. 14.

[371] Acts iv. 32.

[372] Ps. xxix. 6.

[373] Jer. ii. 20.

[374] Is. xlviii. 8.

[375] Ezech. xxviii. 2.

[376] Ps. xxxix. 9.

[377] 2 Kings xxiii.

[378] Ps. ix. 38

[379] Cant. v. 6.

Book VIII

OF THE LOVE OF CONFORMITY, BY WHICH WE UNITE OUR WILL TO THE WILL OF GOD, SIGNIFIED UNTO US BY HIS COMMANDMENTS, COUNSELS AND INSPIRATIONS.



CHAPTER VIII.

THAT THE CONTEMPT OF THE EVANGELICAL COUNSELS IS A GREAT SIN.

The words in which our Saviour exhorts us to tend towards and aim at perfection, are so forcible and so pressing, that we cannot dissemble the obligation we have to undertake to carry out that design. Be holy, says he, because I am holy. [380] He that is holy, let him be sanctified still; and he that is just, let him be justified still. [381] Be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect. [382] For this cause, the great S. Bernard writing to the glorious S. Guerin, Abbot of Aulps, whose life and miracles have left so sweet an odour in this diocese: "The just man," says he, "never says it is enough; he still hungers and thirsts after justice."

Truly, Theotimus, in temporal matters nothing suffices him who is not satisfied with what is enough; for what can suffice him to whom sufficiency is not sufficient? But in spiritual goods he has not sufficient who is satisfied with what is enough, and sufficiency is not sufficient, because true sufficiency in divine things consists partly in the desire of affluence. God in the beginning commanded the earth to bring forth the green herb, and such as may seed, and the fruit-tree yielding fruit after its kind, which has also seed in itself. [383]

And do we not see by experience, that plants and fruits are not come to their full growth and maturity till they bring forth their seeds and pips, whence other trees and plants of the same kind spring. Never do our virtues come to their full stature and measure, till such time as they beget in us desires of progress, which like spiritual seeds serve for the production of new degrees of virtue. And, methinks, the earth of our heart is commanded to bring forth the plants of virtue, which bear the fruits of good works, every one in its kind, and having the seeds of desires and resolutions of ever multiplying and advancing in perfection. And the virtue that bears not the seed of these desires is not yet come to its growth and maturity. "So then," says S. Bernard to the tepid man, "you do not want to advance in perfection? No. Nor yet grow worse? No, truly. What, then?" "you would neither grow better nor worse?" "poor man, you would be what cannot be. Nothing, indeed, in the world is either stable or constant; but of man it is said even more specially that he never remaineth in the same state. [384] It is necessary then that he either go

forward or backward."

Now I say not, any more than does S. Bernard, that it is a sin not to practise the counsels. No, in truth, Theotimus: for it is the very difference between commandments and counsels, that the commandment obliges us under pain of sin, and the counsel only invites us without pain of sin. Yet I distinctly say that to condemn the aiming after Christian perfection is a great sin, and that it is a still greater to condemn the invitation by which our Saviour calls us to it; but it is an insupportable impiety to condemn the counsels and means which our Saviour points out for the attainment of it. It were a heresy to say, that our Saviour had not given us good counsel, and a blasphemy to say to God: Depart from us, we desire not the knowledge of thy ways: [385] but it is a horrible irreverence towards him who with so much love and sweetness invites us to perfection, to say: I will not be holy or perfect, nor have any larger portion of thy benevolence, nor follow the counsels which thou givest me to make progress in perfection.

We may indeed without sin not follow the counsels, on account of the affection we may have to other things: as for example, it is lawful for a man not to sell what he possesseth to give to the poor, because he has not the courage to make so entire a renunciation. It is also lawful to marry, because one loves, or because one has not strength of mind necessary to undertake the war which must be waged against the flesh. But to profess not to wish to follow the counsels, nor any one of them, cannot be done without contempt of him who gives them. Not to follow the counsel of virginity, and so to marry, is not wrong, but marrying as if putting marriage higher than chastity, as heretics do, that is a great contempt either of the counsellor or of his counsel. To drink wine against the doctor's advice when overcome with thirst or with a desire to drink, is not precisely to condemn the doctor nor his advice: but to say "I will not follow the doctor's advice" must necessarily proceed from some bad opinion one harbours of him. Now as regards men, one may often condemn their counsel, without condemning those who give it, because to think that a man may have erred is not to condemn him. But to reject and condemn God's counsel, can only spring from an idea that he has not counselled us well; which cannot be thought but by a spirit of blasphemy, as though God were not wise enough to be able, or good enough to will, to give good advice. We may say the same of the counsels of the Church, which by reason of the continued assistance of the Holy Ghost, who instructs and conducts her in all truth, can never give evil advice.

[380] Levit. xi. 44.

[381] Apoc. xxii. 11

[382] Matt. v. 48.

[383] Gen. i. 11.

[384] Job xiv. 2.

[385] Job xxi. 14.



Part 1 of 2, Question 108, Article 4

Article 4. Whether certain definite counsels are fittingly proposed in the New Law?

Objection 1. It would seem that certain definite counsels are not fittingly proposed in the [New Law](#). For counsels are given about that which is expedient for an end, as we stated above, when treating of counsel (14, 2). But the same things are not expedient for all. Therefore certain definite counsels should not be proposed to all.

Objection 2. Further, counsels regard a greater [good](#). But there are no definite degrees to the greater [good](#). Therefore definite counsels should not be given.

Objection 3. Further, counsels pertain to the life of perfection. But obedience pertains to the life of perfection. Therefore it was unfitting that no counsel of obedience should be contained in the Gospel.

Objection 4. Further, many matters pertaining to the life of perfection are found among the commandments, as, for instance, "Love your enemies" ([Matthew 5:44](#)), and those precepts which [Our Lord](#) gave His [apostles](#) ([Matthew 10](#)). Therefore the counsels are unfittingly given in the [New Law](#): both because they are not all mentioned; and because they are not distinguished from the commandments.

On the contrary, The counsels of a wise friend are of great use, according to [Proverbs 27:9](#): "Ointment and perfumes rejoice the heart: and the [good](#) counsels of a friend rejoice the [soul](#)." But [Christ](#) is our wisest and greatest friend. Therefore His counsels are supremely useful and becoming.

I answer that, The difference between a counsel and a commandment is that a commandment implies [obligation](#), whereas a counsel is left to the option of the one to whom it is given. Consequently in the [New Law](#), which is the [law](#) of liberty, counsels are added to the commandments, and not in the [Old Law](#), which is the [law](#) of bondage. We must therefore understand the commandments of the [New Law](#) to have been given about matters that are [necessary](#) to gain the end of [eternal bliss](#), to which end the [New Law](#) brings us forthwith: but that the counsels are about matters that render the gaining of this end more assured and expeditious.

Now [man](#) is placed between the things of this world, and [spiritual](#) goods wherein [eternal happiness](#) consists: so that the more he cleaves to the one, the more he withdraws from the other, and conversely. Wherefore he that cleaves wholly to the things of this world, so as to make them his end, and to look upon them as the reason and rule of all he does, falls away altogether from

[spiritual](#) goods. Hence this disorder is removed by the commandments. Nevertheless, for [man](#) to gain the end aforesaid, he does not need to renounce the things of the world altogether: since he can, while using the things of this world, attain to [eternal happiness](#), provided he does not place his end in them: but he will attain more speedily thereto by giving up the goods of this world entirely: wherefore the evangelical counsels are given for this purpose.

Now the goods of this world which come into use in [human](#) life, consist in three things: viz. in external [wealth](#) pertaining to the "[concupiscence](#) of the eyes"; carnal pleasures pertaining to the "[concupiscence](#) of the flesh"; and honors, which pertain to the "[pride](#) of life," according to [1 John 2:16](#): and it is in renouncing these altogether, as far as possible, that the evangelical counsels consist. Moreover, every form of the religious life that professes the state of perfection is based on these three: since [riches](#) are renounced by [poverty](#); carnal pleasures by perpetual [chastity](#); and the [pride](#) of life by the bondage of obedience.

Now if a man observe these absolutely, this is in accordance with the counsels as they stand. But if a man observe any one of them in a particular case, this is taking that counsel in a restricted sense, namely, as applying to that particular case. For instance, when anyone gives an [alms](#) to a poor [man](#), not being bound so to do, he follows the counsels in that particular case. In like manner, when a man for some fixed time refrains from carnal pleasures that he may give himself to [prayer](#), he follows the counsel for that particular time. And again, when a man follows not his will as to some [deed](#) which he might do lawfully, he follows the counsel in that particular case: for instance, if he do [good](#) to his enemies when he is not bound to, or if he forgive an injury of which he might [justly](#) seek to be avenged. In this way, too, all particular counsels may be reduced to these three general and perfect counsels.

Reply to Objection 1. The aforesaid counsels, considered in themselves, are expedient to all; but owing to some people being ill-disposed, it happens that some of them are inexpedient, because their disposition is not inclined to such things. Hence [Our Lord](#), in proposing the evangelical counsels, always makes mention of [man's](#) fitness for observing the counsels. For in giving the counsel of perpetual [poverty](#) ([Matthew 19:21](#)), He begins with the words: "If thou wilt be perfect," and then He adds: "Go, sell all [[Vulgate](#): 'what'] thou hast." In like manner when He gave the counsel of perpetual [chastity](#), saying ([Matthew 19:12](#)): "There are eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs for the [kingdom of heaven](#)," He adds straightway: "He that can take, let him take it." And again, the [Apostle](#) ([1 Corinthians 7:35](#)), after giving the counsel of [virginity](#), says: "And this I speak for your profit; not to cast a snare upon you."

Reply to Objection 2. The greater goods are not definitely fixed in the [individual](#); but those which are simply and absolutely the greater [good](#) in general are fixed: and to these all the above particular goods may be reduced, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3. Even the counsel of obedience is understood to have been given by [Our Lord](#) in the words: "And [let him] follow Me." For we follow Him not only by imitating His works, but also by obeying His commandments, according to [John 10:27](#): "My sheep hear My voice . . . and they follow Me."

Reply to Objection 4. Those things which [Our Lord](#) prescribed about the [true](#) love of our enemies, and other similar sayings ([Matthew 5](#); [Luke 6](#)), may be referred to the preparation of the [mind](#), and then they are [necessary](#) for [salvation](#); for instance, that [man](#) be prepared to do [good](#) to his enemies, and other similar actions, when there is need. Hence these things are placed among the precepts. But that anyone should actually and promptly behave thus towards an enemy when there is no special need, is to be referred to the particular counsels, as stated above. As to those matters which are set down in [Matthew 10](#) and [Luke 9](#) and [10](#), they were either disciplinary commands for that particular time, or concessions, as stated above (2, ad 3). Hence they are not set down among the counsels.

Part 2 of 2, Question 19, Article 12

Article 12. Whether poverty of spirit is the beatitude corresponding to the gift of fear?

Objection 1. It would seem that [poverty](#) of spirit is not the beatitude corresponding to the [gift](#) of fear. For fear is the beginning of the [spiritual](#) life, as explained above ([Article 7](#)): whereas [poverty](#) belongs to the perfection of the [spiritual](#) life, according to [Matthew 19:21](#), "If thou wilt be perfect, go sell what thou hast, and give to the poor." Therefore [poverty](#) of spirit does not correspond to the [gift](#) of fear.

Objection 2. Further, it is written ([Psalm 118:120](#)): "Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear," whence it seems to follow that it belongs to fear to restrain the flesh. But the curbing of the flesh seems to belong rather to the beatitude of mourning. Therefore the beatitude of mourning corresponds to the [gift](#) of fear, rather than the beatitude of [poverty](#).

Objection 3. Further, the [gift](#) of fear corresponds to the [virtue](#) of hope, as stated above (9, ad 1). Now the last beatitude which is, "Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of [God](#)," seems above all to correspond to [hope](#), because according to [Romans 5:2](#), "we . . . [glory](#) in the hope of the [glory](#) of the sons of [God](#)." Therefore that beatitude corresponds to the [gift](#) of fear, rather than [poverty](#) of spirit.

Objection 4. Further, it was stated above (I-II, 70, 2) that the fruits correspond to the [beatitudes](#). Now none of the fruits correspond to the [gift](#) of fear. Neither, therefore, does any of the [beatitudes](#).

On the contrary, [Augustine](#) says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): "The fear of the Lord is befitting the [humble](#) of whom it is said: Blessed are the poor in spirit."

I answer that, Poverty of spirit properly corresponds to fear. Because, since it belongs to filial fear to show reverence and submission to [God](#), whatever results from this submission belongs to the [gift](#) of fear. Now from the very fact that a man submits to [God](#), it follows that he ceases to seek greatness either in himself or in another but seeks it only in [God](#). For that would be inconsistent with perfect subjection to [God](#), wherefore it is written ([Psalm 19:8](#)): "Some trust in chariots and some in horses; but we will call upon the name of . . . our [God](#)." It follows that if a

man fear [God](#) perfectly, he does not, by [pride](#), seek greatness either in himself or in external goods, viz. honors and [riches](#). On either case, this proceeds from [poverty](#) of spirit, in so far as the latter denotes either the voiding of a puffed up and [proud](#) spirit, according to [Augustine's](#) interpretation (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4), or the renunciation of worldly goods which is done in spirit, i.e. by one's own will, through the instigation of the [Holy Spirit](#), according to the expounding of [Ambrose](#) on [Luke 6:20](#) and [Jerome](#) on [Matthew 5:3](#).

Reply to Objection 1. Since a beatitude is an act of perfect [virtue](#), all the [beatitudes](#) belong to the perfection of [spiritual](#) life. And this perfection seems to require that whoever would strive to obtain a perfect share of [spiritual](#) goods, needs to begin by despising earthly goods, wherefore fear holds the first place among the [gifts](#). Perfection, however, does not consist in the renunciation itself of temporal goods; since this is the way to perfection: whereas filial fear, to which the beatitude of [poverty](#) corresponds, is consistent with the perfection of wisdom, as stated above (A7,10).

Reply to Objection 2. The undue exaltation of [man](#) either in himself or in another is more directly opposed to that submission to [God](#) which is the result of filial fear, than is external pleasure. Yet this is, in consequence, opposed to fear, since whoever [fears God](#) and is subject to Him, takes no delight in things other than [God](#). Nevertheless, pleasure is not concerned, as exaltation is, with the arduous character of a thing which fear regards: and so the beatitude of [poverty](#) corresponds to fear directly, and the beatitude of mourning, consequently.

Reply to Objection 3. Hope denotes a movement by way of a relation of tendency to a term, whereas fear implies movement by way of a relation of withdrawal from a term: wherefore the last beatitude which is the term of [spiritual](#) perfection, fittingly corresponds to [hope](#), by way of ultimate object; while the first beatitude, which implies withdrawal from external things which hinder submission to [God](#), fittingly corresponds to fear.

Reply to Objection 4. As regards the fruits, it seems that those things correspond to the [gift](#) of fear, which pertain to the moderate use of temporal things or to abstinence therefrom; such are modesty, [continency](#) and [chastity](#).

Part 2 of 2, Question 104

Article 1. Whether one man is bound to obey another?

Objection 1. It seems that one [man](#) is not bound to obey another. For nothing should be done contrary to the divine ordinance. Now [God](#) has so ordered that [man](#) is ruled by his own counsel, according to [Sirach 15:14](#), "[God](#) made [man](#) from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel." Therefore one [man](#) is not bound to obey another.

Objection 2. Further, if one [man](#) were bound to obey another, he would have to look upon the [will](#) of the [person](#) commanding him, as being his rule of conduct. Now [God's](#) will alone, which is always right, is a rule of [human](#) conduct. Therefore [man](#) is bound to obey none but [God](#).

Objection 3. Further, the more gratuitous the service the more is it acceptable. Now what a man does out of [duty](#) is not gratuitous. Therefore if a man were bound in [duty](#) to obey others in doing [good deeds](#), for this very reason his [good deeds](#) would be rendered less acceptable through being done out of obedience. Therefore one [man](#) is not bound to obey another.

On the contrary, It is prescribed ([Hebrews 13:17](#)): "Obey your [prelates](#) and be subject to them."

I answer that, Just as the actions of [natural](#) things proceed from [natural](#) powers, so do [human](#) actions proceed from the [human](#) will. On [natural](#) things it behooved the higher to move the lower to their actions by the excellence of the [natural](#) power bestowed on them by [God](#): and so in [human](#) affairs also the higher must move the lower by their will in virtue of a divinely established authority. Now to move by reason and [will](#) is to command. Wherefore just as in virtue of the divinely established [natural](#) order the lower [natural](#) things need to be subject to the movement of the higher, so too in [human](#) affairs, in virtue of the order of [natural](#) and [divine law](#), inferiors are bound to obey their superiors.

Reply to Objection 1. [God](#) left [man](#) in the hand of his own counsel, not as though it were lawful to him to do whatever he will, but because, unlike irrational creatures, he is not compelled by [natural necessity](#) to do what he ought to do, but is left the free choice proceeding from his own counsel. And just as he has to proceed on his own counsel in doing other things, so too has he in the point of obeying his superiors. For [Gregory](#) says (Moral. xxxv), "When we humbly give way to another's voice, we overcome ourselves in our own hearts."

Reply to Objection 2. The will of [God](#) is the first rule whereby all rational wills are regulated: and to this rule one will approaches more than another, according to a divinely appointed order. Hence the [will](#) of the one [man](#) who issues a command may be as a second rule to the [will](#) of this other [man](#) who obeys him.

Reply to Objection 3. A thing may be deemed gratuitous in two ways. On one way on the part of the [deed](#) itself, because, to wit, one is not bound to do it; in another way, on the part of the doer, because he does it of his own [free will](#). Now a [deed](#) is rendered [virtuous](#), praiseworthy and [meritorious](#), chiefly according as it proceeds from the [will](#). Wherefore although obedience be a [duty](#), if one obey with a prompt will, one's [merit](#) is not for that reason diminished, especially before [God](#), Who sees not only the outward [deed](#), but also the inward will.

Article 2. Whether obedience is a special virtue?

Objection 1. It seems that obedience is not a special [virtue](#). For disobedience is contrary to obedience. But disobedience is a general [sin](#), because [Ambrose](#) says (De Parad. viii) that "[sin](#) is to disobey the [divine law](#)." Therefore obedience is not a special [virtue](#).

Objection 2. Further, every special [virtue](#) is either theological or moral. But obedience is not a theological [virtue](#), since it is not comprised under [faith](#), hope or [charity](#). Nor is it a moral [virtue](#), since it does not hold the mean between excess and deficiency, for the more obedient one is the more is one praised. Therefore obedience is not a special [virtue](#).

Objection 3. Further, [Gregory](#) says (Moral. xxxv) that "obedience is the more [meritorious](#) and praiseworthy, the less it holds its own." But every special [virtue](#) is the more to be praised the more it holds its own, since [virtue](#) requires a man to exercise his will and choice, as stated in Ethic. ii, 4. Therefore obedience is not a special [virtue](#).

Objection 4. Further, [virtues](#) differ in [species](#) according to their objects. Now the object of obedience would seem to be the command of a superior, of which, apparently, there are as many kinds as there are degrees of superiority. Therefore obedience is a general [virtue](#), comprising many special [virtues](#).

On the contrary, obedience is reckoned by some to be a part of [justice](#), as stated above ([Article 80](#)).

I answer that, A special [virtue](#) is assigned to all [good deeds](#) that have a special reason of praise: for it belongs properly to [virtue](#) to render a [deed good](#). Now obedience to a superior is due in accordance with the divinely established order of things, as shown above ([Article 1](#)), and therefore it is a [good](#), since [good](#) consists in mode, [species](#) and order, as [Augustine](#) states (De Natura Boni iii) [Cf. I, 5, 5]. Again, this act has a special aspect of praiseworthiness by reason of its object. For while subjects have many [obligations](#) towards their superiors, this one, that they are bound to obey their commands, stands out as special among the rest. Wherefore obedience is a special [virtue](#), and its specific object is a command tacit or express, because the superior's will, however it become [known](#), is a tacit precept, and a man's obedience seems to be all the more prompt, forasmuch as by obeying he forestalls the express command as soon as he understands his superior's will.

Reply to Objection 1. Nothing prevents the one same material object from admitting two special aspects to which two special [virtues](#) correspond: thus a soldier, by defending his king's fortress, fulfils both an act of [fortitude](#), by facing the danger of death for a [good](#) end, and an act of [justice](#), by rendering due service to his lord. Accordingly the aspect of precept, which obedience considers, occurs in acts of all [virtues](#), but not in all acts of [virtue](#), since not all acts of [virtue](#) are a matter of precept, as stated above (I-II, 96, 3). Moreover, certain things are sometimes a matter of precept, and pertain to no other [virtue](#), such things for instance as are not [evil](#) except because they are forbidden. Wherefore, if obedience be taken in its proper sense, as considering formally and intentionally the aspect of precept, it will be a special [virtue](#), and disobedience a special [sin](#): because in this way it is requisite for obedience that one perform an act of [justice](#) or of some other [virtue](#) with the [intention](#) of fulfilling a precept; and for disobedience that one treat the precept with actual contempt. On the other hand, if obedience be taken in a wide sense for the performance of any action that may be a matter of precept, and disobedience for the omission of that action through any [intention](#) whatever, then obedience will be a general [virtue](#), and disobedience a general [sin](#).

Reply to Objection 2. Obedience is not a theological [virtue](#), for its direct object is not [God](#), but the precept of any superior, whether expressed or inferred, namely, a simple word of the superior, indicating his will, and which the obedient subject obeys promptly, according to [Titus 3:1](#), "Admonish them to be subject to princes, and to obey at a word," etc.

It is, however, a moral [virtue](#), since it is a part of [justice](#), and it observes the mean between excess and deficiency. Excess thereof is measured in respect, not of [quantity](#), but of other circumstances, in so far as a man obeys either whom he ought not, or in matters wherein he ought not to obey, as we have stated above regarding religion (92, 2). We may also reply that as in [justice](#), excess is in the [person](#) who retains another's property, and deficiency in the [person](#) who does not receive his due, according to the [Philosopher](#) (Ethic. v, 4), so too obedience observes the mean between excess on the part of him who fails to pay due obedience to his superior, since he exceeds in fulfilling his own will, and deficiency on the part of the superior, who does not receive obedience. Wherefore in this way obedience will be a mean between two forms of [wickedness](#), as was stated above concerning [justice](#) (58, 10).

Reply to Objection 3. Obedience, like every [virtue](#) requires the [will](#) to be prompt towards its proper object, but not towards that which is repugnant to it. Now the proper object of obedience is a precept, and this proceeds from another's will. Wherefore obedience makes a man's will prompt in fulfilling the [will](#) of another, the maker, namely, of the precept. If that which is prescribed to him is willed by him for its own sake apart from its being prescribed, as happens in agreeable matters, he tends towards it at once by his own will and seems to comply, not on account of the precept, but on account of his own will. But if that which is prescribed is nowise willed for its own sake, but, considered in itself, repugnant to his own will, as happens in disagreeable matters, then it is quite evident that it is not fulfilled except on account of the precept. Hence [Gregory](#) says (Moral. xxxv) that "obedience perishes or diminishes when it holds its own in agreeable matters," because, to wit, one's own will seems to tend principally, not to the accomplishment of the precept, but to the fulfilment of one's own desire; but that "it increases in disagreeable or difficult matters," because there one's own will tends to nothing beside the precept. Yet this must be understood as regards outward appearances: for, on the other hand, according to the judgment of [God](#), Who searches the heart, it may happen that even in agreeable matters obedience, while holding its own, is nonetheless praiseworthy, provided the [will](#) of him that obeys tends no less devotedly [Cf. 82, 2] to the fulfilment of the precept.

Reply to Objection 4. Reverence regards directly the [person](#) that excels: wherefore it admits a various [species](#) according to the various aspects of excellence. Obedience, on the other hand, regards the precept of the [person](#) that excels, and therefore admits of only one aspect. And since obedience is due to a [person's](#) precept on account of reverence to him, it follows that obedience to a man is of one [species](#), though the [causes](#) from which it proceeds differ specifically.

Article 3. Whether obedience is the greatest of the virtues?

Objection 1. It seems that obedience is the greatest of the [virtues](#). For it is written ([1 Samuel 15:22](#)): "Obedience is better than [sacrifices](#)." Now the offering of [sacrifices](#) belongs to religion, which is the greatest of all moral [virtues](#), as shown above (Question 81, Article 6). Therefore obedience is the greatest of all [virtues](#).

Objection 2. Further, [Gregory](#) says (Moral. xxxv) that "obedience is the only [virtue](#) that ingrafts [virtues](#) in the [soul](#) and protects them when ingrafted." Now the [cause](#) is greater than the effect. Therefore obedience is greater than all the [virtues](#).

Objection 3. Further, [Gregory](#) says (Moral. xxxv) that "[evil](#) should never be done out of obedience: yet sometimes for the sake of obedience we should lay aside the [good](#) we are doing." Now one does not lay aside a thing except for something better. Therefore obedience, for whose sake the [good](#) of other [virtues](#) is set aside, is better than other [virtues](#).

On the contrary, obedience deserves praise because it proceeds from [charity](#): for [Gregory](#) says (Moral. xxxv) that "obedience should be practiced, not out of servile fear, but from a sense of [charity](#), not through fear of punishment, but through love of [justice](#)." Therefore [charity](#) is a greater [virtue](#) than obedience.

I answer that, Just as [sin](#) consists in [man](#) contemning [God](#) and adhering to mutable things, so the [merit](#) of a [virtuous](#) act consists in [man](#) contemning [created](#) goods and adhering to [God](#) as his end. Now the end is greater than that which is directed to the end. Therefore if a man contemns [created](#) goods in order that he may adhere to [God](#), his [virtue](#) derives greater praise from his adhering to [God](#) than from his contemning earthly things. And so those, namely the theological, [virtues](#) whereby he adheres to [God](#) in Himself, are greater than the moral [virtues](#), whereby he holds in contempt some earthly thing in order to adhere to [God](#).

Among the moral [virtues](#), the greater the thing which a man contemns that he may adhere to [God](#), the greater the [virtue](#). Now there are three kinds of [human](#) goods that [man](#) may condemn for [God's](#) sake. The lowest of these are external goods, the goods of the body take the middle place, and the highest are the goods of the [soul](#); and among these the chief, in a way, is the [will](#), in so far as, by his will, [man](#) makes use of all other goods. Therefore, properly speaking, the [virtue](#) of obedience, whereby we condemn our own will for [God's](#) sake, is more praiseworthy than the other moral [virtues](#), which condemn other goods for the sake of [God](#).

Hence [Gregory](#) says (Moral. xxxv) that "obedience is rightly preferred to [sacrifices](#), because by [sacrifices](#) another's body is slain whereas by obedience we slay our own will." Wherefore even any other acts of [virtue](#) are [meritorious](#) before [God](#) through being performed out of obedience to [God's](#) will. For were one to suffer even [martyrdom](#), or to give all one's goods to the [poor](#), unless one directed these things to the fulfilment of the divine will, which pertains directly to obedience, they could not be [meritorious](#): as neither would they be if they were done without [charity](#), which cannot [exist](#) apart from obedience. For it is written ([1 John 2:4-5](#)): "He who saith that he [knoweth God](#), and keepeth not His commandments, is a liar . . . but he that keepeth His word, in him in very [deed](#) the [charity](#) of [God](#) is perfected": and this because friends have the same likes and dislikes.

Reply to Objection 1. Obedience proceeds from reverence, which pays worship and [honor](#) to a superior, and in this respect it is contained under different [virtues](#), although considered in itself, as regarding the aspect of precept, it is one special [virtue](#). Accordingly, in so far as it proceeds from reverence for a superior, it is contained, in a way, under observance; while in so far as it proceeds from reverence for one's parents, it is contained under piety; and in so far as it proceeds from reverence for [God](#), it comes under religion, and pertains to devotion, which is the principal act of religion. Wherefore from this point of view it is more praiseworthy to obey [God](#) than to offer sacrifice, as well as because, "in a sacrifice we slay another's body, whereas by obedience we slay our own will," as [Gregory](#) says (Moral. xxxv). As to the special case in which Samuel

spoke, it would have been better for Saul to obey [God](#) than to offer in sacrifice the fat animals of the Amalekites against the commandment of [God](#).

Reply to Objection 2. All acts of [virtue](#), in so far as they come under a precept, belong to obedience. Wherefore according as acts of [virtue](#) act [causally](#) or dispositively towards their generation and preservation, obedience is said to ingraft and protect all [virtues](#). And yet it does not follow that obedience takes precedence of all [virtues](#) absolutely, for two reasons. First, because though an act of [virtue](#) come under a precept, one may nevertheless perform that act of [virtue](#) without considering the aspect of precept. Consequently, if there be any [virtue](#), whose object is [naturally](#) prior to the precept, that [virtue](#) is said to be [naturally](#) prior to obedience. Such a [virtue](#) is [faith](#), whereby we come to [know](#) the sublime [nature](#) of divine authority, by reason of which the power to command is competent to [God](#). Secondly, because infusion of [grace](#) and [virtues](#) may precede, even in point of time, all [virtuous](#) acts: and in this way obedience is not prior to all [virtues](#), neither in point of time nor by [nature](#).

Reply to Objection 3. There are two kinds of [good](#). There is that to which we are bound of [necessity](#), for instance to love [God](#), and so forth: and by no means may such a [good](#) be set aside on account of obedience. But there is another [good](#) to which [man](#) is not bound of [necessity](#), and this [good](#) we ought sometimes to set aside for the sake of obedience to which we are bound of [necessity](#), since we ought not to do [good](#) by falling into [sin](#). Yet as [Gregory](#) remarks (*Moral.* xxxv), "he who forbids his subjects any single [good](#), must needs allow them many others, lest the [souls](#) of those who obey perish utterly from starvation, through being deprived of every [good](#)." Thus the loss of one [good](#) may be compensated by obedience and other goods.

Article 4. Whether God ought to be obeyed in all things?

Objection 1. It seems that [God](#) need not be obeyed in all things. For it is written ([Matthew 9:30-31](#)) that [our Lord](#) after healing the two blind men commanded them, saying: "See that no [man](#) [know](#) this. But they going out spread His fame abroad in all that country." Yet they are not blamed for so doing. Therefore it seems that we are not bound to obey [God](#) in all things.

Objection 2. Further, no one is bound to do anything contrary to [virtue](#). Now we find that [God](#) commanded certain things contrary to [virtue](#): thus He commanded [Abraham](#) to slay his innocent son ([Genesis 22](#)); and the [Jews](#) to steal the property of the Egyptians ([Exodus 11](#)), which things are contrary to [justice](#); and Osee to take to himself a [woman](#) who was an adulteress ([Hosea 3](#)), and this is contrary to [chastity](#). Therefore [God](#) is not to be obeyed in all things.

Objection 3. Further, whoever obeys [God](#) conforms his will to the divine will even as to the thing willed. But we are not bound in all things to conform our will to the divine will as to the thing willed, as stated above (I-II, 19, 10). Therefore [man](#) is not bound to obey [God](#) in all things.

On the contrary, It is written ([Exodus 24:7](#)): "All things that the Lord hath spoken we will do, and we will be obedient."

I answer that, As stated above ([Article 1](#)), he who obeys is moved by the command of the [person](#) he obeys, just as [natural](#) things are moved by their motive [causes](#). Now just a [God](#) is the

first mover of all things that are moved [naturally](#), so too is He the first mover of all wills, as shown above (I-II, 09, 6). Therefore just as all [natural](#) things are subject to the divine motion by a [natural necessity](#) so too all wills, by a kind of [necessity](#) of [justice](#), are bound to obey the divine command.

Reply to Objection 1. [Our Lord](#) in telling the blind men to conceal the [miracle](#) had no [intention](#) of binding them with the force of a divine precept, but, as [Gregory](#) says (Moral. xix), "gave an example to His servants who follow Him that they might wish to hide their [virtue](#) and yet that it should be proclaimed against their will, in order that others might profit by their example."

Reply to Objection 2. Even as [God](#) does nothing contrary to [nature](#) (since "the [nature](#) of a thing is what [God](#) does therein," according to a [gloss](#) on [Romans 11](#)), and yet does certain things contrary to the wonted course of [nature](#); so to [God](#) can command nothing contrary to [virtue](#) since [virtue](#) and rectitude of [human](#) will consist chiefly in conformity with [God's](#) will and obedience to His command, although it be contrary to the wonted mode of [virtue](#). Accordingly, then, the command given to [Abraham](#) to slay his innocent son was not contrary to [justice](#), since [God](#) is the author of life and death. Nor again was it contrary to [justice](#) that He commanded the [Jews](#) to take things belonging to the Egyptians, because all things are His, and He gives them to whom He will. Nor was it contrary to [chastity](#) that Osee was commanded to take an adulteress, because [God](#) Himself is the ordainer of [human](#) generation, and the right manner of intercourse with [woman](#) is that which He appoints. Hence it is evident that the [persons](#) aforesaid did not [sin](#), either by obeying [God](#) or by willing to obey Him.

Reply to Objection 3. Though [man](#) is not always bound to will what [God](#) wills, yet he is always bound to will what [God](#) wills him to will. This comes to [man's knowledge](#) chiefly through [God's](#) command, wherefore [man](#) is bound to obey [God's](#) commands in all things.

Article 5. Whether subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all things?

Objection 1. It seems that subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all things. For the [Apostle](#) says ([Colossians 3:20](#)): "Children, obey your parents in all things," and farther on ([Colossians 3:22](#)): "Servants, obey in all things your masters according to the flesh." Therefore in like manner other subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all things.

Objection 2. Further, superiors stand between [God](#) and their subjects, according to [Deuteronomy 5:5](#), "I was the mediator and stood between the Lord and you at that time, to show you His words." Now there is no going from extreme to extreme, except through that which stands between. Therefore the commands of a superior must be esteemed the commands of [God](#), wherefore the [Apostle](#) says ([Galatians 4:14](#)): "You . . . received me as an [angel](#) of [God](#), even as [Christ Jesus](#)" and ([1 Thessalonians 2:13](#)): "When you had received of us the word of the hearing of [God](#), you received it, not as the word of [men](#), but, as it is indeed, the word of [God](#)." Therefore as [man](#) is bound to obey [God](#) in all things, so is he bound to obey his superiors.

Objection 3. Further, just as religious in making their profession take [vows](#) of [chastity](#) and [poverty](#), so do they also [vow](#) obedience. Now a religious is bound to observe [chastity](#) and [poverty](#) in all things. Therefore he is also bound to obey in all things.

On the contrary, It is written ([Acts 5:29](#)): "We ought to obey [God](#) rather than men." Now sometimes the things commanded by a superior are against [God](#). Therefore superiors are not to be obeyed in all things.

I answer that, As stated above (A1,4), he who obeys is moved at the bidding of the [person](#) who commands him, by a certain [necessity](#) of [justice](#), even as a [natural](#) thing is moved through the power of its mover by a [natural necessity](#). That a [natural](#) thing be not moved by its mover, may happen in two ways. First, on account of a hindrance arising from the stronger power of some other mover; thus wood is not burnt by fire if a stronger force of water intervene. Secondly, through lack of order in the movable with regard to its mover, since, though it is subject to the latter's action in one respect, yet it is not subject thereto in every respect. Thus, a humor is sometimes subject to the action of heat, as regards being heated, but not as regards being dried up or consumed. On like manner there are two reasons, for which a subject may not be bound to obey his superior in all things. First on account of the command of a higher power. For as a [gloss](#) says on [Romans 13:2](#), "They that resist [[Vulgate](#): 'He that resisteth'] the power, resist the ordinance of [God](#)" (cf. [St. Augustine](#), De Verb. Dom. viii). "If a commissioner issue an order, are you to comply, if it is contrary to the bidding of the proconsul? Again if the proconsul command one thing, and the emperor another, will you hesitate, to disregard the former and serve the latter? Therefore if the emperor commands one thing and [God](#) another, you must disregard the former and obey [God](#)." Secondly, a subject is not bound to obey his superior if the latter command him to do something wherein he is not subject to him. For Seneca says (De Beneficiis iii): "It is wrong to suppose that slavery falls upon the whole [man](#): for the better part of him is excepted." His body is subjected and assigned to his master but his [soul](#) is his own. Consequently in matters touching the internal movement of the [will](#) [man](#) is not bound to obey his fellow-[man](#), but [God](#) alone.

Nevertheless [man](#) is bound to obey his fellow-[man](#) in things that have to be done externally by means of the body: and yet, since by [nature](#) all [men](#) are equal, he is not bound to obey another [man](#) in matters touching the [nature](#) of the body, for instance in those relating to the support of his body or the begetting of his children. Wherefore servants are not bound to obey their masters, nor children their parents, in the question of contracting marriage or of remaining in the state of [virginity](#) or the like. But in matters concerning the disposal of actions and [human](#) affairs, a subject is bound to obey his superior within the sphere of his authority; for instance a soldier must obey his general in matters relating to [war](#), a servant his master in matters touching the execution of the duties of his service, a son his father in matters relating to the conduct of his life and the care of the household; and so forth.

Reply to Objection 1. When the [Apostle](#) says "in all things," he refers to matters within the sphere of a father's or master's authority.

Reply to Objection 2. [Man](#) is subject to [God](#) simply as regards all things, both internal and external, wherefore he is bound to obey Him in all things. On the other hand, inferiors are not

subject to their superiors in all things, but only in certain things and in a particular way, in respect of which the superior stands between [God](#) and his subjects, whereas in respect of other matters the subject is immediately under [God](#), by Whom he is taught either by the [natural](#) or by the written [law](#).

Reply to Objection 3. [Religious](#) profess obedience as to the regular mode of life, in respect of which they are subject to their superiors: wherefore they are bound to obey in those matters only which may belong to the regular mode of life, and this obedience suffices for [salvation](#). If they be willing to obey even in other matters, this will belong to the superabundance of perfection; provided, however, such things be not contrary to [God](#) or to the rule they profess, for obedience in this case would be unlawful.

Accordingly we may distinguish a threefold obedience; one, sufficient for [salvation](#), and consisting in obeying when one is bound to obey: secondly, perfect obedience, which obeys in all things lawful: thirdly, indiscreet obedience, which obeys even in matters unlawful.

Article 6. Whether Christians are bound to obey the secular powers?

Objection 1. It seems that [Christians](#) are not bound to obey the [secular power](#). For a [gloss](#) on [Matthew 17:25](#), "Then the children are free," says: "If in every kingdom the children of the king who holds sway over that kingdom are free, then the children of that King, under Whose sway are all kingdoms, should be free in every kingdom." Now [Christians](#), by their [faith](#) in [Christ](#), are made children of [God](#), according to [John 1:12](#): "He gave them power to be made the sons of [God](#), to them that [believe](#) in His name." Therefore they are not bound to obey the [secular power](#).

Objection 2. Further, it is written ([Romans 7:4](#)): "You . . . are become dead to the [law](#) by the body of [Christ](#)," and the [law](#) mentioned here is the [divine law](#) of the [Old Testament](#). Now [human law](#) whereby men are subject to the [secular power](#) is of less account than the [divine law](#) of the [Old Testament](#). Much more, therefore, since they have become members of [Christ's](#) body, are men freed from the [law](#) of subjection, whereby they were under the power of secular princes.

Objection 3. Further, men are not bound to obey robbers, who oppress them with [violence](#). Now, [Augustine](#) says (De Civ. Dei iv): "Without [justice](#), what else is a kingdom but a huge robbery?" Since therefore the authority of secular princes is frequently exercised with [injustice](#), or owes its origin to some [unjust](#) usurpation, it seems that [Christians](#) ought not to obey secular princes.

On the contrary, It is written ([Titus 3:1](#)): "Admonish them to be subject to princes and powers," and ([1 Peter 2:13-14](#)): "Be ye subject . . . to every [human](#) creature for [God's](#) sake: whether it be to the king as excelling, or to governors as sent by him."

I answer that, [Faith](#) in [Christ](#) is the origin and [cause](#) of [justice](#), according to [Romans 3:22](#), "The [justice](#) of [God](#) by [faith](#) of [Jesus Christ](#):" wherefore [faith](#) in [Christ](#) does not void the order of [justice](#), but strengthens it." Now the order of [justice](#) requires that subjects obey their superiors,

else the stability of [human](#) affairs would cease. Hence [faith](#) in [Christ](#) does not excuse the faithful from the [obligation](#) of obeying secular princes.

Reply to Objection 1. As stated above ([Article 5](#)), subjection whereby one [man](#) is bound to another regards the body; not the [soul](#), which retains its liberty. Now, in this state of life we are freed by the [grace](#) of [Christ](#) from defects of the [soul](#), but not from defects of the body, as the [Apostle](#) declares by saying of himself ([Romans 7:23](#)) that in his mind he served the [law](#) of [God](#), but in his flesh the [law](#) of [sin](#). Wherefore those that are made children of [God](#) by [grace](#) are free from the [spiritual](#) bondage of [sin](#), but not from the bodily bondage, whereby they are held bound to earthly masters, as a [gloss](#) observes on [1 Timothy 6:1](#), "Whosoever are servants under the yoke," etc.

Reply to Objection 2. The [Old Law](#) was a figure of the [New Testament](#), and therefore it had to cease on the advent of [truth](#). And the comparison with [human law](#) does not stand because thereby one [man](#) is subject to another. Yet [man](#) is bound by [divine law](#) to obey his fellow-[man](#).

Reply to Objection 3. [Man](#) is bound to obey secular princes in so far as this is required by order of [justice](#). Wherefore if the prince's authority is not just but usurped, or if he commands what is [unjust](#), his subjects are not bound to obey him, except perhaps [accidentally](#), in order to avoid [scandal](#) or danger.

2 of 2, Question 151 to 154, Article 5

Question 151. Chastity

1. [Is chastity a virtue?](#)
2. [Is it a general virtue?](#)
3. [Is it a virtue distinct from abstinence?](#)
4. [Its relation to purity](#)

Article 1. Whether chastity is a virtue?

Objection 1. It would seem that [chastity](#) is not a [virtue](#). For here we are treating of [virtues](#) of the [soul](#). But [chastity](#), seemingly, belongs to the body: for a [person](#) is said to be chaste because he behaves in a certain way as regards the use of certain parts of the body. Therefore [chastity](#) is not a [virtue](#).

Objection 2. Further, [virtue](#) is "a [voluntary habit](#)," as stated in *Ethic. ii, 6*. But [chastity](#), apparently, is not [voluntary](#), since it can be taken away by force from a [woman](#) to whom [violence](#) is done. Therefore it seems that [chastity](#) is not a [virtue](#).

Objection 3. Further, there is no [virtue](#) in unbelievers. Yet some unbelievers are chaste. Therefore [chastity](#) is not a [virtue](#).

Objection 4. Further, the fruits are distinct from the [virtues](#). But [chastity](#) is reckoned among the fruits ([Galatians 5:23](#)). Therefore [chastity](#) is not a [virtue](#).

On the contrary, [Augustine](#) says (De Decem Chord. [Serm. ix de Tempore]): "Whereas thou shouldst excel thy wife in [virtue](#), since [chastity](#) is a [virtue](#), thou yieldest to the first onslaught of [lust](#), while thou wishest thy wife to be victorious."

I answer that, Chastity takes its name from the fact that reason "chastises" [concupiscence](#), which, like a child, needs curbing, as the [Philosopher](#) states (Ethic. iii, 12). Now the [essence](#) of [human virtue](#) consists in being something moderated by reason, as shown above (I-II, 64, 1). Therefore it is evident that [chastity](#) is a [virtue](#).

Reply to Objection 1. Chastity does indeed reside in the [soul](#) as its subject, though its [matter](#) is in the body. For it belongs to [chastity](#) that a man make moderate use of bodily members in accordance with the judgment of his [reason](#) and the choice of his will.

Reply to Objection 2. As [Augustine](#) says (De Civ. Dei i, 18), "so long as her mind holds to its purpose, whereby she has [merited](#) to be [holy](#) even in body, not even the [violence](#) of another's [lust](#) can deprive her body of its [holiness](#), which is safeguarded by her persevering [continency](#)." He also says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that "in the [mind](#) there is a [virtue](#) which is the companion of [fortitude](#), whereby it is resolved to suffer any [evil](#) whatsoever rather than consent to [evil](#)."

Reply to Objection 3. As [Augustine](#) says (Contra Julian. iv, 3), "it is impossible to have any [true virtue](#) unless one be [truly](#) just; nor is it possible to be just unless one live by [faith](#)." Whence he argues that in unbelievers there is neither [true chastity](#), nor any other [virtue](#), because, to wit, they are not referred to the due end, and as he adds (Contra Julian. iv, 3) "[virtues](#) are distinguished from [vices](#) not by their functions," i.e. their acts, "but by their ends."

Reply to Objection 4. Chastity is a [virtue](#) in so far as it works in accordance with reason, but in so far as it delights in its act, it is reckoned among the fruits.

Article 2. Whether chastity is a general virtue?

Objection 1. It would seem that [chastity](#) is a general [virtue](#). For [Augustine](#) says (De Mendacio xx) that "[chastity](#) of the [mind](#) is the well-ordered movement of the [mind](#) that does not prefer the lesser to the greater things." But this belongs to every [virtue](#). Therefore [chastity](#) is a general [virtue](#).

Objection 2. Further, "Chastity" takes its name from "chastisement" [Cf. 1]. Now every movement of the [appetitive](#) part should be chastised by reason. Since, then, every moral [virtue](#) curbs some movement of the [appetite](#), it seems that every moral [virtue](#) is [chastity](#).

Objection 3. Further, [chastity](#) is opposed to fornication. But fornication seems to belong to every kind of [sin](#): for it is written ([Psalm 72:27](#)): "Thou shalt destroy [[Vulgate](#): 'hast destroyed'] all them that go awhoring from [[Douay](#): 'are disloyal to'] Thee." Therefore [chastity](#) is a general [virtue](#).

On the contrary, Macrobius [In Somn. Scip. i, 8 reckons it to be a part of [temperance](#).

I answer that, The word "[chastity](#)" is employed in two ways. First, properly; and thus it is a special [virtue](#) having a special [matter](#), namely the [concupiscences](#) relating to venereal pleasures. Secondly, the word "[chastity](#)" is employed metaphorically: for just as a mingling of bodies conduces to venereal pleasure which is the proper [matter](#) of [chastity](#) and of [lust](#) its contrary [vice](#), so too the [spiritual](#) union of the [mind](#) with certain things conduces to a pleasure which is the [matter](#) of a [spiritual chastity](#) metaphorically speaking, as well as of a [spiritual](#) fornication likewise metaphorically so called. For if the [human](#) mind delight in the [spiritual](#) union with that to which it behooves it to be united, namely [God](#), and refrains from delighting in union with other things against the requirements of the order established by [God](#), this may be called a [spiritual chastity](#), according to [2 Corinthians 11:2](#), "I have espoused you to one husband, that I may present you as a chaste [virgin](#) to [Christ](#)." If, on the other hand, the [mind](#) be united to any other things whatsoever, against the prescription of the Divine order, it will be called [spiritual](#) fornication, according to [Jeremiah 3:1](#), "But thou hast prostituted thyself to many lovers." Taking [chastity](#) in this sense, it is a general [virtue](#), because every [virtue](#) withdraws the [human](#) mind from delighting in a union with unlawful things. Nevertheless, the [essence](#) of this [chastity](#) consists principally in [charity](#) and the other theological [virtues](#), whereby the [human](#) mind is united to [God](#).

Reply to Objection 1. This argument takes [chastity](#) in the metaphorical sense.

Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (1; 142, 2), the [concupiscence](#) of that which gives pleasure is especially likened to a child, because the desire of pleasure is connatural to us, especially of pleasures of touch which are directed to the maintenance of [nature](#). Hence it is that if the [concupiscence](#) of such pleasures be fostered by consenting to it, it will wax very strong, as in the case of a child left to his own will. Wherefore the [concupiscence](#) of these pleasures stands in very great need of being chastised: and consequently [chastity](#) is applied antonomastically to such like [concupiscences](#), even as [fortitude](#) is about those matters wherein we stand in the greatest need of strength of mind.

Reply to Objection 3. This argument considers [spiritual](#) fornication metaphorically so called, which is opposed to [spiritual chastity](#), as stated.

Article 3. Whether chastity is a distinct virtue from abstinence?

Objection 1. It would seem that [chastity](#) is not a distinct [virtue](#) from abstinence. Because where the [matter](#) is generically the same, one [virtue](#) suffices. Now it would seem that things pertaining to the same sense are of one genus. Therefore, since pleasures of the palate which are the [matter](#)

of abstinence, and venereal pleasures which are the [matter](#) of [chastity](#), pertain to the touch, it seems that [chastity](#) is not a distinct [virtue](#) from abstinence.

Objection 2. Further, the [Philosopher](#) (Ethic. iii, 12) likens all [vices](#) of intemperance to childish [sins](#), which need chastising. Now "[chastity](#)" takes its name from "chastisement" of the contrary [vices](#). Since then certain [vices](#) are bridled by abstinence, it seems that abstinence is [chastity](#).

Objection 3. Further, the pleasures of the other senses are the concern of [temperance](#) in so far as they refer to pleasures of touch; which are the [matter](#) of [temperance](#). Now pleasures of the palate, which are the [matter](#) of abstinence, are directed to venereal pleasures, which are the [matter](#) of [chastity](#): wherefore [Jerome](#) says [Ep. cxlvii ad Amand. Cf. Gratian, Dist. xlv.], commenting on [Titus 1:7](#), "Not given to wine, no striker," etc.: "The belly and the organs of generation are neighbors, that the neighborhood of the organs may indicate their complicity in [vice](#)." Therefore abstinence and [chastity](#) are not distinct [virtues](#).

On the contrary, The [Apostle](#) ([2 Corinthians 6:5-6](#)) reckons "[chastity](#)" together with "fastings" which pertain to abstinence.

I answer that, As stated above (Question 141, Article 4), [temperance](#) is properly about the [concupiscences](#) of the pleasures of touch: so that where there are different kinds of pleasure, there are different [virtues](#) comprised under [temperance](#). Now pleasures are proportionate to the actions whose perfections they are, as stated in Ethic. ix, 4,5: and it is evident that actions connected with the use of food whereby the [nature](#) of the [individual](#) is maintained differ generically from actions connected with the use of matters venereal, whereby the [nature](#) of the [species](#) is preserved. Therefore [chastity](#), which is about venereal pleasures, is a distinct [virtue](#) from abstinence, which is about pleasures of the palate.

Reply to Objection 1. Temperance is chiefly about pleasures of touch, not as regards the sense's judgment concerning the objects of touch. which judgment is of uniform character concerning all such objects, but as regards the use itself of those objects, as stated in Ethic. iii, 10. Now the uses of meats, drinks, and venereal matters differ in character. Wherefore there must needs be different [virtues](#), though they regard the one sense.

Reply to Objection 2. Venereal pleasures are more impetuous, and are more oppressive on the reason than the pleasures of the palate: and therefore they are in greater need of chastisement and restraint, since if one consent to them this increases the force of [concupiscence](#) and weakens the strength of the [mind](#). Hence [Augustine](#) says (Soliloq. i, 10): "I consider that nothing so casts down the manly mind from its heights as the fondling of [women](#), and those bodily contacts which belong to the [married](#) state."

Reply to Objection 3. The pleasures of the other senses do not pertain to the maintenance of [man's nature](#), except in so far as they are directed to pleasures of touch. Wherefore in the [matter](#) of such pleasures there is no other [virtue](#) comprised under [temperance](#). But the pleasures of the palate, though directed somewhat to venereal pleasures, are [essentially](#) directed to the preservation of [man's](#) life: wherefore by their very [nature](#) they have a special [virtue](#), although this [virtue](#) which is called abstinence directs its act to [chastity](#) as its end.

Article 4. Whether purity belongs especially to chastity?

Objection 1. It would seem that purity does not belong especially to chastity. For [Augustine](#) says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that "purity is a [virtue](#) of the [soul](#)." Therefore it is not something belonging to [chastity](#), but is of itself a [virtue](#) distinct from [chastity](#).

Objection 2. Further, "pudicitia" [purity] is derived from "pudor," which is equivalent to shame. Now shame, according to [Damascene](#) [De Fide Orth. ii, 15, is about a disgraceful act, and this is common to all [sinful](#) acts. Therefore purity belongs no more to [chastity](#) than to the other [virtues](#).

Objection 3. Further, the [Philosopher](#) says (Ethic. iii, 12) that "every kind of intemperance is most deserving of reproach." Now it would seem to belong to purity to avoid all that is deserving of reproach. Therefore purity belongs to all the parts of [temperance](#), and not especially to [chastity](#).

On the contrary, [Augustine](#) says (De Perseverantia xx): "We must give praise to purity, that he who has ears to hear, may put to none but a lawful use the organs intended for procreation." Now the use of these organs is the proper [matter](#) of [chastity](#). Therefore purity belongs properly to [chastity](#).

I answer that, As stated above (Objection 2), "pudicitia" [purity] takes its name from "pudor," which signifies shame. Hence purity must needs be properly about the things of which [man](#) is most ashamed. Now [men](#) are most ashamed of venereal acts, as [Augustine](#) remarks (De Civ. Dei xiv, 18), so much so that even the conjugal act, which is adorned by the honesty [Cf. 145] of marriage, is not devoid of shame: and this because the movement of the organs of generation is not subject to the command of [reason](#), as are the movements of the other external members. Now [man](#) is ashamed not only of this sexual union but also of all the signs thereof, as the [Philosopher](#) observes (Rhet. ii, 6). Consequently purity regards venereal matters properly, and especially the signs thereof, such as impure looks, kisses, and touches. And since the latter are more wont to be observed, purity regards rather these external signs, while [chastity](#) regards rather sexual union. Therefore purity is directed to [chastity](#), not as a [virtue](#) distinct therefrom, but as expressing a circumstance of chastity. Nevertheless the one is sometimes used to designate the other.

Reply to Objection 1. [Augustine](#) is here speaking of purity as designating [chastity](#).

Reply to Objection 2. Although every [vice](#) has a certain disgrace, the [vices](#) of intemperance are especially disgraceful, as stated above (Question 142, Article 4).

Reply to Objection 3. Among the [vices](#) of intemperance, venereal [sins](#) are most deserving of reproach, both on account of the insubordination of the genital organs, and because by these [sins](#) especially, the reason is absorbed.

Question 152. Virginity

1. [In what does virginity consist?](#)
2. [Is it lawful?](#)
3. [Is it a virtue?](#)
4. [Its excellence in comparison with marriage](#)
5. [Its excellence in comparison with the other virtues](#)

Article 1. Whether virginity consists in integrity of the flesh?

Objection 1. It would seem that [virginity](#) does not consist in integrity of the flesh. For [Augustine](#) says (De Nup. et Concup.) [The quotation is from De Sancta Virgin. xiii] that "[virginity](#) is the continual meditation on incorruption in a corruptible flesh." But meditation does not concern the flesh. Therefore [virginity](#) is not situated in the flesh.

Objection 2. Further, [virginity](#) denotes a kind of purity. Now [Augustine](#) says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that "purity dwells in the [soul](#)." Therefore [virginity](#) is not incorruption of the flesh.

Objection 3. Further, the integrity of the flesh would seem to consist in the seal of virginal purity. Yet sometimes the seal is broken without loss of [virginity](#). For [Augustine](#) says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that "those organs may be injured through being wounded by mischance. Physicians, too, sometimes do for the sake of health that which makes one shudder to see: and a midwife has been [known](#) to destroy by touch the [proof](#) of [virginity](#) that she sought." And he adds: "Nobody, I think, would be so foolish as to deem this [maiden](#) to have forfeited even bodily sanctity, though she lost the integrity of that organ." Therefore [virginity](#) does not consist in incorruption of the flesh.

Objection 4. Further, corruption of the flesh consists chiefly in resolution of the semen: and this may take place without copulation, whether one be asleep or awake. Yet seemingly [virginity](#) is not lost without copulation: for [Augustine](#) says (De Virgin. xiii) that "virginal integrity and [holy continency](#) that refrains from all sexual intercourse is the portion of [angels](#)." Therefore [virginity](#) does not consist in incorruption of the flesh.

On the contrary, [Augustine](#) says (De Virgin. viii) that "[virginity](#) is [continence](#) whereby integrity of the flesh is vowed, [consecrated](#) and observed in [honor](#) of the [Creator](#) of both [soul](#) and flesh."

I answer that, [Virginity](#) takes its name apparently from "viror" [freshness], and just as a thing is described as fresh and retaining its freshness, so long as it is not parched by excessive heat, so too, [virginity](#) denotes that the [person](#) possessed thereof is unseared by the heat of [concupiscence](#) which is experienced in achieving the greatest bodily pleasure which is that of sexual intercourse. Hence, [Ambrose](#) says (De Virgin. i, 5) that "virginal [chastity](#) is integrity free of pollution."

Now venereal pleasures offer three points for consideration. The first is on the part of the body, viz. the violation of the seal of [virginity](#). The second is the link between that which concerns the [soul](#) and that which concerns the body, and this is the resolution of the semen, [causing](#) sensible pleasure. The third is entirely on the part of the [soul](#), namely the purpose of attaining this pleasure. Of these three the first is [accidental](#) to the moral act, which as such must be considered in reference to the [soul](#). The second stands in the relation of [matter](#) to the moral act, since the sensible [passions](#) are the matters of moral acts. But the third stands in the position of form and complement, because the [essence](#) of [morality](#) is perfected in that which concerns the reason. Since then [virginity](#) consists in freedom from the aforesaid corruption, it follows that the integrity of the bodily organ is [accidental](#) to [virginity](#); while freedom from pleasure in resolution of the semen is related thereto materially; and the purpose of perpetually abstaining from this pleasure is the formal and complete element in [virginity](#).

Reply to Objection 1. This definition of [Augustine's](#) expresses directly that which is formal in [virginity](#). For "meditation" denotes reason's purpose; and the addition "perpetual" does not imply that a [virgin](#) must always retain this meditation actually, but that she should bear in mind the purpose of always persevering therein. The material element is expressed indirectly by the words "on incorruption in a corruptible body." This is added to show the difficulty of [virginity](#): for if the flesh were incorruptible, it would not be difficult to maintain a perpetual meditation on incorruption.

Reply to Objection 2. It is [true](#) that purity, as to its [essence](#), is in the [soul](#); but as to its [matter](#), it is in the body: and it is the same with [virginity](#). Wherefore [Augustine](#) says (De Virgin. viii) that "although [virginity](#) resides in the flesh," and for this reason is a bodily [quality](#), "yet it is a [spiritual](#) thing, which a [holy continency](#) fosters and preserves."

Reply to Objection 3. As stated above, the integrity of a bodily organ is [accidental](#) to [virginity](#), in so far as a [person](#), through purposely abstaining from venereal pleasure, retains the integrity of a bodily organ. Hence if the organ lose its integrity by chance in some other way, this is no more prejudicial to [virginity](#) than being deprived of a hand or foot.

Reply to Objection 4. Pleasure resulting from resolution of semen may arise in two ways. If this be the result of the [mind's](#) purpose, it destroys [virginity](#), whether copulation takes place or not. [Augustine](#), however, mentions copulation, because such like resolution is the ordinary and [natural](#) result thereof. On another way this may happen beside the purpose of the [mind](#), either during sleep, or through [violence](#) and without the [mind's](#) consent, although the flesh derives pleasure from it, or again through weakness of [nature](#), as in the case of those who are subject to a flow of semen. On such cases [virginity](#) is not forfeit, because such like pollution is not the result of impurity which excludes [virginity](#).

Article 2. Whether virginity is unlawful?

Objection 1. It would seem that [virginity](#) is unlawful. For whatever is contrary to a precept of the [natural law](#) is unlawful. Now just as the words of [Genesis 2:16](#), "Of every tree" that is in "paradise, thou shalt eat," indicate a precept of the [natural law](#), in reference to the preservation of the [individual](#), so also the words of [Genesis 1:28](#), "Increase and multiply, and fill the earth,"

express a precept of the [natural law](#), in reference to the preservation of the [species](#). Therefore just as it would be a [sin](#) to abstain from all food, as this would be to act counter to the [good](#) of the [individual](#), so too it is a [sin](#) to abstain altogether from the act of procreation, for this is to act against the [good](#) of the [species](#).

Objection 2. Further, whatever declines from the mean of [virtue](#) is apparently [sinful](#). Now [virginity](#) declines from the mean of [virtue](#), since it abstains from all venereal pleasures: for the [Philosopher](#) says (Ethic. ii, 2), that "he who revels in every pleasure, and abstains from not even one, is intemperate: but he who refrains from all is loutish and insensible." Therefore [virginity](#) is something [sinful](#).

Objection 3. Further, punishment is not due save for a [vice](#). Now in olden times those were punished who led a celibate life, as Valerius Maximus asserts [Dict. Fact. Mem. ii, 9. Hence according to [Augustine](#) (De Vera Relig. iii) [Plato](#) "is said to have sacrificed to [nature](#), in order that he might [atone](#) for his perpetual [continency](#) as though it were a [sin](#)." Therefore [virginity](#) is a [sin](#).

On the contrary, No [sin](#) is a matter of direct counsel. But [virginity](#) is a matter of direct counsel: for it is written ([1 Corinthians 7:25](#)): "Concerning [virgins](#) I have no commandment of the Lord: but I give counsel." Therefore [virginity](#) is not an unlawful thing.

I answer that, In [human acts](#), those are [sinful](#) which are against right reason. Now right reason requires that things directed to an end should be used in a measure proportionate to that end. Again, [man's good](#) is threefold as stated in Ethic. i, 8; one consisting in external things, for instance [riches](#); another, consisting in bodily goods; the third, consisting in the goods of the [soul](#) among which the goods of the contemplative life take precedence of the goods of the active life, as the [Philosopher](#) shows (Ethic. x, 7), and as [our Lord](#) declared ([Luke 10:42](#)), "[Mary](#) hath chosen the better part." Of these goods those that are external are directed to those which belong to the body, and those which belong to the body are directed to those which belong to the [soul](#); and furthermore those which belong to the active life are directed to those which belong to the life of [contemplation](#). Accordingly, right reason dictates that one use external goods in a measure proportionate to the body, and in like manner as regards the rest. Wherefore if a man refrain from possessing certain things (which otherwise it were [good](#) for him to possess), for the sake of his body's [good](#), or of the [contemplation](#) of [truth](#), this is not [sinful](#), but in accord with right reason. On like manner if a man abstain from bodily pleasures, in order more freely to give himself to the [contemplation](#) of [truth](#), this is in accordance with the rectitude of reason. Now [holy virginity](#) refrains from all venereal pleasure in order more freely to have leisure for Divine [contemplation](#): for the [Apostle](#) says ([1 Corinthians 7:34](#)): "The unmarried [woman](#) and the [virgin](#) thinketh on the things of the Lord: that she may be [holy](#) in both body and in spirit. But she that is [married](#) thinketh on the things of the world, how she may please her husband." Therefore it follows that [virginity](#) instead of being [sinful](#) is worthy of praise.

Reply to Objection 1. A precept implies a [duty](#), as stated above (Question 122, Article 1). Now there are two kinds of [duty](#). There is the [duty](#) that has to be fulfilled by one [person](#); and a [duty](#) of this kind cannot be set aside without [sin](#). The other [duty](#) has to be fulfilled by the multitude, and the fulfilment of this kind of [duty](#) is not binding on each one of the multitude. For the multitude

has many [obligations](#) which cannot be discharged by the [individual](#); but are fulfilled by one [person](#) doing this, and another doing that. Accordingly the precept of [natural law](#) which binds [man](#) to eat must needs be fulfilled by each [individual](#), otherwise the [individual](#) cannot be sustained. On the other hand, the precept of procreation regards the whole multitude of [men](#), which needs not only to multiply in body, but also to advance spiritually. Wherefore sufficient provision is made for the [human](#) multitude, if some betake themselves to carnal procreation, while others abstaining from this betake themselves to the [contemplation](#) of Divine things, for the beauty and welfare of the whole [human race](#). Thus too in an army, some take sentry [duty](#), others are standard-bearers, and others fight with the sword: yet all these things are [necessary](#) for the multitude, although they cannot be done by one [person](#).

Reply to Objection 2. The [person](#) who, beside the dictate of right reason, abstains from all pleasures through aversion, as it were, for pleasure as such, is insensible as a country lout. But a [virgin](#) does not refrain from every pleasure, but only from that which is venereal: and abstains therefrom according to right reason, as stated above. Now the mean of [virtue](#) is fixed with reference, not to [quantity](#) but to right reason, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6: wherefore it is said of the magnanimous (Ethic. iv, 3) that "in point of [quantity](#) he goes to the extreme, but in point of becomingness he follows the mean."

Reply to Objection 3. Laws are framed according to what occurs more frequently. Now it seldom happened in olden times that anyone refrained from all venereal pleasure through love of the [contemplation](#) of [truth](#): as [Plato](#) alone is related to have done. Hence it was not through thinking this a [sin](#), that he offered sacrifice, but "because he yielded to the [false](#) opinion of his fellow countrymen," as [Augustine](#) remarks (De Vera Relig. iii).

Article 3. Whether virginity is a virtue?

Objection 1. It would seem that [virginity](#) is not a [virtue](#). For "no [virtue](#) is in us by [nature](#)," as the [Philosopher](#) says (Ethic. ii, 1). Now [virginity](#) is in us by [nature](#), since all are [virgins](#) when born. Therefore [virginity](#) is not a [virtue](#).

Objection 2. Further, whoever has one [virtue](#) has all [virtues](#), as stated above (I-II, 65, 1). Yet some have other [virtues](#) without having [virginity](#): else, since none can go to the heavenly kingdom without [virtue](#), no one could go there without [virginity](#), which would involve the condemnation of marriage. Therefore [virginity](#) is not a [virtue](#).

Objection 3. Further, every [virtue](#) is recovered by penance. But [virginity](#) is not recovered by penance: wherefore [Jerome](#) says [Ep. xxii ad Eustoch.]: "Other things [God](#) can do, but He cannot restore the [virgin](#) after her downfall." Therefore seemingly [virginity](#) is not a [virtue](#).

Objection 4. Further, no [virtue](#) is lost without [sin](#). Yet [virginity](#) is lost without [sin](#), namely by marriage. Therefore [virginity](#) is not a [virtue](#).

Objection 5. Further, [virginity](#) is condivided with [widowhood](#) and conjugal purity. But neither of these is a [virtue](#). Therefore [virginity](#) is not a [virtue](#).

On the contrary, [Ambrose](#) says (De Virgin. i, 3): "Love of [virginity](#) moves us to say something about [virginity](#), lest by passing it over we should seem to cast a slight on what is a [virtue](#) of high degree."

I answer that, As stated above ([Article 1](#)), the formal and complete element in [virginity](#) is the purpose of abstaining from venereal pleasure, which purpose is rendered praiseworthy by its end, in so far, to wit, as this is done in order to have leisure for Divine things: while the material element in [virginity](#) is integrity of the flesh free of all experience of venereal pleasure. Now it is manifest that where a [good](#) action has a special [matter](#) through having a special excellence, there is a special kind of [virtue](#): for example, magnificence which is about great expenditure is for this reason a special [virtue](#) distinct from liberality, which is about all uses of money in general. Now to keep oneself free from the experience of venereal pleasure has an excellence of its own deserving of greater praise than keeping oneself free from inordinate venereal pleasure. Wherefore [virginity](#) is a special [virtue](#) being related to [chastity](#) as magnificence to liberality.

Reply to Objection 1. Men have from their birth that which is material in [virginity](#), namely integrity of the flesh and freedom from venereal experience. But they have not that which is formal in [virginity](#), namely the purpose of safeguarding this integrity for [God's](#) sake, which purpose gives [virginity](#) its character of [virtue](#). Hence [Augustine](#) says (De Virgin. xi): "Nor do we praise [virgins](#) for being [virgins](#), but, because their [virginity](#) is [consecrated](#) to [God](#) by [holy continency](#)."

Reply to Objection 2. Virtues are connected together by reason of that which is formal in them, namely [charity](#), or by reason of [prudence](#), as stated above (129, 3, ad 2), but not by reason of that which is material in them. For nothing hinders a [virtuous man](#) from providing the [matter](#) of one [virtue](#), and not the [matter](#) of another [virtue](#): thus a poor [man](#) has the [matter](#) of [temperance](#), but not that of magnificence. It is in this way that one who has the other [virtues](#) lacks the [matter](#) of [virginity](#), namely the aforesaid integrity of the flesh: nevertheless he can have that which is formal in [virginity](#), his mind being so prepared that he has the purpose of safeguarding this same integrity of the flesh, should it be fitting for him to do so: even as a poor [man](#) may be so prepared in mind as to have the purpose of being magnificent in his expenditure, were he in a position to do so: or again as a prosperous [man](#) is so prepared in mind as to purpose bearing misfortune with equanimity: without which preparedness of the [mind](#) no [man](#) can be [virtuous](#).

Reply to Objection 3. Virtue can be recovered by penance as regards that which is formal in [virtue](#), but not as to that which is material therein. For if a magnificent [man](#) has squandered all his [wealth](#) he does not recover his [riches](#) by repenting of his [sin](#). On like manner a [person](#) who has lost [virginity](#) by [sin](#), recovers by repenting, not the [matter](#) of [virginity](#) but the purpose of [virginity](#).

As regards the [matter](#) of [virginity](#) there is that which can be [miraculously](#) restored by [God](#), namely the integrity of the organ, which we hold to be [accidental](#) to [virginity](#): while there is something else which cannot be restored even by [miracle](#), to wit, that one who has experienced venereal [lust](#) should cease to have had that experience. For [God](#) cannot make that which is done not to have been done, as stated in I, 25, 4.

Reply to Objection 4. [Virginity](#) as a [virtue](#) denotes the purpose, confirmed by [vow](#), of observing perpetual integrity. For [Augustine](#) says (De Virgin. viii) that "by [virginity](#), integrity of the flesh is vowed, [consecrated](#) and observed in [honor](#) of the [Creator](#) of both [soul](#) and flesh." Hence [virginity](#), as a [virtue](#), is never lost without [sin](#).

Reply to Objection 5. Conjugal [chastity](#) is deserving of praise merely because it abstains from unlawful pleasures: hence no excellence attaches to it above that of [chastity](#) in general. Widowhood, however, adds something to [chastity](#) in general; but it does not attain to that which is perfect in this matter, namely to entire freedom from venereal pleasure; [virginity](#) alone achieves this. Wherefore [virginity](#) alone is accounted a [virtue](#) above [chastity](#), even as magnificence is reckoned above liberality.

Article 4. Whether virginity is more excellent than marriage?

Objection 1. It would seem that [virginity](#) is not more excellent than marriage. For [Augustine](#) says (De Bono Conjug. xxi): "Continence was equally [meritorious](#) in John who remained unmarried and [Abraham](#) who begot children." Now a greater [virtue](#) has greater [merit](#). Therefore [virginity](#) is not a greater [virtue](#) than conjugal [chastity](#).

Objection 2. Further, the praise accorded a [virtuous man](#) depends on his [virtue](#). If, then, [virginity](#) were preferable to conjugal [continence](#), it would seem to follow that every [virgin](#) is to be praised more than any [married woman](#). But this is [untrue](#). Therefore [virginity](#) is not preferable to marriage.

Objection 3. Further, the common [good](#) takes precedence of the private [good](#), according to the [Philosopher](#) (Ethic. i, 2). Now marriage is directed to the common [good](#): for [Augustine](#) says (De Bono Conjug. xvi): "What food is to a man's wellbeing, such is sexual intercourse to the welfare of the [human race](#)." On the other hand, [virginity](#) is ordered to the [individual good](#), namely in order to avoid what the [Apostle](#) calls the "tribulation of the flesh," to which [married](#) people are subject ([1 Corinthians 7:28](#)). Therefore [virginity](#) is not greater than conjugal [continence](#).

On the contrary, [Augustine](#) says (De Virgin. xix): "Both solid reason and the authority of [Holy Writ](#) show that neither is marriage [sinful](#), nor is it to be equaled to the [good](#) of virginal [continence](#) or even to that of [widowhood](#)."

I answer that, According to [Jerome](#) (Contra Jovin. i) the [error](#) of Jovinian consisted in holding [virginity](#) not to be preferable to marriage. This [error](#) is refuted above all by the example of [Christ](#) Who both chose a [virgin](#) for His mother, and remained Himself a [virgin](#), and by the teaching of the [Apostle](#) who ([1 Corinthians 7](#)) counsels [virginity](#) as the greater [good](#). It is also refuted by reason, both because a Divine [good](#) takes precedence of a [human good](#), and because the [good](#) of the [soul](#) is preferable to the [good](#) of the body, and again because the [good](#) of the contemplative life is better than that of the active life. Now [virginity](#) is directed to the [good](#) of the [soul](#) in respect of the contemplative life, which consists in thinking "on the things of [God](#)" [[Vulgate](#): 'the Lord'], whereas marriage is directed to the [good](#) of the body, namely the bodily increase of the

[human race](#), and belongs to the active life, since the [man](#) and [woman](#) who embrace the [married](#) life have to think "on the things of the world," as the [Apostle](#) says ([1 Corinthians 7:34](#)). Without [doubt](#) therefore [virginity](#) is preferable to conjugal [continence](#).

Reply to Objection 1. Merit is measured not only by the kind of action, but still more by the [mind](#) of the agent. Now [Abraham](#) had a mind so disposed, that he was prepared to observe [virginity](#), if it were in keeping with the times for him to do so. Wherefore in him conjugal [continence](#) was equally [meritorious](#) with the virginal [continence](#) of John, as regards the [essential](#) reward, but not as regards the [accidental](#) reward. Hence [Augustine](#) says (De Bono Conjug. xxi) that both "the celibacy of John and the marriage of [Abraham](#) fought [Christ's](#) battle in keeping with the difference of the times: but John was continent even in [deed](#), whereas [Abraham](#) was continent only in [habit](#)."

Reply to Objection 2. Though [virginity](#) is better than conjugal [continence](#), a [married person](#) may be better than a [virgin](#) for two reasons. First, on the part of [chastity](#) itself; if to wit, the [married person](#) is more prepared in mind to observe [virginity](#), if it should be expedient, than the one who is actually a [virgin](#). Hence [Augustine](#) (De Bono Conjug. xxii) charges the [virgin](#) to say: "I am no better than [Abraham](#), although the [chastity](#) of celibacy is better than the [chastity](#) of marriage." Further on he gives the reason for this: "For what I do now, he would have done better, if it were fitting for him to do it then; and what they did I would even do now if it behooved me now to do it." Secondly, because perhaps the [person](#) who is not a [virgin](#) has some more excellent [virtue](#). Wherefore [Augustine](#) says (De Virgin. xlv): "Whence does a [virgin know](#) the things that belong to the Lord, however solicitous she be about them, if perchance on account of some [mental](#) fault she be not yet ripe for [martyrdom](#), whereas this [woman](#) to whom she delighted in preferring herself is already able to drink the [chalice](#) of the Lord?"

Reply to Objection 3. The common [good](#) takes precedence of the private [good](#), if it be of the same genus: but it may be that the private [good](#) is better generically. It is thus that the [virginity](#) that is [consecrated](#) to [God](#) is preferable to carnal fruitfulness. Hence [Augustine](#) says (De Virgin. ix): "It must be confessed that the fruitfulness of the flesh, even of those [women](#) who in these times seek naught else from marriage but children in order to make them servants of [Christ](#), cannot compensate for lost [virginity](#)."

Article 5. Whether virginity is the greatest of virtues?

Objection 1. It would seem that [virginity](#) is the greatest of [virtues](#). For [Cyprian](#) says (De Virgin. [De Habitu Virg.]): "We address ourselves now to the [virgins](#). Sublime is their [glory](#), but no less exalted is their vocation. They are a flower of the [Church's](#) sowing, the [pride](#) and ornament of [spiritual grace](#), the most [honored](#) portion of [Christ's](#) flock."

Objection 2. Further, a greater reward is due to the greater [virtue](#). Now the greatest reward is due to [virginity](#), namely the hundredfold fruit, according to a [gloss](#) on [Matthew 13:23](#). Therefore [virginity](#) is the greatest of the [virtues](#).

Objection 3. Further, the more a [virtue](#) conforms us to [Christ](#), the greater it is. Now [virginity](#) above all conforms us to [Christ](#); for it is declared in the [Apocalypse 14:4](#) that [virgins](#) "follow the

Lamb whithersoever He goeth," and ([Apocalypse 14:3](#)) that they sing "a new canticle," which "no" other "[man](#)" could say. Therefore [virginity](#) is the greatest of the [virtues](#).

On the contrary, [Augustine](#) says (De Virgin. xlvi): "No one, methinks, would dare prefer [virginity](#) to [martyrdom](#)," and (De Virgin. xlv): "The authority of the [Church](#) informs the faithful in no uncertain manner, so that they [know](#) in what place the [martyrs](#) and the [holy virgins](#) who have departed this life are commemorated in the [Sacrament of the Altar](#)." By this we are given to understand that [martyrdom](#), and also the monastic state, are preferable to [virginity](#).

I answer that, A thing may excel all others in two ways. First, in some particular genus: and thus [virginity](#) is most excellent, namely in the genus of [chastity](#), since it surpasses the [chastity](#) both of [widowhood](#) and of marriage. And because comeliness is ascribed to [chastity](#) antonomastically, it follows that surpassing beauty is ascribed to chastity. Wherefore [Ambrose](#) says (De Virgin. i, 7): "Can anyone esteem any beauty greater than a [virgin's](#), since she is beloved of her King, approved by her Judge, dedicated to her Lord, [consecrated](#) to her [God](#)?" Secondly, a thing may be most excellent simply, and in this way [virginity](#) is not the most excellent of the [virtues](#). Because the end always excels that which is directed to the end; and the more effectively a thing is directed to the end, the better it is. Now the end which renders [virginity](#) praiseworthy is that one may have leisure for Divine things, as stated above ([Article 4](#)). Wherefore the theological [virtues](#) as well as the [virtue](#) of religion, the acts of which consist in being occupied about Divine things, are preferable to [virginity](#). Moreover, [martyrs](#) work more mightily in order to cleave to [God](#)--since for this end they hold their own life in contempt; and those who dwell in monasteries--since for this end they give up their own will and all that they may possess--than [virgins](#) who renounce venereal pleasure for that same purpose. Therefore [virginity](#) is not simply the greatest of [virtues](#).

Reply to Objection 1. Virgins are "the more [honored](#) portion of [Christ's](#) flock," and "their [glory](#) more sublime" in comparison with [widows](#) and [married women](#).

Reply to Objection 2. The hundredfold fruit is ascribed to [virginity](#), according to [Jerome](#) [Ep. cxxiii ad Ageruch.], on account of its superiority to [widowhood](#), to which the sixtyfold fruit is ascribed, and to marriage, to which is ascribed the thirtyfold fruit. But according to [Augustine](#) (De QQ. Evang. i, 9), "the hundredfold fruit is given to [martyrs](#), the sixtyfold to [virgins](#), and the thirtyfold to [married persons](#)." Wherefore it does not follow that [virginity](#) is simply the greatest of [virtues](#), but only in comparison with other degrees of [chastity](#).

Reply to Objection 3. Virgins "follow the Lamb whithersoever He goeth," because they imitate [Christ](#), by integrity not only of the [mind](#) but also of the flesh, as [Augustine](#) says (De Virgin. xxvii). Wherefore they follow the [Lamb](#) in more ways, but this does not imply that they follow more closely, because other [virtues](#) make us cleave to [God](#) more closely by imitation of the [mind](#). The "new [hymn](#)" which [virgins](#) alone sing, is their [joy](#) at having preserved integrity of the flesh.

Question 153. Lust

Article 1. Whether the matter of lust is only venereal desires and pleasures?

Objection 1. It would seem that the [matter](#) of [lust](#) is not only venereal desires and pleasures. For [Augustine](#) says (Confess. ii, 6) that "[lust](#) affects to be called surfeit and abundance." But surfeit regards meat and drink, while abundance refers to [riches](#). Therefore [lust](#) is not properly about venereal desires and pleasures.

Objection 2. Further, it is written ([Proverbs 20:1](#)): "Wine is a [lustful](#) [[Douay](#): 'luxurious'] thing." Now wine is connected with pleasure of meat and drink. Therefore these would seem to be the [matter](#) of [lust](#).

Objection 3. Further, [lust](#) is defined "as the desire of wanton pleasure" [[Alexander of Hales](#), Summ. Theol. ii, cxvli]. But wanton pleasure regards not only venereal matters but also many others. Therefore [lust](#) is not only about venereal desires and pleasures.

On the contrary, To the [lustful](#) it is said (De Vera Relig. iii [Written by [St. Augustine](#)]): "He that soweth in the flesh, of the flesh shall reap corruption." Now the sowing of the flesh refers to venereal pleasures. Therefore these belong to [lust](#).

I answer that, As [Isidore](#) says (Etym. x), "a [lustful man](#) is one who is debauched with pleasures." Now venereal pleasures above all debauch a man's mind. Therefore [lust](#) is especially concerned with such like pleasures.

Reply to Objection 1. Even as [temperance](#) chiefly and properly applies to pleasures of touch, yet consequently and by a kind of likeness is referred to other matters, so too, [lust](#) applies chiefly to venereal pleasures, which more than anything else work the greatest havoc in a man's mind, yet secondarily it applies to any other matters pertaining to excess. Hence a [gloss](#) on [Galatians 5:19](#) says "[lust](#) is any kind of surfeit."

Reply to Objection 2. Wine is said to be a [lustful](#) thing, either in the sense in which surfeit in any [matter](#) is ascribed to [lust](#), or because the use of too much wine affords an incentive to venereal pleasure.

Reply to Objection 3. Although wanton pleasure applies to other matters, the name of [lust](#) has a special application to venereal pleasures, to which also wantonness is specially applicable, as [Augustine](#) remarks (De Civ. xiv, 15,16).

Article 2. Whether no venereal act can be without sin?

Objection 1. It would seem that no venereal act can be without [sin](#). For nothing but [sin](#) would seem to hinder [virtue](#). Now every venereal act is a great hindrance to [virtue](#). For [Augustine](#) says

(Soliloq. i, 10): "I consider that nothing so casts down the manly mind from its height as the fondling of a [woman](#), and those bodily contacts." Therefore, seemingly, no venereal act is without [sin](#).

Objection 2. Further, any excess that makes one forsake the [good](#) of reason is [sinful](#), because [virtue](#) is corrupted by "excess" and "deficiency" as stated in Ethic. ii, 2. Now in every venereal act there is excess of pleasure, since it so absorbs the [mind](#), that "it is incompatible with the act of understanding," as the [Philosopher](#) observes (Ethic. vii, 11); and as [Jerome](#) [[Origen](#), Hom. vi in Num.; Cf. [Jerome](#), Ep. cxxiii ad Ageruch.] states, rendered the hearts of the [prophets](#), for the moment, insensible to the spirit of [prophecy](#). Therefore no venereal act can be without [sin](#).

Objection 3. Further, the [cause](#) is more powerful than its effect. Now [original sin](#) is transmitted to children by [concupiscence](#), without which no venereal act is possible, as [Augustine](#) declares (De Nup. et Concup. i, 24). Therefore no venereal act can be without [sin](#).

On the contrary, [Augustine](#) says (De Bono Conjug. xxv): "This is a sufficient answer to [heretics](#), if only they will understand that no [sin](#) is committed in that which is against neither [nature](#), nor morals, nor a commandment": and he refers to the act of sexual intercourse between the patriarchs of old and their several wives. Therefore not every venereal act is a [sin](#).

I answer that, A [sin](#), in [human acts](#), is that which is against the order of reason. Now the order of reason consists in its ordering everything to its end in a fitting manner. Wherefore it is no [sin](#) if one, by the dictate of [reason](#), makes use of certain things in a fitting manner and order for the end to which they are adapted, provided this end be something [truly good](#). Now just as the preservation of the bodily [nature](#) of one [individual](#) is a [true good](#), so, too, is the preservation of the [nature](#) of the [human species](#) a very great [good](#). And just as the use of food is directed to the preservation of life in the [individual](#), so is the use of venereal acts directed to the preservation of the whole [human race](#). Hence [Augustine](#) says (De Bono Conjug. xvi): "What food is to a man's well being, such is sexual intercourse to the welfare of the whole [human race](#)." Wherefore just as the use of food can be without [sin](#), if it be taken in due manner and order, as required for the welfare of the body, so also the use of venereal acts can be without [sin](#), provided they be performed in due manner and order, in keeping with the end of [human](#) procreation.

Reply to Objection 1. A thing may be a hindrance to [virtue](#) in two ways. First, as regards the ordinary degree of [virtue](#), and as to this nothing but [sin](#) is an obstacle to [virtue](#). Secondly, as regards the perfect degree of [virtue](#), and as to this [virtue](#) may be hindered by that which is not a [sin](#), but a lesser [good](#). On this way sexual intercourse casts down the [mind](#) not from [virtue](#), but from the height, i.e. the perfection of [virtue](#). Hence [Augustine](#) says (De Bono Conjug. viii): "Just as that was [good](#) which Martha did when busy about serving [holy](#) men, yet better still that which Mary did in hearing the word of [God](#): so, too, we praise the [good](#) of Susanna's conjugal [chastity](#), yet we prefer the [good](#) of the [widow](#) Anna, and much more that of the Virgin Mary."

Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (152, 2, ad 2; I-II, 64, 2), the mean of [virtue](#) depends not on [quantity](#) but on conformity with right reason: and consequently the exceeding pleasure attaching to a venereal act directed according to reason, is not opposed to the mean of [virtue](#). Moreover, [virtue](#) is not concerned with the amount of pleasure experienced by the external sense,

as this depends on the disposition of the body; what matters is how much the interior [appetite](#) is affected by that pleasure. Nor does it follow that the act in question is contrary to [virtue](#), from the fact that the free [act](#) of [reason](#) in considering [spiritual](#) things is incompatible with the aforesaid pleasure. For it is not contrary to [virtue](#), if the [act](#) of [reason](#) be sometimes interrupted for something that is done in accordance with reason, else it would be against [virtue](#) for a [person](#) to set himself to sleep. That venereal [concupiscence](#) and pleasure are not subject to the command and moderation of [reason](#), is due to the punishment of the first [sin](#), inasmuch as the reason, for rebelling against [God](#), deserved that its body should rebel against it, as [Augustine](#) says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13).

Reply to Objection 3. As [Augustine](#) says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13), "the child, shackled with [original sin](#), is born of fleshly [concupiscence](#) (which is not imputed as [sin](#) to the regenerate) as of a daughter of [sin](#)." Hence it does not follow that the act in question is a [sin](#), but that it contains something penal resulting from the first [sin](#).

Article 3. Whether the lust that is about venereal acts can be a sin?

Objection 1. It would seem that [lust](#) about venereal acts cannot be a [sin](#). For the venereal act consists in the emission of semen which is the surplus from food, according to the [Philosopher](#) (De Gener. Anim. i, 18). But there is no [sin](#) attaching to the emission of other superfluities. Therefore neither can there be any [sin](#) in venereal acts.

Objection 2. Further, everyone can lawfully make what use he pleases of what is his. But in the venereal act a man uses only what is his own, except perhaps in [adultery](#) or rape. Therefore there can be no [sin](#) in venereal acts, and consequently [lust](#) is no [sin](#).

Objection 3. Further, every [sin](#) has an opposite [vice](#). But, seemingly, no [vice](#) is opposed to [lust](#). Therefore [lust](#) is not a [sin](#).

On the contrary, The [cause](#) is more powerful than its effect. Now wine is forbidden on account of [lust](#), according to the saying of the [Apostle](#) ([Ephesians 5:18](#)), "Be not drunk with wine wherein is [lust](#) [[Douay](#): 'luxury']". Therefore [lust](#) is forbidden.

Further, it is numbered among the works of the flesh: [Galatians 5:19](#) [[Douay](#): 'luxury'].

I answer that, The more [necessary](#) a thing is, the more it behooves one to observe the order of reason in its regard; wherefore the more [sinful](#) it becomes if the order of reason be forsaken. Now the use of venereal acts, as stated in the foregoing Article, is most [necessary](#) for the common [good](#), namely the preservation of the [human race](#). Wherefore there is the greatest [necessity](#) for observing the order of reason in this matter: so that if anything be done in this connection against the dictate of reason's ordering, it will be a [sin](#). Now [lust](#) consists [essentially](#) in exceeding the order and mode of reason in the [matter](#) of venereal acts. Wherefore without any [doubt](#) [lust](#) is a [sin](#).

Reply to Objection 1. As the [Philosopher](#) says in the same book (De Gener. Anim. i, 18), "the semen is a surplus that is needed." For it is said to be superfluous, because it is the residue from the action of the nutritive power, yet it is needed for the work of the generative power. But the other superfluities of the [human](#) body are such as not to be needed, so that it matters not how they are emitted, provided one observe the decencies of social life. It is different with the emission of semen, which should be accomplished in a manner befitting the end for which it is needed.

Reply to Objection 2. As the [Apostle](#) says ([1 Corinthians 6:20](#)) in speaking against [lust](#), "You are bought with a great price: glorify and bear [God](#) in your body." Wherefore by inordinately using the body through [lust](#) a man wrongs [God](#) Who is the Supreme Lord of our body. Hence [Augustine](#) says (De Decem. Chord. 10 [Serm. ix (xcvi de Temp.)]): "[God](#) Who thus governs His servants for their [good](#), not for His, made this order and commandment, lest unlawful pleasures should destroy His temple which thou hast begun to be."

Reply to Objection 3. The opposite of [lust](#) is not found in many, since men are more inclined to pleasure. Yet the contrary [vice](#) is comprised under insensibility, and occurs in one who has such a dislike for sexual intercourse as not to pay the marriage debt.

Article 4. Whether lust is a capital vice?

Objection 1. It seems that [lust](#) is not a capital [vice](#). For [lust](#) is apparently the same as "[uncleanness](#)," according to a [gloss](#) on [Ephesians 5:3](#) (Cf. [2 Corinthians 12:21](#)). But [uncleanness](#) is a daughter of [gluttony](#), according to [Gregory](#) (Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore [lust](#) is not a capital [vice](#).

Objection 2. Further, [Isidore](#) says (De Summo Bono ii, 39) that "as [pride](#) of mind leads to the depravity of [lust](#), so does [humility](#) of mind safeguard the [chastity](#) of the flesh." Now it is seemingly contrary to the [nature](#) of a capital [vice](#) to arise from another [vice](#). Therefore [lust](#) is not a capital [vice](#).

Objection 3. Further, [lust](#) is [caused](#) by [despair](#), according to [Ephesians 4:19](#), "Who despairing, have given themselves up to lasciviousness." But [despair](#) is not a capital [vice](#); indeed, it is accounted a daughter of sloth, as stated above (35, 4, ad 2). Much less, therefore, is [lust](#) a capital [vice](#).

On the contrary, [Gregory](#) (Moral. xxxi, 45) places [lust](#) among the capital [vices](#).

I answer that, As stated above (148, 5; I-II, 84, 3,4), a capital [vice](#) is one that has a very desirable end, so that through desire for that end, a man proceeds to commit many [sins](#), all of which are said to arise from that [vice](#) as from a principal [vice](#). Now the end of [lust](#) is venereal pleasure, which is very great. Wherefore this pleasure is very desirable as regards the sensitive [appetite](#), both on account of the intensity of the pleasure, and because such like [concupiscence](#) is connatural to [man](#). Therefore it is evident that [lust](#) is a capital [vice](#).

Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (Question 148, Article 6), according to some, the [uncleanness](#) which is reckoned a daughter of [gluttony](#) is a certain [uncleanness](#) of the body, and thus the objection is not to the point. If, however, it denote the [uncleanness](#) of [lust](#), we must reply that it is [caused](#) by [gluttony](#) materially--in so far as [gluttony](#) provides the bodily [matter](#) of [lust](#)--and not under the aspect of final [cause](#), in which respect chiefly the capital [vices](#) are said to be the [cause](#) of others.

Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (132, 4, ad 1), when we were treating of vainglory, [pride](#) is accounted the common mother of all [sins](#), so that even the capital [vices](#) originate therefrom.

Reply to Objection 3. Certain [persons](#) refrain from [lustful](#) pleasures chiefly through hope of the [glory](#) to come, which hope is removed by [despair](#), so that the latter is a [cause](#) of [lust](#), as removing an obstacle thereto, not as its direct [cause](#); whereas this is seemingly [necessary](#) for a capital [vice](#).

Article 5. Whether the daughters of lust are fittingly described?

Objection 1. It would seem that the daughters of [lust](#) are unfittingly reckoned to be "blindness of mind, thoughtlessness, inconstancy, rashness, self-love, [hatred](#) of [God](#), love of this world and abhorrence or [despair](#) of a future world." For [mental](#) blindness, thoughtlessness and rashness pertain to imprudence, which is to be found in every [sin](#), even as [prudence](#) is in every [virtue](#). Therefore they should not be reckoned especially as daughters of [lust](#).

Objection 2. Further, constancy is reckoned a part of [fortitude](#), as stated above (128, ad 6; 137, 3). But [lust](#) is contrary, not to [fortitude](#) but to [temperance](#). Therefore inconstancy is not a daughter of [lust](#).

Objection 3. Further, "Self-love extending to the contempt of [God](#)" is the origin of every [sin](#), as [Augustine](#) says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28). Therefore it should not be accounted a daughter of [lust](#).

Objection 4. Further, [Isidore](#) [QQ. in Deut., qu. xvi] mentions four, namely, "obscene," "scurrilous," "wanton" and "foolish talking." There the aforesaid enumeration would seem to be superfluous.

On the contrary, stands the authority of [Gregory](#) (Moral. xxxi, 45).

I answer that, When the lower powers are strongly moved towards their objects, the result is that the higher powers are hindered and disordered in their acts. Now the effect of the [vice](#) of [lust](#) is that the lower [appetite](#), namely the [concupiscible](#), is most vehemently intent on its object, to wit, the object of pleasure, on account of the vehemence of the pleasure. Consequently the higher powers, namely the reason and the [will](#), are most grievously disordered by [lust](#).

Now the reason has four acts in matters of action. First there is simple understanding, which apprehends some end as [good](#), and this act is hindered by [lust](#), according to [Daniel 13:56](#), "Beauty hath deceived thee, and [lust](#) hath perverted thy heart." On this respect we have

"blindness of mind." The second act is counsel about what is to be done for the sake of the end: and this is also hindered by the [concupiscence](#) of [lust](#). Hence Terence says (Eunuch., act 1, sc. 1), speaking of lecherous love: "This thing admits of neither counsel nor moderation, thou canst not control it by counseling." On this respect there is "rashness," which denotes absence of counsel, as stated above (Question 53, Article 3). The third act is judgment about the things to be done, and this again is hindered by [lust](#). For it is said of the [lustful](#) old men ([Daniel 13:9](#)): "They perverted their own mind . . . that they might not . . . remember just judgments." On this respect there is "thoughtlessness." The fourth act is the reason's command about the thing to be done, and this also is impeded by [lust](#), in so far as through being carried away by [concupiscence](#), a man is hindered from doing what his [reason](#) ordered to be done. [To this "inconstancy" must be referred.] [The sentence in brackets is omitted in the Leonine edition.] Hence Terence says (Eunuch., act 1, sc. 1) of a man who declared that he would leave his mistress: "One little [false](#) tear will undo those words."

On the part of the [will](#) there results a twofold inordinate act. One is the desire for the end, to which we refer "self-love," which regards the pleasure which a man desires inordinately, while on the other hand there is "[hatred](#) of [God](#)," by reason of His forbidding the desired pleasure. The other act is the desire for the things directed to the end. With regard to this there is "love of this world," whose pleasures a man desires to enjoy, while on the other hand there is "[despair](#) of a future world," because through being held back by carnal pleasures he cares not to obtain [spiritual](#) pleasures, since they are distasteful to him.

Reply to Objection 1. According to the [Philosopher](#) (Ethic. vi, 5), intemperance is the chief corruptive of [prudence](#): wherefore the [vices](#) opposed to [prudence](#) arise chiefly from [lust](#), which is the principal [species](#) of intemperance.

Reply to Objection 2. The constancy which is a part of [fortitude](#) regards hardships and objects of fear; but constancy in refraining from pleasures pertains to [continence](#) which is a part of [temperance](#), as stated above (143). Hence the inconstancy which is opposed thereto is to be reckoned a daughter of [lust](#). Nevertheless even the first named inconstancy arises from [lust](#), inasmuch as the latter enfeebles a man's heart and renders it effeminate, according to [Hosea 4:11](#), "Fornication and wine and drunkenness take away the heart [[Douay](#): 'understanding']". Vegetius, too, says (De Re Milit. iii) that "the less a man [knows](#) of the pleasures of life, the less he [fears](#) death." Nor is there any need, as we have repeatedly stated, for the daughters of a capital [vice](#) to agree with it in [matter](#) (cf. 35, 4, ad 2; 118, 8, ad 1; 148, 6).

Reply to Objection 3. Self-love in respect of any goods that a man desires for himself is the common origin of all [sins](#); but in the special point of desiring carnal pleasures for oneself, it is reckoned a daughter of [lust](#).

Reply to Objection 4. The [sins](#) mentioned by [Isidore](#) are inordinate external acts, pertaining in the main to speech; wherein there is a fourfold inordinateness. First, on account of the [matter](#), and to this we refer "obscene words": for since "out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh" ([Matthew 12:34](#)), the [lustful man](#), whose heart is full of lewd [concupiscences](#), readily breaks out into lewd words. Secondly, on account of the [cause](#): for, since [lust](#) [causes](#) thoughtlessness and rashness, the result is that it makes a man speak without weighing or giving

a thought to his words. which are described as "scurrilous." Thirdly, on account of the end: for since the [lustful man](#) seeks pleasure, he directs his speech thereto, and so gives utterance to "wanton words." Fourthly, on account of the sentiments expressed by his words, for through [causing](#) blindness of mind, [lust](#) perverts a man's sentiments, and so he gives way "to foolish talking," for instance, by expressing a preference for the pleasures he desires to anything else.

Question 154. The parts of Lust

1. [Into what parts is lust divided?](#)
2. [Is simple fornication a mortal sin?](#)
3. [Is it the greatest of sins?](#)
4. [Is there mortal sin in touches, kisses and such like seduction?](#)
5. [Is nocturnal pollution a mortal sin?](#)
6. [Seduction](#)
7. [Rape](#)
8. [Adultery](#)
9. [Incest](#)
10. [Sacrilege](#)
11. [The sin against nature](#)
12. [The order of gravity in the aforesaid sins](#)

Article 1. Whether six species are fittingly assigned to lust?

Objection 1. It would seem that six [species](#) are unfittingly assigned to [lust](#), namely, "simple fornication, [adultery](#), [incest](#), seduction, rape, and the unnatural [vice](#)." For diversity of [matter](#) does not diversify the [species](#). Now the aforesaid division is made with regard to diversity of [matter](#), according as the [woman](#) with whom a man has intercourse is [married](#) or a [virgin](#), or of some other [condition](#). Therefore it seems that the [species](#) of [lust](#) are diversified in this way.

Objection 2. Further, seemingly the [species](#) of one [vice](#) are not differentiated by things that belong to another [vice](#). Now [adultery](#) does not differ from simple fornication, save in the point of a man having intercourse with one who is another's, so that he commits an [injustice](#). Therefore it seems that [adultery](#) should not be reckoned a [species](#) of [lust](#).

Objection 3. Further, just as a man may happen to have intercourse with a [woman](#) who is bound to another [man](#) by marriage, so may it happen that a man has intercourse with a [woman](#) who is bound to [God](#) by [vow](#). Therefore [sacrilege](#) should be reckoned a [species](#) of [lust](#), even as [adultery](#) is.

Objection 4. Further, a [married man](#) [sins](#) not only if he be with another [woman](#), but also if he use his own wife inordinately. But the latter [sin](#) is comprised under [lust](#). Therefore it should be reckoned among the [species](#) thereof.

Objection 5. Further, the [Apostle](#) says ([2 Corinthians 12:21](#)): "Lest again, when I come, [God humble](#) me among you, and I mourn many of them that [sinned](#) before, and have not done penance for the [uncleanness](#) and fornication and lasciviousness that they have committed." Therefore it seems that also [uncleanness](#) and lasciviousness should be reckoned [species](#) of [lust](#), as well as fornication.

Objection 6. Further, the thing divided is not to be reckoned among its parts. But [lust](#) is reckoned together with the aforesaid: for it is written ([Galatians 5:19](#)): "The works of the flesh are manifest, which are fornication, [uncleanness](#), immodesty, [lust](#) [[Douay](#): 'luxury']." Therefore it seems that fornication is unfittingly reckoned a [species](#) of [lust](#).

On the contrary, The aforesaid division is given in the Decretals 36, qu. i [Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa].

I answer that As stated above (Question 153, Article 3), the [sin](#) of [lust](#) consists in seeking venereal pleasure not in accordance with right reason. This may happen in two ways. First, in respect of the [matter](#) wherein this pleasure is sought; secondly, when, whereas there is due [matter](#), other due circumstances are not observed. And since a circumstance, as such, does not specify a moral act, whose [species](#) is derived from its object which is also its [matter](#), it follows that the [species](#) of [lust](#) must be assigned with respect to its [matter](#) or object.

Now this same [matter](#) may be discordant with right reason in two ways. First, because it is inconsistent with the end of the venereal act. On this way, as hindering the begetting of children, there is the "[vice](#) against [nature](#)," which attaches to every venereal act from which generation cannot follow; and, as hindering the due upbringing and advancement of the child when born, there is "simple fornication," which is the union of an unmarried [man](#) with an unmarried [woman](#). Secondly, the [matter](#) wherein the venereal act is consummated may be discordant with right reason in relation to other [persons](#); and this in two ways. First, with regard to the [woman](#), with whom a man has connection, by reason of due [honor](#) not being paid to her; and thus there is "[incest](#)," which consists in the misuse of a [woman](#) who is related by [consanguinity](#) or affinity. Secondly, with regard to the [person](#) under whose authority the [woman](#) is placed: and if she be under the authority of a husband, it is "[adultery](#)," if under the authority of her father, it is "seduction," in the absence of [violence](#), and "rape" if [violence](#) be employed.

These [species](#) are differentiated on the part of the [woman](#) rather than of the [man](#), because in the venereal act the [woman](#) is passive and is by way of [matter](#), whereas the [man](#) is by way of agent; and it has been stated above (Objection 1) that the aforesaid [species](#) are assigned with regard to a difference of [matter](#).

Reply to Objection 1. The aforesaid diversity of [matter](#) is connected with a formal difference of object, which difference results from different modes of opposition to right reason, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (I-II, 18, 07), nothing hinders the deformities of different [vices](#) concurring in the one act, and in this way [adultery](#) is comprised under [lust](#) and [injustice](#).

Nor is this deformity of [injustice](#) altogether [accidental](#) to [lust](#): since the [lust](#) that obeys [concupiscence](#) so far as to lead to [injustice](#), is thereby shown to be more grievous.

Reply to Objection 3. Since a [woman](#), by vowing [continence](#), contracts a [spiritual](#) marriage with [God](#), the [sacrilege](#) that is committed in the violation of such a [woman](#) is a [spiritual adultery](#). On like manner, the other kinds of [sacrilege](#) pertaining to [lustful matter](#) are reduced to other [species](#) of [lust](#).

Reply to Objection 4. The [sin](#) of a husband with his wife is not connected with undue [matter](#), but with other circumstances, which do not constitute the [species](#) of a moral act, as stated above (I-II, 18, 2).

Reply to Objection 5. As a [gloss](#) says on this passage, "[uncleanness](#)" stands for [lust](#) against [nature](#), while "lasciviousness" is a man's abuse of boys, wherefore it would appear to pertain to seduction. We may also reply that "lasciviousness" relates to certain acts circumstantial to the venereal act, for instance kisses, touches, and so forth.

Reply to Objection 6. According to a [gloss](#) on this passage "[lust](#)" there signifies any kind of excess.

Article 2. Whether simple fornication is a mortal sin?

Objection 1. It would seem that simple fornication is not a mortal [sin](#). For things that come under the same head would seem to be on a par with one another. Now fornication comes under the same head as things that are not mortal [sins](#): for it is written ([Acts 15:29](#)): "That you abstain from things sacrificed to [idols](#), and from blood, and from things strangled, and from fornication." But there is not mortal [sin](#) in these observances, according to [1 Timothy 4:4](#), "Nothing is rejected that is received with thanksgiving." Therefore fornication is not a mortal [sin](#).

Objection 2. Further, no mortal [sin](#) is the [matter](#) of a Divine precept. But the Lord commanded ([Hosea 1:2](#)): "Go take thee a wife of fornications, and have of her children of fornications." Therefore fornication is not a mortal [sin](#).

Objection 3. Further, no mortal [sin](#) is mentioned in [Holy Writ](#) without disapprobation. Yet simple fornication is mentioned without disapprobation by [Holy Writ](#) in connection with the patriarchs. Thus we read ([Genesis 16:4](#)) that [Abraham](#) went in to his handmaid Agar; and further on ([Genesis 30:5-9](#)) that [Jacob](#) went in to Bala and Zelpha the handmaids of his wives; and again ([Genesis 38:18](#)) that [Juda](#) was with Tamar whom he thought to be a harlot. Therefore simple fornication is not a mortal [sin](#).

Objection 4. Further, every mortal [sin](#) is contrary to [charity](#). But simple fornication is not contrary to [charity](#), neither as regards the love of [God](#), since it is not a [sin](#) directly against [God](#), nor as regards the love of our neighbor, since thereby no one is injured. Therefore simple fornication is not a mortal [sin](#).

Objection 5. Further, every mortal [sin](#) leads to [eternal](#) perdition. But simple fornication has not this result: because a [gloss](#) of [Ambrose](#) [The quotation is from the Gloss of [Peter Lombard](#), who refers it to [St. Ambrose](#): whereas it is from [Hilary](#) the [deacon](#)] on [1 Timothy 4:8](#), "[Godliness](#) is profitable to all things," says: "The whole of [Christian](#) teaching is summed up in mercy and [godliness](#): if a man conforms to this, even though he gives way to the inconstancy of the flesh, doubtless he will be punished, but he will not perish." Therefore simple fornication is not a mortal [sin](#).

Objection 6. Further, [Augustine](#) says (De Bono Conjug. xvi) that "what food is to the well-being of the body, such is sexual intercourse to the welfare of the [human race](#)." But inordinate use of food is not always a mortal [sin](#). Therefore neither is all inordinate sexual intercourse; and this would seem to apply especially to simple fornication, which is the least grievous of the aforesaid [species](#).

On the contrary, It is written ([Tobit 4:13](#)): "Take heed to keep thyself . . . from all fornication, and beside thy wife never endure to [know](#) a crime." Now crime denotes a mortal [sin](#). Therefore fornication and all intercourse with other than one's wife is a mortal [sin](#).

Further, nothing but mortal [sin](#) debars a man from [God's](#) kingdom. But fornication debars him, as shown by the words of the [Apostle](#) ([Galatians 5:21](#)), who after mentioning fornication and certain other [vices](#), adds: "They who do such things shall not obtain the [kingdom of God](#)." Therefore simple fornication is a mortal [sin](#).

Further, it is written in the Decretals (XXII, qu. i, can. Praedicandum): "They should [know](#) that the same penance is to be enjoined for perjury as for [adultery](#), fornication, and wilful [murder](#) and other criminal offenses." Therefore simple fornication is a criminal or mortal [sin](#).

I answer that, Without any [doubt](#) we must hold simple fornication to be a mortal [sin](#), notwithstanding that a [gloss](#) [[St. Augustine](#), QQ. in Deut., qu. 37 on [Deuteronomy 23:17](#), says: "This is a prohibition against going with whores, whose vileness is venial." For instead of "venial" it should be "venal," since such is the wanton's trade. On order to make this evident, we must take note that every [sin](#) committed directly against [human](#) life is a mortal [sin](#). Now simple fornication implies an inordinateness that tends to injure the life of the offspring to be born of this union. For we find in all animals where the upbringing of the offspring needs care of both male and female, that these come together not indeterminately, but the male with a certain female, whether one or several; such is the case with all birds: while, on the other hand, among those animals, where the female alone suffices for the offspring's upbringing, the union is indeterminate, as in the case of dogs and like animals. Now it is evident that the upbringing of a [human](#) child requires not only the mother's care for his nourishment, but much more the care of his father as guide and guardian, and under whom he progresses in goods both internal and external. Hence [human nature](#) rebels against an indeterminate union of the sexes and demands that a man should be united to a determinate [woman](#) and should abide with her a long time or even for a whole lifetime. Hence it is that in the [human race](#) the male has a [natural](#) solicitude for the [certainty](#) of offspring, because on him devolves the upbringing of the child: and this certainly would cease if the union of sexes were indeterminate.

This union with a certain definite [woman](#) is called [matrimony](#); which for the above reason is said to belong to the [natural law](#). Since, however, the union of the sexes is directed to the common [good](#) of the whole [human race](#), and common goods depend on the [law](#) for their determination, as stated above (I-II, 90, 2), it follows that this union of [man](#) and [woman](#), which is called [matrimony](#), is determined by some [law](#). What this determination is for us will be stated in the Third Part of this work (Supplement, 050, seqq.), where we shall treat of the [sacrament of matrimony](#). Wherefore, since fornication is an indeterminate union of the sexes, as something incompatible with [matrimony](#), it is opposed to the [good](#) of the child's upbringing, and consequently it is a mortal [sin](#).

Nor does it matter if a man having [knowledge](#) of a [woman](#) by fornication, make sufficient provision for the upbringing of the child: because a [matter](#) that comes under the determination of the [law](#) is judged according to what happens in general, and not according to what may happen in a particular case.

Reply to Objection 1. Fornication is reckoned in conjunction with these things, not as being on a par with them in sinfulness, but because the matters mentioned there were equally liable to [cause](#) dispute between [Jews](#) and [Gentiles](#), and thus prevent them from agreeing unanimously. For among the [Gentiles](#), fornication was not deemed unlawful, on account of the corruption of [natural reason](#): whereas the [Jews](#), taught by the [Divine law](#), considered it to be unlawful. The other things mentioned were loathsome to the [Jews](#) through custom introduced by the [law](#) into their daily life. Hence the [Apostles](#) forbade these things to the [Gentiles](#), not as though they were unlawful in themselves, but because they were loathsome to the [Jews](#), as stated above (I-II, 103, 4, ad 3).

Reply to Objection 2. Fornication is said to be a [sin](#), because it is contrary to right reason. Now [man's](#) reason is right, in so far as it is ruled by the Divine Will, the first and supreme rule. Wherefore that which a man does by [God's](#) will and in obedience to His command, is not contrary to right reason, though it may seem contrary to the general order of reason: even so, that which is done [miraculously](#) by the Divine power is not contrary to [nature](#), though it be contrary to the usual course of [nature](#). Therefore just as [Abraham](#) did not [sin](#) in being willing to slay his innocent son, because he obeyed [God](#), although considered in itself it was contrary to right [human reason](#) in general, so, too, Osee [sinned](#) not in committing fornication by [God's](#) command. Nor should such a copulation be strictly called fornication, though it be so called in reference to the general course of things. Hence [Augustine](#) says (Confess. iii, 8): "When [God](#) commands a thing to be done against the customs or agreement of any people, though it were never done by them heretofore, it is to be done"; and afterwards he adds: "For as among the powers of [human](#) society, the greater authority is obeyed in preference to the lesser, so must [God](#) in preference to all."

Reply to Objection 3. [Abraham](#) and [Jacob](#) went in to their handmaidens with no purpose of fornication, as we shall show further on when we treat of [matrimony](#) (Supplement, 065, 5, ad 2). As to [Juda](#) there is no need to excuse him, for he also [caused Joseph](#) to be sold.

Reply to Objection 4. Simple fornication is contrary to the love of our neighbor, because it is opposed to the [good](#) of the child to be born, as we have shown, since it is an act of generation accomplished in a manner disadvantageous to the future child.

Reply to Objection 5. A [person](#), who, while given to works of piety, yields to the inconstancy of the flesh, is freed from [eternal](#) loss, in so far as these works dispose him to receive the [grace](#) to repent, and because by such works he makes satisfaction for his past inconstancy; but not so as to be freed by pious works, if he persist in carnal inconstancy impenitent until death.

Reply to Objection 6. One copulation may result in the begetting of a man, wherefore inordinate copulation, which hinders the [good](#) of the future child, is a mortal [sin](#) as to the very genus of the act, and not only as to the inordinateness of [concupiscence](#). On the other hand, one meal does not hinder the [good](#) of a man's whole life, wherefore the act of [gluttony](#) is not a mortal [sin](#) by reason of its genus. It would, however, be a mortal [sin](#), if a man were knowingly to partake of a food which would alter the whole [condition](#) of his life, as was the case with [Adam](#).

Nor is it [true](#) that fornication is the least of the [sins](#) comprised under [lust](#), for the marriage act that is done out of sensuous pleasure is a lesser [sin](#).

Article 3. Whether fornication is the most grievous of sins?

Objection 1. It would seem that fornication is the most grievous of [sins](#). For seemingly a [sin](#) is the more grievous according as it proceeds from a greater sensuous pleasure. Now the greatest sensuous pleasure is in fornication, for a [gloss](#) on [1 Corinthians 7:9](#) says that the "flame of sensuous pleasure is most fierce in [lust](#)." Therefore it seems that fornication is the gravest of [sins](#).

Objection 2. Further, a [sin](#) is the more grievous that is committed against a [person](#) more closely united to the sinner: thus he [sins](#) more grievously who strikes his father than one who strikes a stranger. Now according to [1 Corinthians 6:18](#), "He that committeth fornication [sinneth](#) against his own body," which is most intimately connected with a man. Therefore it seems that fornication is the most grievous of [sins](#).

Objection 3. Further, the greater a [good](#) is, the graver would seem to be the [sin](#) committed against it. Now the [sin](#) of fornication is seemingly opposed to the [good](#) of the whole [human race](#), as appears from what was said in the foregoing Article. It is also against [Christ](#), according to [1 Corinthians 6:15](#), "Shall I . . . take the members of [Christ](#), and make them the members of a harlot?" Therefore fornication is the most grievous of [sins](#).

On the contrary, [Gregory](#) says (Moral. xxxiii, 12) that the [sins](#) of the flesh are less grievous than [spiritual sins](#).

I answer that, The gravity of a [sin](#) may be measured in two ways, first with regard to the [sin](#) in itself, secondly with regard to some [accident](#). The gravity of a [sin](#) is measured with regard to the [sin](#) itself, by reason of its [species](#), which is determined according to the [good](#) to which that [sin](#) is opposed. Now fornication is contrary to the [good](#) of the child to be born. Wherefore it is a graver [sin](#), as to its [species](#), than those [sins](#) which are contrary to external goods, such as [theft](#) and the

like; while it is less grievous than those which are directly against [God](#), and [sins](#) that are injurious to the life of one already born, such as [murder](#).

Reply to Objection 1. The sensual pleasure that aggravates a [sin](#) is that which is in the inclination of the [will](#). But the sensual pleasure that is in the sensitive [appetite](#), lessens [sin](#), because a [sin](#) is the less grievous according as it is committed under the impulse of a greater passion. It is in this way that the greatest sensual pleasure is in fornication. Hence [Augustine](#) says (De Agone Christiano [Serm. ccxciii; ccl de Temp.; see Appendix to [St. Augustine's](#) works]) that of all a [Christian's](#) conflicts, the most difficult combats are those of [chastity](#); wherein the fight is a daily one, but victory rare: and [Isidore](#) declares (De Summo Bono ii, 39) that "[mankind](#) is subjected to the [devil](#) by carnal [lust](#) more than by anything else," because, to wit, the vehemence of this passion is more difficult to overcome.

Reply to Objection 2. The fornicator is said to [sin](#) against his own body, not merely because the pleasure of fornication is consummated in the flesh, which is also the case in [gluttony](#), but also because he acts against the [good](#) of his own body by an undue resolution and defilement thereof, and an undue association with another. Nor does it follow from this that fornication is the most grievous [sin](#), because in [man](#) reason is of greater value than the body, wherefore if there be a [sin](#) more opposed to reason, it will be more grievous.

Reply to Objection 3. The [sin](#) of fornication is contrary to the [good](#) of the [human race](#), in so far as it is prejudicial to the [individual](#) begetting of the one [man](#) that may be born. Now one who is already an actual member of the [human species](#) attains to the perfection of the [species](#) more than one who is a man [potentially](#), and from this point of view [murder](#) is a more grievous [sin](#) than fornication and every kind of [lust](#), through being more opposed to the [good](#) of the [human species](#). Again, a Divine [good](#) is greater than the [good](#) of the [human race](#); and therefore those [sins](#) also that are against [God](#) are more grievous. Moreover, fornication is a [sin](#) against [God](#), not directly as though the fornicator intended to offend [God](#), but consequently, in the same way as all mortal [sins](#). And just as the members of our body are [Christ's](#) members, so too, our spirit is one with [Christ](#), according to [1 Corinthians 6:17](#), "He who is joined to the Lord is one spirit." Wherefore also [spiritual sins](#) are more against [Christ](#) than fornication is.

Article 4. Whether there can be mortal sin in touches and kisses?

Objection 1. It would seem that there is no mortal [sin](#) in touches and kisses. For the [Apostle](#) says ([Ephesians 5:3](#)): "Fornication and all [uncleanness](#), or [covetousness](#), let it not so much as be named among you, as becometh [saints](#)," then he adds: "Or obscenity" (which a [gloss](#) refers to "[kissing](#) and fondling"), "or foolish talking" (as "soft speeches"), "or scurrility" (which "fools call geniality--i.e. jocularly"), and afterwards he continues ([Ephesians 5:5](#)): "For [know](#) ye this and understand that no fornicator, or [unclean](#), or covetous [person](#) (which is the serving of [idols](#)), hath inheritance in the kingdom of [Christ](#) and of [God](#)," thus making no further mention of obscenity, as neither of foolish talking or scurrility. Therefore these are not mortal [sins](#).

Objection 2. Further, fornication is stated to be a mortal [sin](#) as being prejudicial to the [good](#) of the future child's begetting and upbringing. But these are not affected by kisses and touches or blandishments. Therefore there is no mortal [sin](#) in these.

Objection 3. Further, things that are mortal [sins](#) in themselves can never be [good](#) actions. Yet kisses, touches, and the like can be done sometimes without [sin](#). Therefore they are not mortal [sins](#) in themselves.

On the contrary, A [lustful](#) look is less than a touch, a caress or a kiss. But according to [Matthew 5:28](#), "Whosoever shall look on a [woman](#) to [lust](#) after her hath already committed [adultery](#) with her in his heart." Much more therefore are [lustful](#) kisses and other like things mortal [sins](#). Further, [Cyprian](#) says (Ad Pompon, de Virgin., Ep. lxii), "By their very intercourse, their blandishments, their converse, their embraces, those who are associated in a sleep that [knows](#) neither [honor](#) nor shame, acknowledge their disgrace and crime." Therefore by doing these things a man is guilty of a crime, that is, of mortal [sin](#).

I answer that, A thing is said to be a mortal works. [sin](#) in two ways. First, by reason of its [species](#), and in this way a kiss, caress, or touch does not, of its very [nature](#), imply a mortal [sin](#), for it is possible to do such things without [lustful](#) pleasure, either as being the custom of one's country, or on account of some [obligation](#) or reasonable [cause](#). Secondly, a thing is said to be a mortal [sin](#) by reason of its [cause](#): thus he who gives an [alms](#), in order to lead someone into [heresy](#), [sins](#) mortally on account of his corrupt [intention](#). Now it has been stated above (I-II, 74, 8), that it is a mortal [sin](#) not only to consent to the act, but also to the delectation of a mortal [sin](#). Wherefore since fornication is a mortal [sin](#), and much more so the other kinds of [lust](#), it follows that in such like [sins](#) not only consent to the act but also consent to the pleasure is a mortal [sin](#). Consequently, when these kisses and caresses are done for this delectation, it follows that they are mortal [sins](#), and only in this way are they said to be [lustful](#). Therefore in so far as they are [lustful](#), they are mortal [sins](#).

Reply to Objection 1. The [Apostle](#) makes no further mention of these three because they are not [sinful](#) except as directed to those that he had mentioned before.

Reply to Objection 2. Although kisses and touches do not by their very [nature](#) hinder the [good](#) of the [human](#) offspring, they proceed from [lust](#), which is the source of this hindrance: and on this account they are mortally [sinful](#).

Reply to Objection 3. This argument proves that such things are not mortal [sins](#) in their [species](#).

Article 5. Whether nocturnal pollution is a mortal sin?

Objection 1. It would seem that nocturnal pollution is a [sin](#). For the same things are the [matter](#) of [merit](#) and demerit. Now a man may [merit](#) while he sleeps, as was the case with Solomon, who while asleep obtained the [gift](#) of wisdom from the [Lord](#) ([1 Samuel 3:5](#)). Therefore a man may demerit while asleep; and thus nocturnal pollution would seem to be a [sin](#).

Objection 2. Further, whoever has the use of [reason](#) can [sin](#). Now a man has the use of [reason](#) while asleep, since in our sleep we frequently discuss matters, choose this rather than that, consenting to one thing, or dissenting to another. Therefore one may [sin](#) while asleep, so that nocturnal pollution is not prevented by sleep from being a [sin](#), seeing that it is a [sin](#) according to its genus.

Objection 3. Further, it is useless to reprove and instruct one who cannot act according to or against [reason](#). Now [man](#), while asleep, is instructed and reprovved by [God](#), according to [Job 33:15-16](#), "By a dream in a vision by night, when deep sleep is wont to lay hold of [men](#) [*Vulgate*: 'When deep sleep falleth upon men.' [St. Thomas](#) is apparently quoting from [memory](#), as the passage is given correctly above, 95, 6, Objection 1 . . . Then He openeth the ears of [men](#), and teaching instructeth them in what they are to learn." Therefore a man, while asleep, can act according to or against his [reason](#), and this is to do [good](#) or [sinful](#) actions, and thus it seems that nocturnal pollution is a [sin](#).

On the contrary, [Augustine](#) says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 15): "When the same image that comes into the [mind](#) of a speaker presents itself to the [mind](#) of the sleeper, so that the latter is unable to distinguish the [imaginary](#) from the real union of bodies, the flesh is at once moved, with the result that usually follows such motions; and yet there is as little [sin](#) in this as there is in speaking and therefore thinking about such things while one is awake."

I answer that, Nocturnal pollution may be considered in two ways. First, in itself; and thus it has not the character of a [sin](#). For every [sin](#) depends on the judgment of [reason](#), since even the first movement of the sensuality has nothing [sinful](#) in it, except in so far as it can be suppressed by reason; wherefore in the absence of reason's judgment, there is no [sin](#) in it. Now during sleep reason has not a free judgment. For there is no one who while sleeping does not regard some of the images formed by his [imagination](#) as though they were real, as stated above in I, 84, 8, ad 2. Wherefore what a man does while he sleeps and is deprived of reason's judgment, is not imputed to him as a [sin](#), as neither are the actions of a maniac or an imbecile.

Secondly, nocturnal pollution may be considered with reference to its [cause](#). This may be threefold. One is a bodily [cause](#). For when there is excess of seminal humor in the body, or when the humor is disintegrated either through overheating of the body or some other disturbance, the sleeper dreams things that are connected with the discharge of this excessive or disintegrated humor: the same thing happens when [nature](#) is cumbered with other superfluities, so that phantasms relating to the discharge of those superfluities are formed in the [imagination](#). Accordingly if this excess of humor be due to a [sinful cause](#) (for instance excessive eating or drinking), nocturnal pollution has the character of [sin](#) from its [cause](#): whereas if the excess or disintegration of these superfluities be not due to a [sinful cause](#), nocturnal pollution is not [sinful](#), neither in itself nor in its [cause](#).

A second [cause](#) of nocturnal pollution is on the part of the [soul](#) and the inner [man](#): for instance when it happens to the sleeper on account of some previous thought. For the thought which preceded while he was awake, is sometimes purely speculative, for instance when one thinks about the [sins](#) of the flesh for the purpose of discussion; while sometimes it is accompanied by a certain emotion either of [concupiscence](#) or of abhorrence. Now nocturnal pollution is more apt to

arise from thinking about carnal [sins](#) with [concupiscence](#) for such pleasures, because this leaves its trace and inclination in the [soul](#), so that the sleeper is more easily led in his [imagination](#) to consent to acts productive of pollution. In this sense the [Philosopher](#) says (Ethic. i, 13) that "in so far as certain movements in some degree pass" from the waking state to the state of sleep, "the dreams of [good](#) men are better than those of any other people": and [Augustine](#) says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 15) that "even during sleep, the [soul](#) may have conspicuous [merit](#) on account of its [good](#) disposition." Thus it is evident that nocturnal pollution may be [sinful](#) on the part of its [cause](#). on the other hand, it may happen that nocturnal pollution ensues after thoughts about carnal acts, though they were speculative, or accompanied by abhorrence, and then it is not [sinful](#), neither in itself nor in its [cause](#).

The third [cause](#) is [spiritual](#) and external; for instance when by the work of a [devil](#) the sleeper's phantasms are disturbed so as to induce the aforesaid result. Sometimes this is associated with a previous [sin](#), namely the neglect to guard against the wiles of the [devil](#). Hence the words of the [hymn](#) at even: "Our enemy repress, that so our bodies no [uncleanness know](#)" [Translation W. K. Blount].

On the other hand, this may occur without any fault on [man's](#) part, and through the [wickedness](#) of the [devil](#) alone. Thus we read in the Collationes Patrum (Coll. xxii, 6) of a man who was ever wont to suffer from nocturnal pollution on festivals, and that the [devil](#) brought this about in order to prevent him from receiving Holy Communion. Hence it is manifest that nocturnal pollution is never a [sin](#), but is sometimes the result of a previous [sin](#).

Reply to Objection 1. Solomon did not [merit](#) to receive wisdom from [God](#) while he was asleep. He received it in token of his previous desire. It is for this reason that his petition is stated to have been pleasing to [God](#) ([1 Kings 3:10](#)), as [Augustine](#) observes (Gen. ad lit. xii, 15).

Reply to Objection 2. The use of [reason](#) is more or less hindered in sleep, according as the inner sensitive powers are more or less overcome by sleep, on account of the [violence](#) or attenuation of the evaporations. Nevertheless it is always hindered somewhat, so as to be unable to elicit a judgment altogether free, as stated in I, 84, 8, ad 2. Therefore what it does then is not imputed to it as a [sin](#).

Reply to Objection 3. [Reason's](#) apprehension is not hindered during sleep to the same extent as its judgment, for this is accomplished by reason turning to sensible objects, which are the first principles of [human](#) thought. Hence nothing hinders [man's](#) reason during sleep from apprehending anew something arising out of the traces left by his previous thoughts and phantasms presented to him, or again through Divine [revelation](#), or the interference of a [good](#) or bad [angel](#).

Article 6. Whether seduction should be reckoned a species of lust?

Objection 1. It would seem that seduction should not be reckoned a [species](#) of [lust](#). For seduction denotes the unlawful violation of a [virgin](#), according to the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1)

[Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa]. But this may occur between an unmarried [man](#) and an unmarried [woman](#), which pertains to fornication. Therefore seduction should not be reckoned a [species](#) of [lust](#), distinct from fornication.

Objection 2. Further, [Ambrose](#) says (De Patriarch. [De [Abraham](#) i, 4): "Let no [man](#) be deluded by [human](#) laws: all seduction is [adultery](#)." Now a [species](#) is not contained under another that is differentiated in opposition to it. Therefore since [adultery](#) is a [species](#) of [lust](#), it seems that seduction should not be reckoned a [species](#) of [lust](#).

Objection 3. Further, to do a [person](#) an injury would seem to pertain to [injustice](#) rather than to [lust](#). Now the seducer does an injury to another, namely the violated [maiden](#)'s father, who "can take the injury as personal to himself" [Gratian, ad can. Lex illa], and sue the seducer for damages. Therefore seduction should not be reckoned a [species](#) of [lust](#).

On the contrary, Seduction consists properly in the venereal act whereby a [virgin](#) is violated. Therefore, since [lust](#) is properly about venereal actions, it would seem that seduction is a [species](#) of [lust](#).

I answer that, When the [matter](#) of a [vice](#) has a special deformity, we must reckon it to be a determinate [species](#) of that [vice](#). Now [lust](#) is a [sin](#) concerned with venereal [matter](#), as stated above (Question 153, Article 1). And a special deformity attaches to the violation of a [virgin](#) who is under her father's care: both on the part of the [maid](#), who through being violated without any previous compact of marriage is both hindered from contracting a lawful marriage and is put on the road to a wanton life from which she was withheld lest she should lose the seal of [virginity](#): and on the part of the father, who is her guardian, according to [Sirach 42:11](#), "Keep a sure watch over a shameless daughter, lest at any time she make thee become a laughing-stock to thy enemies." Therefore it is evident that seduction which denotes the unlawful violation of a [virgin](#), while still under the guardianship of her parents, is a determinate [species](#) of [lust](#).

Reply to Objection 1. Although a [virgin](#) is free from the bond of marriage, she is not free from her father's power. Moreover, the seal of [virginity](#) is a special obstacle to the intercourse of fornication, in that it should be removed by marriage only. Hence seduction is not simple fornication, since the latter is intercourse with harlots, [women](#), namely, who are no longer [virgins](#), as a [gloss](#) observes on [2 Corinthians 12](#), "And have not done penance for the [uncleanness](#) and fornication," etc.

Reply to Objection 2. [Ambrose](#) here takes seduction in another sense, as applicable in a general way to any [sin](#) of [lust](#). Wherefore seduction, in the words quoted, signifies the intercourse between a [married man](#) and any [woman](#) other than his wife. This is clear from his adding: "Nor is it lawful for the husband to do what the wife may not." On this sense, too, we are to understand the words of [Numbers 5:13](#): "If [[Vulgate](#): 'But'] the [adultery](#) is secret, and cannot be provided by [witnesses](#), because she was not found in [adultery](#) [stupro]."

Reply to Objection 3. Nothing prevents a [sin](#) from having a greater deformity through being united to another [sin](#). Now the [sin](#) of [lust](#) obtains a greater deformity from the [sin](#) of [injustice](#), because the [concupiscence](#) would seem to be more inordinate, seeing that it refrains not from the

pleasurable object so that it may avoid an [injustice](#). On fact a twofold [injustice](#) attaches to it. One is on the part of the [virgin](#), who, though not violated by force, is nevertheless [seduced](#), and thus the seducer is bound to compensation. Hence it is written ([Exodus 22:16-17](#)): "If a man [seduce](#) a [virgin](#) not yet espoused, and lie with her, he shall endow her and have her to wife. If the [maid's](#) father will not give her to him, he shall give money according to the [dowry](#), which [virgins](#) are wont to receive." The other injury is done to the [maid's](#) father: wherefore the seducer is bound by the [Law](#) to a penalty in his regard. For it is written ([Deuteronomy 22:28-29](#)): "If a man find a damsel that is a [virgin](#), who is not espoused, and taking her, lie with her, and the [matter](#) come to judgment: he that lay with her shall give to the father of the [maid](#) fifty sicles of silver, and shall have her to wife, and because he hath [humbled](#) her, he may not put her away all the days of his life": and this, lest he should [prove](#) to have [married](#) her in mockery, as [Augustine](#) observes. [QQ. in Dt., qu. xxxiv.]

Article 7. Whether rape is a species of lust, distinct from seduction?

Objection 1. It would seem that rape is not a [species](#) of [lust](#), distinct from seduction. For [Isidore](#) says (Etym. v, 26) that "seduction [stuprum], or rape, properly speaking, is unlawful intercourse, and takes its name from its [causing](#) corruption: wherefore he that is guilty of rape is a seducer." Therefore it seems that rape should not be reckoned a [species](#) of [lust](#) distinct from seduction.

Objection 2. Further, rape, apparently, implies [violence](#). For it is stated in the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1 [Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa]) that "rape is committed when a [maid](#) is taken away by force from her father's house that after being violated she may be taken to wife." But the employment of force is [accidental](#) to [lust](#), for this [essentially](#) regards the pleasure of intercourse. Therefore it seems that rape should not be reckoned a determinate [species](#) of [lust](#).

Objection 3. Further, the [sin](#) of [lust](#) is curbed by marriage: for it is written ([1 Corinthians 7:2](#)): "For fear of fornication, let every [man](#) have his own wife." Now rape is an obstacle to subsequent marriage, for it was enacted in the council of Meaux: "We decree that those who are guilty of rape, or of abducting or seducing [women](#), should not have those [women](#) in marriage, although they should have subsequently [married](#) them with the consent of their parents." Therefore rape is not a determinate [species](#) of [lust](#) distinct from seduction.

Objection 4. Further, a man may have [knowledge](#) of his newly [married](#) wife without committing a [sin](#) of [lust](#). Yet he may commit rape if he take her away by force from her parents' house, and have carnal [knowledge](#) of her. Therefore rape should not be reckoned a determinate [species](#) of [lust](#).

On the contrary, Rape is unlawful sexual intercourse, as [Isidore](#) states (Etym. v, 26). But this pertains to the [sin](#) of [lust](#). Therefore rape is a [species](#) of [lust](#).

I answer that, Rape, in the sense in which we speak of it now, is a [species](#) of [lust](#): and sometimes it coincides with seduction; sometimes there is rape without seduction, and sometimes seduction without rape.

They coincide when a man employs force in order unlawfully to violate a [virgin](#). This force is employed sometimes both towards the [virgin](#) and towards her father; and sometimes towards the father and not to the [virgin](#), for instance if she allows herself to be taken away by force from her father's house. Again, the force employed in rape differs in another way, because sometimes a [maid](#) is taken away by force from her parents' house, and is forcibly violated: while sometimes, though taken away by force, she is not forcibly violated, but of her own consent, whether by act of fornication or by the act of marriage: for the [conditions](#) of rape remain no matter how force is employed. There is rape without seduction if a man abduct a [widow](#) or one who is not a [virgin](#). Hence Pope Symmachus says [Ep. v ad Caesarium; Cf. can. Raptores xxxvi, qu. 2, "We abhor abductors whether of [widows](#) or of [virgins](#) on account of the heinousness of their crime."

There is seduction without rape when a man, without employing force, violates a [virgin](#) unlawfully.

Reply to Objection 1. Since rape frequently coincides with seduction, the one is sometimes used to signify the other.

Reply to Objection 2. The employment of force would seem to arise from the greatness of [concupiscence](#), the result being that a man does not fear to endanger himself by offering [violence](#).

Reply to Objection 3. The rape of a [maiden](#) who is promised in marriage is to be judged differently from that of one who is not so promised. For one who is promised in marriage must be restored to her [betrothed](#), who has a right to her in virtue of their [betrothal](#): whereas one that is not promised to another must first of all be restored to her father's care, and then the abductor may lawfully marry her with her parents' consent. Otherwise the marriage is unlawful, since whosoever steals a thing he is bound to restore it. Nevertheless rape does not dissolve a marriage already contracted, although it is an impediment to its being contracted. As to the decree of the council in question, it was made in abhorrence of this crime, and has been abrogated. Wherefore [Jerome](#) [The quotation is from Can. Tria. xxxvi, qu. 2 declares the contrary: "Three kinds of lawful marriage," says he, "are mentioned in [Holy Writ](#). The first is that of a chaste [maiden](#) given away lawfully in her maidenhood to a man. The second is when a man finds a [maiden](#) in the city, and by force has carnal [knowledge](#) of her. If the father be willing, the [man](#) shall endow her according to the father's estimate, and shall pay the price of her purity [Cf. [Deuteronomy 22:23-29](#). The third is, when the [maiden](#) is taken away from such a man, and is given to another at the father's will."

We may also take this decree to refer to those who are promised to others in marriage, especially if the [betrothal](#) be expressed by words in the present tense.

Reply to Objection 4. The [man](#) who is just [married](#) has, in virtue of the [betrothal](#), a certain right in her: wherefore, although he [sins](#) by using [violence](#), he is not guilty of the crime of rape. Hence [Pope Gelasius](#) says [Can. Lex illa, xxvii, qu. 2; xxxvi, qu. 1]: "This [law](#) of bygone rulers stated that rape was committed when a [maiden](#), with regard to whose marriage nothing had so far been decided, was taken away by force."

Article 8. Whether adultery is determinate species of lust, distinct from the other species?

Objection 1. It would seem that [adultery](#) is not a determinate [species](#) of [lust](#), distinct from the other [species](#). For [adultery](#) takes its name from a man having intercourse "with a [woman](#) who is not his own [ad alteram]," according to a [gloss](#) [[St. Augustine](#): Serm. li, 13 de Divers. lxiii] on [Exodus 20:14](#). Now a [woman](#) who is not one's own may be of various [conditions](#), namely either a [virgin](#), or under her father's care, or a harlot, or of any other description. Therefore it seems that [adultery](#) is not a [species](#) of [lust](#) distinct from the others.

Objection 2. Further, [Jerome](#) says [Contra Jovin. i]: "It matters not for what reason a man behaves as one demented. Hence Sixtus the [Pythagorean](#) says in his Maxims: He that is insatiable of his wife is an adulterer," and in like manner one who is over enamored of any [woman](#). Now every kind of [lust](#) includes a too ardent love. Therefore [adultery](#) is in every kind of [lust](#): and consequently it should not be reckoned a [species](#) of [lust](#).

Objection 3. Further, where there is the same kind of deformity, there would seem to be the same [species](#) of [sin](#). Now, apparently, there is the same kind of deformity in seduction and [adultery](#): since in either case a [woman](#) is violated who is under another [person's](#) authority. Therefore [adultery](#) is not a determinate [species](#) of [lust](#), distinct from the others.

On the contrary, Pope Leo [[St. Augustine](#), De Bono Conjug. iv; Cf. Append. Grat. ad can. Ille autem. xxxii, qu. 5] says that "[adultery](#) is sexual intercourse with another [man](#) or [woman](#) in contravention of the marriage compact, whether through the impulse of one's own [lust](#), or with the consent of the other party." Now this implies a special deformity of [lust](#). Therefore [adultery](#) is a determinate [species](#) of [lust](#).

I answer that, Adultery, as its name implies, "is access to another's marriage-bed [ad alienum torum]" [Cf. Append. Gratian, ad can. Ille autem. xxxii, qu. 1. By so doing a man is guilty of a twofold offense against [chastity](#) and the [good](#) of [human](#) procreation. First, by accession to a [woman](#) who is not joined to him in marriage, which is contrary to the [good](#) of the upbringing of his own children. Secondly, by accession to a [woman](#) who is united to another in marriage, and thus he hinders the [good](#) of another's children. The same applies to the [married woman](#) who is corrupted by [adultery](#). Wherefore it is written ([Sirach 23:32-33](#)): "Every [woman](#) . . . that leaveth her husband . . . shall be guilty of [sin](#). For first she hath been unfaithful to the [law](#) of the Most High" (since there it is commanded: "Thou shalt not commit [adultery](#)"); "and secondly, she hath offended against her husband," by making it uncertain that the children are his: "thirdly, she hath fornicated in [adultery](#), and hath gotten children of another [man](#)," which is contrary to the [good](#) of her offspring. The first of these, however, is common to all mortal [sins](#), while the two others belong especially to the deformity of [adultery](#). Hence it is manifest that [adultery](#) is a determinate [species](#) of [lust](#), through having a special deformity in venereal acts.

Reply to Objection 1. If a [married man](#) has intercourse with another [woman](#), his [sin](#) may be denominated either with regard to him, and thus it is always [adultery](#), since his action is contrary to the fidelity of marriage, or with regard to the [woman](#) with whom he has intercourse; and thus

sometimes it is [adultery](#), as when a [married man](#) has intercourse with another's wife; and sometimes it has the character of seduction, or of some other [sin](#), according to various [conditions](#) affecting the [woman](#) with whom he has intercourse: and it has been stated above ([Article 1](#)) that the [species](#) of [lust](#) correspond to the various [conditions](#) of [women](#).

Reply to Objection 2. Matrimony is specially ordained for the [good](#) of [human](#) offspring, as stated above ([Article 2](#)). But [adultery](#) is specially opposed to [matrimony](#), in the point of breaking the marriage [faith](#) which is due between husband and wife. And since the [man](#) who is too ardent a lover of his wife acts counter to the [good](#) of marriage if he use her indecently, although he be not unfaithful, he may in a sense be called an adulterer; and even more so than he that is too ardent a lover of another [woman](#).

Reply to Objection 3. The wife is under her husband's authority, as united to him in marriage: whereas the [maid](#) is under her father's authority, as one who is to be [married](#) by that authority. Hence the [sin](#) of [adultery](#) is contrary to the [good](#) of marriage in one way, and the [sin](#) of seduction in another; wherefore they are reckoned to differ specifically. Of other matters concerning [adultery](#) we shall speak in the Third Part [Supplement, 59, 3; Supplement, 60,62] when we treat of [matrimony](#).

Article 9. Whether incest is a determinate species of lust?

Objection 1. It would seem that [incest](#) is not a determinate [species](#) of [lust](#). For [incest](#) ['Incestus' is equivalent to 'in-castus = 'unchaste'] takes its name from being a privation of [chastity](#). But all kinds of [lust](#) are opposed to [chastity](#). Therefore it seems that [incest](#) is not a [species](#) of [lust](#), but is [lust](#) itself in general.

Objection 2. Further, it is stated in the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1 [Cf. Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa]) that "[incest](#) is intercourse between a man and a [woman](#) related by [consanguinity](#) or affinity." Now affinity differs from [consanguinity](#). Therefore it is not one but several [species](#) of [lust](#).

Objection 3. Further, that which does not, of itself, imply a deformity, does not constitute a determinate [species](#) of [vice](#). But intercourse between those who are related by [consanguinity](#) or affinity does not, of itself, contain any deformity, else it would never have been lawful. Therefore [incest](#) is not a determinate [species](#) of [lust](#).

On the contrary, The [species](#) of [lust](#) are distinguished according to the various [conditions](#) of [women](#) with whom a man has unlawful intercourse. Now [incest](#) implies a special [condition](#) on the part of the [woman](#), because it is unlawful intercourse with a [woman](#) related by [consanguinity](#) or affinity as stated (Objection 2). Therefore [incest](#) is a determinate [species](#) of [lust](#).

I answer that, As stated above (A1,6) wherever we find something incompatible with the right use of venereal actions, there must needs be a determinate [species](#) of [lust](#). Now sexual intercourse with [women](#) related by [consanguinity](#) or affinity is unbecoming to venereal union on three counts. First, because [man naturally](#) owes a certain respect to his parents and therefore to his other blood relations, who are descended in near degree from the same parents: so much so

indeed that among the ancients, as Valerius Maximus relates [Dict. Fact. Memor. ii, 1, it was not deemed right for a son to bathe with his father, lest they should see one another naked. Now from what has been said (142, 4; 151, 4), it is evident that in venereal acts there is a certain shamefulness inconsistent with respect, wherefore men are ashamed of them. Wherefore it is unseemly that such [persons](#) should be united in venereal intercourse. This reason seems to be indicated ([Leviticus 18:7](#)) where we read: "She is thy mother, thou shalt not uncover her nakedness," and the same is expressed further on with regard to others.

The second reason is because blood relations must needs live in close touch with one another. Wherefore if they were not debarred from venereal union, opportunities of venereal intercourse would be very frequent and thus men's minds would be enervated by [lust](#). Hence in the [Old Law](#) [[Leviticus 18](#)] the prohibition was apparently directed specially to those [persons](#) who must needs live together.

The third reason is, because this would hinder a man from having many friends: since through a man taking a stranger to wife, all his wife's relations are united to him by a special kind of friendship, as though they were of the same blood as himself. Wherefore [Augustine](#) says (De Civ. Dei xv, 16): "The demands of [charity](#) are most perfectly satisfied by [men](#) uniting together in the bonds that the various ties of friendship require, so that they may live together in a useful and becoming amity; nor should one [man](#) have many relationships in one, but each should have one."

[Aristotle](#) adds another reason (2 Polit. ii): for since it is [natural](#) that a man should have a liking for a [woman](#) of his kindred, if to this be added the love that has its origin in venereal intercourse, his love would be too ardent and would become a very great incentive to [lust](#): and this is contrary to [chastity](#). Hence it is evident that [incest](#) is a determinate [species](#) of [lust](#).

Reply to Objection 1. Unlawful intercourse between [persons](#) related to one another would be most prejudicial to [chastity](#), both on account of the opportunities it affords, and because of the excessive ardor of love, as stated in the Article. Wherefore the unlawful intercourse between such [persons](#) is called "[incest](#)" antonomastically.

Reply to Objection 2. Persons are related by affinity through one who is related by [consanguinity](#): and therefore since the one depends on the other, [consanguinity](#) and affinity entail the same kind of unbecomingness.

Reply to Objection 3. There is something [essentially](#) unbecoming and contrary to [natural reason](#) in sexual intercourse between [persons](#) related by blood, for instance between parents and children who are directly and immediately related to one another, since children [naturally](#) owe their parents [honor](#). Hence the [Philosopher](#) instances a horse (De Animal. ix, 47) which covered its own mother by mistake and threw itself over a precipice as though horrified at what it had done, because some animals even have a [natural](#) respect for those that have begotten them. There is not the same [essential](#) unbecomingness attaching to other [persons](#) who are related to one another not directly but through their parents: and, as to this, becomingness or unbecomingness varies according to custom, and [human](#) or [Divine law](#): because, as stated above ([Article 2](#)), sexual intercourse, being directed to the common [good](#), is subject to [law](#). Wherefore, as

[Augustine](#) says (De Civ. Dei xv, 16), whereas the union of brothers and sisters goes back to olden times, it became all the more worthy of condemnation when religion forbade it.

Article 10. Whether sacrilege can be a species of lust?

Objection 1. It would seem that [sacrilege](#) cannot be a [species](#) of [lust](#). For the same [species](#) is not contained under different genera that are not subalternated to one another. Now [sacrilege](#) is a [species](#) of irreligion, as stated above (Question 99, Article 2). Therefore [sacrilege](#) cannot be reckoned a [species](#) of [lust](#).

Objection 2. Further, the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1 [Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa]), do not place [sacrilege](#) among other [sins](#) which are reckoned [species](#) of [lust](#). Therefore it would seem not to be a [species](#) of [lust](#).

Objection 3. Further, something derogatory to a sacred thing may be done by the other kinds of [vice](#), as well as by [lust](#). But [sacrilege](#) is not reckoned a [species](#) of [gluttony](#), or of any other similar [vice](#). Therefore neither should it be reckoned a [species](#) of [lust](#).

On the contrary, [Augustine](#) says (De Civ. Dei xv, 16) that "if it is [wicked](#), through [covetousness](#), to go beyond one's earthly bounds, how much more [wicked](#) is it through venereal [lust](#) to transgress the bounds of morals!" Now to go beyond one's earthly bounds in sacred matters is a [sin](#) of [sacrilege](#). Therefore it is likewise a [sin](#) of [sacrilege](#) to overthrow the bounds of morals through venereal desire in sacred matters. But venereal desire pertains to [lust](#). Therefore [sacrilege](#) is a [species](#) of [lust](#).

I answer that, As stated above (I-II, 18, 6,7), the act of a [virtue](#) or [vice](#), that is directed to the end of another [virtue](#) or [vice](#), assumes the latter's [species](#): thus, [theft](#) committed for the sake of [adultery](#), passes into the [species](#) of [adultery](#). Now it is evident that as [Augustine](#) states (De Virgin. 8), the observance of [chastity](#), by being directed to the worship of [God](#), becomes an act of religion, as in the case of those who [vow](#) and keep [chastity](#). Wherefore it is manifest that [lust](#) also, by violating something pertaining to the worship of [God](#), belongs to the [species](#) of [sacrilege](#): and in this way [sacrilege](#) may be accounted a [species](#) of [lust](#).

Reply to Objection 1. Lust, by being directed to another [vice](#) as its end, becomes a [species](#) of that [vice](#): and so a [species](#) of [lust](#) may be also a [species](#) of irreligion, as of a higher genus.

Reply to Objection 2. The enumeration referred to, includes those [sins](#) which are [species](#) of [lust](#) by their very [nature](#): whereas [sacrilege](#) is a [species](#) of [lust](#) in so far as it is directed to another [vice](#) as its end, and may coincide with the various [species](#) of [lust](#). For unlawful intercourse between [persons](#) mutually united by [spiritual](#) relationship, is a [sacrilege](#) after the manner of incest. Intercourse with a [virgin consecrated](#) to [God](#), inasmuch as she is the spouse of [Christ](#), is [sacrilege](#) resembling [adultery](#). If the [maiden](#) be under her father's authority, it will be [spiritual](#) seduction; and if force be employed it will be [spiritual](#) rape, which kind of rape even the [civil law](#) punishes more severely than others. Thus the Emperor Justinian says [Cod. i, iii de Episc. et Cler. 5: "If any [man](#) dare, I will not say to rape, but even to [tempt](#) a [consecrated virgin](#) with a view to marriage, he shall be liable to capital punishment."

Reply to Objection 3. Sacrilege is committed on a [consecrated](#) thing. Now a [consecrated](#) thing is either a [consecrated person](#), who is desired for sexual intercourse, and thus it is a kind of [lust](#), or it is desired for possession, and thus it is a kind of [injustice](#). Sacrilege may also come under the head of [anger](#), for instance, if through [anger](#) an injury be done to a [consecrated person](#). Again, one may commit a [sacrilege](#) by partaking gluttonously of sacred food. Nevertheless, [sacrilege](#) is ascribed more specially to [lust](#) which is opposed to [chastity](#) for the observance of which certain [persons](#) are specially [consecrated](#).

Article 11. Whether the unnatural vice is a species of lust?

Objection 1. It would seem that the unnatural [vice](#) is not a [species](#) of [lust](#). For no mention of the [vice](#) against [nature](#) is made in the enumeration given above (1, Objection 1). Therefore it is not a [species](#) of [lust](#).

Objection 2. Further, [lust](#) is contrary to [virtue](#); and so it is comprised under [vice](#). But the unnatural [vice](#) is comprised not under [vice](#), but under bestiality, according to the [Philosopher](#) (Ethic. vii, 5). Therefore the unnatural [vice](#) is not a [species](#) of [lust](#).

Objection 3. Further, [lust](#) regards acts directed to [human](#) generation, as stated above (Question 153, Article 2): Whereas the unnatural [vice](#) concerns acts from which generation cannot follow. Therefore the unnatural [vice](#) is not a [species](#) of [lust](#).

On the contrary, It is reckoned together with the other [species](#) of [lust](#) ([2 Corinthians 12:21](#)) where we read: "And have not done penance for the [uncleanness](#), and fornication, and lasciviousness," where a [gloss](#) says: "Lasciviousness, i.e., unnatural [lust](#)."

I answer that, As stated above (A6,9) wherever there occurs a special kind of deformity whereby the venereal act is rendered unbecoming, there is a determinate [species](#) of [lust](#). This may occur in two ways: First, through being contrary to right reason, and this is common to all [lustful vices](#); secondly, because, in addition, it is contrary to the [natural](#) order of the venereal act as becoming to the [human race](#): and this is called "the unnatural [vice](#)." This may happen in several ways. First, by procuring pollution, without any copulation, for the sake of venereal pleasure: this pertains to the [sin](#) of "[uncleanness](#)" which some call "effeminacy." Secondly, by copulation with a thing of undue [species](#), and this is called "bestiality." Thirdly, by copulation with an undue sex, male with male, or female with female, as the [Apostle](#) states ([Romans 1:27](#)): and this is called the "[vice](#) of sodomy." Fourthly, by not observing the [natural](#) manner of copulation, either as to undue means, or as to other monstrous and bestial manners of copulation.

Reply to Objection 1. There we enumerated the [species](#) of [lust](#) that are not contrary to [human nature](#): wherefore the unnatural [vice](#) was omitted.

Reply to Objection 2. Bestiality differs from [vice](#), for the latter is opposed to [human virtue](#) by a certain excess in the same [matter](#) as the [virtue](#), and therefore is reducible to the same genus.

Reply to Objection 3. The [lustful man](#) intends not [human](#) generation but venereal pleasures. It is possible to have this without those acts from which [human](#) generation follows: and it is that which is sought in the unnatural [vice](#).

Article 12. Whether the unnatural vice is the greatest sin among the species of lust?

Objection 1. It would seem that the unnatural [vice](#) is not the greatest [sin](#) among the [species](#) of [lust](#). For the more a [sin](#) is contrary to [charity](#) the graver it is. Now [adultery](#), seduction and rape which are injurious to our neighbor are seemingly more contrary to the love of our neighbor, than unnatural [sins](#), by which no other [person](#) is injured. Therefore the unnatural [sin](#) is not the greatest among the [species](#) of [lust](#).

Objection 2. Further, [sins](#) committed against [God](#) would seem to be the most grievous. Now [sacrilege](#) is committed directly against [God](#), since it is injurious to the Divine worship. Therefore [sacrilege](#) is a graver [sin](#) than the unnatural [vice](#).

Objection 3. Further, seemingly, a [sin](#) is all the more grievous according as we owe a greater love to the [person](#) against whom that [sin](#) is committed. Now the order of [charity](#) requires that a man love more those [persons](#) who are united to him--and such are those whom he defiles by [incest](#)--than [persons](#) who are not connected with him, and whom in certain cases he defiles by the unnatural [vice](#). Therefore [incest](#) is a graver [sin](#) than the unnatural [vice](#).

Objection 4. Further, if the unnatural [vice](#) is most grievous, the more it is against [nature](#) the graver it would seem to be. Now the [sin](#) of [uncleanness](#) or effeminacy would seem to be most contrary to [nature](#), since it would seem especially in accord with [nature](#) that agent and patient should be distinct from one another. Hence it would follow that [uncleanness](#) is the gravest of unnatural [vices](#). But this is not [true](#). Therefore unnatural [vices](#) are not the most grievous among [sins](#) of [lust](#).

On the contrary, [Augustine](#) says (De adult. conjug. [The quotation is from Cap. Adulterii xxxii, qu. 7. Cf. [Augustine](#), De Bono Conjugali, viii.]) that "of all these," namely the [sins](#) belonging to [lust](#), "that which is against [nature](#) is the worst."

I answer that, In every genus, worst of all is the corruption of the principle on which the rest depend. Now the principles of reason are those things that are according to [nature](#), because reason presupposes things as determined by [nature](#), before disposing of other things according as it is fitting. This may be observed both in speculative and in practical matters. Wherefore just as in speculative matters the most grievous and shameful [error](#) is that which is about things the [knowledge](#) of which is [naturally](#) bestowed on [man](#), so in matters of action it is most grave and shameful to act against things as determined by [nature](#). Therefore, since by the unnatural [vices](#) [man](#) transgresses that which has been determined by [nature](#) with regard to the use of venereal actions, it follows that in this matter this [sin](#) is gravest of all. After it comes [incest](#), which, as stated above ([Article 9](#)), is contrary to the [natural](#) respect which we owe [persons](#) related to us.

With regard to the other [species](#) of [lust](#) they imply a transgression merely of that which is determined by right reason, on the presupposition, however, of [natural](#) principles. Now it is more against reason to make use of the venereal act not only with prejudice to the future offspring, but also so as to injure another [person](#) besides. Wherefore simple fornication, which is committed without [injustice](#) to another [person](#), is the least grave among the [species](#) of [lust](#). Then, it is a greater [injustice](#) to have intercourse with a [woman](#) who is subject to another's authority as regards the act of generation, than as regards merely her guardianship. Wherefore [adultery](#) is more grievous than seduction. And both of these are aggravated by the use of [violence](#). Hence rape of a [virgin](#) is graver than seduction, and rape of a wife than [adultery](#). And all these are aggravated by coming under the head of [sacrilege](#), as stated above (10, ad 2).

Reply to Objection 1. Just as the ordering of right reason proceeds from [man](#), so the order of [nature](#) is from [God](#) Himself: wherefore in [sins](#) contrary to [nature](#), whereby the very order of [nature](#) is violated, an injury is done to [God](#), the Author of [nature](#). Hence [Augustine](#) says (Confess. iii, 8): "Those foul offenses that are against [nature](#) should be everywhere and at all times detested and punished, such as were those of the people of Sodom, which should all nations commit, they should all stand guilty of the same crime, by the [law](#) of [God](#) which hath not so made men that they should so abuse one another. For even that very intercourse which should be between [God](#) and us is violated, when that same [nature](#), of which He is the Author, is polluted by the perversity of [lust](#)."

Reply to Objection 2. Vices against [nature](#) are also against [God](#), as stated above (ad 1), and are so much more grievous than the depravity of [sacrilege](#), as the order impressed on [human nature](#) is prior to and more firm than any subsequently established order.

Reply to Objection 3. The [nature](#) of the [species](#) is more intimately united to each [individual](#), than any other [individual](#) is. Wherefore [sins](#) against the specific [nature](#) are more grievous.

Reply to Objection 4. Gravity of a [sin](#) depends more on the abuse of a thing than on the omission of the right use. Wherefore among [sins](#) against [nature](#), the lowest place belongs to the [sin](#) of [uncleanness](#), which consists in the mere omission of copulation with another. While the most grievous is the [sin](#) of bestiality, because use of the due [species](#) is not observed. Hence a [gloss](#) on [Genesis 37:2](#), "He accused his brethren of a most [wicked](#) crime," says that "they copulated with cattle." After this comes the [sin](#) of sodomy, because use of the right sex is not observed. Lastly comes the [sin](#) of not observing the right manner of copulation, which is more grievous if the abuse regards the "vas" than if it affects the manner of copulation in respect of other circumstances.