

## CHAPTER CXLVII

### THAT MAN NEEDS THE DIVINE ASSISTANCE IN ORDER TO OBTAIN BEATITUDE

WHEREAS it is clear from the foregoing, that divine providence governs rational creatures otherwise than other things, inasmuch as they differ from others in natural condition, it remains to be proved that also on account of the excellence of their end, a more exalted mode of government is applied to them by divine providence.<sup>4</sup>

It is evident that in keeping with their nature, they attain to a higher participation of the end. For, since they are of an intellectual nature, they are able by their operation to be in touch with intelligible truth: which is impossible for other things, since they lack intelligence. And, forasmuch as they attain to intelligible truth by their natural operation, it is clear that God provides for them otherwise than for other things: in that to man is given intelligence and reason, that thereby he may be able both to discern and to discover the truth: also to him are given the sensitive powers, both interior and exterior, that by them he may be assisted to discover the truth: also to him is given the use of speech, so that by making use of it, one who has conceived the truth in his mind, may be able to impart it to another: so that men may thus assist one another in the knowledge of truth, even as in other necessities of life, since man is *by nature a social animal*.

Furthermore, the knowledge of truth that is appointed as man's last end is one which surpasses his natural faculty: for it consists in his seeing the First Truth itself in itself, as we have proved above. Now this is not competent to lower creatures, namely that they be able to reach an end surpassing their natural faculty. Consequently, there arises from this end an additional reason why a different manner of government should be

accorded to men, and to other creatures of a lower nature. Because the means should be proportionate to the end. So that, if man be directed to an end surpassing his natural faculty, he stands in need of a supernatural assistance from God, to enable him to tend to that end.

Moreover. A thing of inferior nature cannot attain to what is proper to a higher nature except by virtue of that higher nature: thus the moon, that shines not of itself, is made to shine by the power and action of the sun: and water that is not hot of itself, becomes hot by the power and action of fire. Now, to see the First Truth itself in itself, so far surpasses the faculty of human nature, that it belongs to God alone, as we have shown above. Therefore man needs the divine assistance in order to reach that end.

Again. Everything obtains its last end by its own operation. Now, an operation derives its efficacy from the operating principle: wherefore by the action of the seed something is produced in a definite species, through the efficacy pre-existing in the seed. Therefore man cannot, by his own operation, attain to his last end, which surpasses the faculty of his natural powers, unless his operation be enabled by the divine power to bring him thereto.

Besides. No instrument can achieve ultimate perfection by virtue of its own form, but only by virtue of the principal agent: although by virtue of its own form it can cause some disposition to the ultimate perfection. Thus a saw, by reason of its own form, causes the cutting of the wood, but the form of the bench is produced by the art that employs the instrument: likewise in the body of an animal, resolution and consumption is the result of the animal heat, but the formation of flesh, and regulation of increase and other such things, come from the vegetative soul, which uses heat as its instrument. Now, to God the first agent by intellect and will, all intellects and wills are

subordinate, as instruments under the principal agent. Consequently their operations have no efficacy in respect of their ultimate perfection, which is the attainment of final beatitude, except by the power of God. Therefore the rational nature needs the divine assistance in order to obtain its last end.

Further. Many obstacles prevent man from reaching his end. For he is hindered by the weakness of his reason, which is easily drawn into error which bars him from the straight road that leads to his end. He is also hindered by the passions of the sensitive faculty, and by the affections whereby he is drawn to sensible and inferior things, since the more he adheres to them, the further is he removed from his last end: for such things are below man, whereas his end is above him. Again he is often hindered by weakness of the body from doing acts of virtue, whereby he tends to beatitude. Therefore he needs the help of God, lest by such obstacles he turn away utterly from his last end.

Hence it is said (Jo. 4:44): *No man can come to Me, unless the Father, who hath sent Me, draw him:* and (15:4): *As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, unless it abide in the vine, so neither can you, unless you abide in Me.* Hereby we refute the error of the Pelagians, who asserted that man can merit the glory of God by his free-will alone.

## CHAPTER CXLVIII

### THAT THE ASSISTANCE OF DIVINE GRACE DOES NOT COMPEL MAN TO VIRTUE

POSSIBLY, it might appear to some that the divine assistance compels man to do well, since it is said (Jo. 4:44): *No man can come to Me unless the Father, who hath sent Me, draw him:* and on account of the saying (Rom. 8:14): *Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God:* and

again (2 Cor. 5:14): *The charity of Christ presseth us.* And it would seem that compulsion is implied in being *drawn, led* and *pressed*.

But it is evident that this is not true. For divine providence provides for all things according to their mode, as we have proved above. Now, it is proper to man and every rational nature, to act voluntarily and to be master of his actions, as we have shown:<sup>2</sup> and compulsion is incompatible with this. Therefore God by assisting man does not compel him to do right.

Again. When we say that the divine assistance is given to man that he may do well, we mean that it does our works in us, even as the first cause does the works of second causes, and the principal agent produces the action of the instrument, wherefore it is said (Isa. 26:12): *Lord, Thou hast wrought all our works in us.* Now, the first cause produces the operation of the second cause, according to the latter's mode. Therefore God also causes our works in us according to our mode, which is that we act freely and not by compulsion. Therefore the divine assistance does not compel a man to do right.

Besides. Man is directed to his end by his will: because the object of the will is the good and the end. Now, the divine assistance is given to us chiefly that we may obtain the end. Therefore this assistance does not deprive us of the act of the will, but in a special way is the cause of this act in us: hence the Apostle says (Philip. 2:13): *It is God who worketh in us both to will and to accomplish, according to His good will.* But compulsion excludes from us the act of the will: for we do under compulsion that which is against our will. Therefore God does not, by His assistance, compel us to do right.

Further. Man reaches his last end by acts of virtue: for beatitude is said to be *the reward of virtue*. Now compulsory actions are not acts of virtue: because virtue's

principal condition is choice, which is impossible unless it be voluntary, to which compulsion is opposed. Therefore God does not compel man to do right.

Moreover. The means should be proportionate to the end. Now, the last end which is happiness is not becoming except to those who act voluntarily, and are masters of their own actions: hence neither inanimate beings nor dumb animals are said to be happy, as neither are they said to be lucky or unlucky, save metaphorically. Therefore the assistance which God gives man that he may obtain happiness, does not compel him.

Hence it is said (Deut. 30:15–18): *Consider that the Lord hath set before thee this day life and good, and on the other hand, death and evil: that thou mayest love the Lord thy God, and walk in His ways. ... But if thy heart be turned away, so that thou wilt not hear ... I foretell thee this day that thou shalt perish.* Again it is said (Ecclus. 15:18): *Before man is life and death, good and evil. That which he shall choose shall be given him.*

## CHAPTER CXLIX

### THAT MAN IS UNABLE TO MERIT THE DIVINE ASSISTANCE

It can be clearly shown from what has been said, that man is unable to merit God's assistance. For everything is in the position of matter in regard to what is above it. Now matter does not move itself to its perfection, but needs to be moved by another. Therefore man does not move himself to the effect of obtaining the divine assistance, for this is above him: rather indeed is he moved for this purpose by God. Now the motion of the mover precedes the movement of the thing moved both logically and causally. Consequently the divine assistance is not given to us because by our good deeds we previously move ourselves to obtain it, but

rather do we advance by our good deeds, because of God's prevenient help.

Again. An instrumental agent does not produce a disposition for the introduction of perfection by the principal agent, except in so far as it acts by virtue of the principal agent: thus animal heat does not prepare matter for the form of flesh any more than for another form, save in so far as it acts by virtue of the soul. Now, our soul works under God as the instrumental under the principal agent. Consequently the soul is unable to prepare itself to receive the effect of the divine assistance, save forasmuch as it acts by virtue of God. Therefore it is anticipated by the divine assistance, rather than anticipates it, as though it merited it, or prepared itself for it.

Also. No particular agent can in every case anticipate the action of the first universal agent: because every action of a particular agent originates from a universal agent: thus here below every movement is anticipated by the heavenly movement. Now, the human soul is subordinate to God as the particular to the universal agent. Therefore there cannot be a right movement in the soul that is not anticipated by the divine action. Hence our Lord said (Jo. 15:5): *Without me you can do nothing.*

Besides. Meed is proportionate to merit: because equality of justice is observed in giving rewards. Now, since the effect of God's assistance surpasses the faculty of nature, it is not proportionate to the acts that man performs by his natural faculty. Therefore man cannot by such acts merit the aforesaid assistance.

Further. Knowledge precedes the movement of the will. Now, knowledge of his supernatural end comes to man from God: because man cannot obtain such knowledge by his natural reason, since it surpasses his natural faculty. Therefore the movement of our will towards our last end

needs to be anticipated by the divine assistance.

Hence it is said (Tit. 3:5): *Not by the works of justice which we have done, but according to His mercy He hath saved us.* And (Rom. 9:16): *It is not of him that willeth, namely to will, nor of him that runneth, namely to run, but of God that showeth mercy:* because, to wit, in order that he may will and do well, man needs God's prevenient assistance: even as an effect is not usually ascribed to the proximate agent but to the first mover: thus victory is attributed to the general, although it is achieved by the work of the soldiers. Hence these words do not exclude free-will, as some have misunderstood them to do, as though man were not master of his own actions both internal and external: but they indicate the subjection of the free-will to God. Moreover, it is said (Lament. 4.): *Convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted:* whence it is clear that our conversion to God is anticipated by the assistance of God when he converts us.

Yet we read (Zach. 1:3) as said in the person of God: *Turn ye to me ... and I will turn to you:* this does not however deny the anticipating of our conversion by God's operation which we have affirmed, but it means that after our conversion, whereby we turn to him, he maintains it by strengthening it so as to make it effective, and by upholding it, that it may reach its due end.

Hereby we refute the error of the Pelagians, who said that this assistance is given to us on account of our merits: and that the beginning of our justification is from us, but the consummation from God.

## CHAPTER CL

THAT THIS SAME ASSISTANCE IS CALLED  
GRACE; AND WHAT IS MEANT BY  
SANCTIFYING GRACE

SEEING that what is given to a man apart from his merits, is said to be given to him gratis: and since the divine assistance given to man anticipates all human merit, as we have said; it follows that this assistance is bestowed on man gratuitously, and therefore is fittingly known by the name of *grace*. Hence the Apostle says (Rom. 11:6): *And if by grace, it is not now by works: otherwise grace is no more grace.* There is also another reason for which the aforesaid assistance of God has received the name of *grace*. For one man is said to be pleasing (*gratus*) to another, because he is beloved by him, wherefore he who is beloved of another, is said to be in his *grace*. Now it is essential to love that the lover be a well-wisher and a well-doer to the one whom he loves. And indeed the good of every creature is the object of God's will and operation: since the creature's very being and its every perfection come from God willing and operating, as we have proved above: wherefore it is said (Wisd. 11:25): *Thou lovest all things that are, and hatest none of the things which thou hast made.* But a special kind of divine love offers itself to our consideration; it is that which is bestowed on those whom he assists to obtain a good which surpasses the order of their nature, namely the perfect enjoyment, not of any created good, but of his very self. Accordingly this assistance is fittingly named *grace*: not only because it is given gratis, as we have shown; but also because by this assistance man, by a special favour, is rendered pleasing (*gratus*) to God. Hence the Apostle says (Eph. 1:5, 6): *Who hath predestinated us unto the adoption of children ... according to the purpose of His will: unto the praise of glory in which He hath graced us in His beloved Son.*

Now this same grace must needs be something in the man who is graced, something by way of form and perfection. For that which is being directed to an end,

must have a continuous order thereto: because the mover causes a continuous change in the thing moved, until the latter by its movement reaches the end. Since then man, as we proved above, is directed to his last end by the assistance of the divine grace, it follows that he must possess this assistance continuously, until he reach his end. But this would not be the case were man to share in this assistance by way of motion or passion, and not by way of a form, abiding and reposing, as it were, within him: for such motion and passion would not be in man except when he is actually turned towards his end, and this is not always so in man, as may be seen especially when he is asleep. Therefore sanctifying grace is a form and perfection abiding in man, even when he is doing nothing.

Again. God's love causes the good that is in us: even as man's love is evoked and caused by some good in the beloved. Now, man is incited to love someone especially, on account of some good already existing in the beloved. Consequently where there is special love of God for man, we must suppose some special good bestowed on man by God. Since, then, according to what we have been saying, sanctifying grace denotes God's special love for man, it must in consequence imply the presence of some special goodness and perfection in man.

Also. Everything is directed to a suitable end in proportion to its form: since different species have different ends. Now, the end whereto man is directed by the assistance of divine grace is above human nature. Therefore man needs, over and above, a supernatural form and perfection, so as to be suitably directed to that same end.

Besides. It behoves man to reach his last end by means of his own actions. Now, everything acts in proportion to its form. Therefore, in order that man may be brought to his last end by means of his own actions,

he needs to receive an additional form, whereby his actions may be rendered effective in meriting his last end.

Further. Divine providence provides for each thing according to the mode of its nature, as we have shown above. Now, the mode proper to man is that, for the perfection of his operations, he needs, besides his natural powers, certain perfections and habits, to enable him to do the good well as it were connaturally and with both ease and pleasure. Therefore the assistance of grace which man receives from God that he may obtain his last end, denotes a form and perfection abiding in man.

Hence God's grace is designated in Scripture as being a kind of light; for the Apostle says (Ephes. 5:8): *You were heretofore darkness, but now light in the Lord.* And it is fitting that the perfection whereby man is assisted towards his last end, which consists in seeing God, be named *light*, which is a principle of vision.

Hereby we refute the opinion of those who say that grace places nothing in man: even as nothing is posited in a man by saying that he has the king's favour (*gratiam*), but only in the king himself who loves him. It is clear, then, that they were deceived through not observing the difference between divine and human love. For God's love causes the good which He loves in a man: whereas human love does not so always.

## CHAPTER CLI

### THAT SANCTIFYING GRACE CAUSES IN US THE LOVE OF GOD

FROM what has been said it follows that by the assistance of sanctifying grace man is enabled to love God. For sanctifying grace is an effect in man of the divine love.<sup>3</sup> Now, the proper effect of the divine love in man would seem to be that man loves God. Because the chief thing in the intention of

one who loves, is that he be loved in return: since the endeavour of the lover tends especially to draw the beloved to love of him: and unless he accomplishes this, love must cease. Consequently the effect of sanctifying grace in man is that he loves God.

Again. Things that have a common end must be united in so far as they are directed to that end: hence in a state men are joined together in concord that they may ensure the good of the commonwealth; and soldiers, when engaged in battle, must needs be united together, and act in unison in order to achieve the victory which is their common end. Now, the last end to which man is conducted by the assistance of divine grace, is the vision of God in His essence, which vision is proper to God himself: so that this final good is communicated to man by God. Consequently man cannot attain to this end unless he be united to God by conformity of will. And this is the proper effect of love; since *it is proper to friends to like and dislike the same things, and to have common joys and griefs*. Therefore by sanctifying grace man becomes a lover of God: because by it man is directed to an end communicated to him by God.

Also. Since the end and the good is the proper object of the appetite or affections, it follows that man's affective faculty is perfected chiefly by sanctifying grace which directs man to his last end. Now, the chief perfection of the affective faculty is love. A sign of which is that every affective movement originates in love: for no one desires, or hopes, or rejoices, save on account of a good that he loves; and in like manner no one shuns, or fears, or grieves, or is angry, except on account of something contrary to that which he loves. Therefore the principal effect of sanctifying grace is that man loves God.

Further. The form by virtue of which a thing is directed to its end, likens that thing

somewhat to that end: thus a body by virtue of the form of gravity assumes a certain likeness to and conformity with the place to which its movement tends naturally. Now, we have already shown that sanctifying grace is a form residing in man, and directing him to his last end, which is God. Therefore grace makes man like to God. But likeness is the cause of love; because *like loves like*. Therefore grace makes man a lover of God.

Moreover. Operation, to be perfect, must be constant and prompt. Now, this is the chief effect of love, which makes even hard things seem light. Since then sanctifying grace is needed for the perfection of human actions, as stated above, it follows of necessity that this same grace produces in us the love of God.

Hence the Apostle says (Rom. 5:5): *The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts, by the Holy Ghost who is given to us*.

Moreover our Lord promised the vision of Himself to those who love Him, saying (Jo. 14:21): *He that loveth me, shall be loved of My Father: and I will love him, and will manifest myself to him*.

It is evident, then, that grace which directs us to that end which is to see God, causes in us the love of God.

## CHAPTER CLII

### THAT GRACE CAUSES FAITH IN US

FORASMUCH as grace causes charity in us, it follows that faith also is caused in us by grace.

Because the movement whereby we are directed by grace to our last end, is voluntary and not compulsory, as we have shown. Now there cannot be voluntary movement towards the unknown. Consequently, for us to be directed voluntarily to our last end, grace must first of all provide us with knowledge of that end. But this knowledge cannot be one of clear

vision, in this state of life, as we have already proved.<sup>6</sup> Therefore it must be knowledge by faith.

Moreover. The mode of cognition in every cognitive being follows the mode of that being's nature: hence the mode of cognition differs in the angel, man and dumb animals, according to the diversity of their several natures, as we have shown. Now, that man may attain to his last end, he receives a perfection in addition to and surpassing his nature, namely grace, as we have proved.<sup>2</sup> Consequently, it behoves man to receive over and above his natural knowledge, a knowledge surpassing his natural reason. This is the knowledge of faith, which is of things unseen by natural reason.

Again. Whenever a thing is moved by an agent to that which is proper to that agent, the thing moved must needs at the outset be imperfectly subject to the impressions of the agent, such impressions being as it were foreign and improper thereto, until they become proper to it in the term of the movement: thus wood is at first heated by fire, and such heat is not proper to the wood, but something outside its nature; but in the end, when the wood is incandescent, the heat becomes proper and connatural to it. In like manner, when one is taught by a master, at first he must needs receive the master's ideas, not as understanding them by himself, but as taking them in faith, through their being above his capacity, so to speak: but in the end, when he has been thoroughly taught, he will be able to understand them. Now, as we have shown already, we are directed to our last end by the assistance of divine grace. And our last end is the clear vision of the First Truth in itself, as we have proved.<sup>4</sup> Therefore, before obtaining this end, man's mind, with the assistance of divine grace, must needs be subject to God by believing.

Further. At the beginning of this work we set down the advantages for which it is necessary that man should receive the divine truth by believing therein. Whence we may conclude that it was necessary for faith to be produced in us by divine grace.

Hence the Apostle says (Ephes. 2:8): *By grace you are saved through faith: and that not of yourselves, for it is the gift of God.*

Hereby we refute the error of the Pelagians who said that the beginning of faith in us is not from God, but from ourselves.

## CHAPTER CLIII

### THAT DIVINE GRACE CAUSES HOPE IN US

IN the same way it can be proved that grace must needs cause in us the hope of future bliss.

Because the love which a man has for others, arises from his love for himself, inasmuch as a man looks upon his friend as his other self. Now, a man loves himself, in that he wishes good for himself; even as he loves another, in that he wishes good for him. Consequently, a man through having an affection for his own good, is led to have an affection for another's good. So that when a man hopes for a good from another he is on the way to love him in himself, of whom he hopes some good: for a man is loved in himself, when the lover wills his good, even though he gain nothing from it. Wherefore, since sanctifying grace causes man to love God for himself,<sup>2</sup> the consequence is that grace also causes man to hope in God.—Friendship whereby one loves another in himself, although it be not for one's own profit, nevertheless turns to one's profit in many ways, in so far as one friend helps another as he would help himself. Consequently, when one man loves another and knows that he is beloved of him, the result is that he has hope of him. Now, grace makes man a lover of God, according to the

love of charity, so that at the same time he knows by faith that God already loves him, as expressed by the words of 1 Jo. 4:10: *In this is love: not as though we had loved God, but because He hath first loved us.* The effect, therefore, of the gift of grace is that man hopes in God.—Hence it is evident that, as hope prepares man for true love of God, so conversely by charity man is strengthened in hope.

Moreover. There arises in every lover the desire to be united as far as possible with the beloved: hence nothing gives greater pleasure to friends than living together. Since, then, grace makes man a lover of God, it must also make him desire union with God, as far as this is possible. Now, faith which originates from grace,<sup>2</sup> affirms it to be possible for man to be united to God in perfect enjoyment wherein beatitude consists. Wherefore the desire of this enjoyment arises in man from his love of God. But the desire of a thing troubles the soul of the desirer unless he have the hope of obtaining it. Accordingly, as grace gives rise in man to the love of God and faith, it was fitting that it should also give rise to the hope of obtaining beatitude in the life to come.

Again. If any difficulty offers itself to those who are being directed to an end desired by them, they are comforted by the hope of obtaining it: thus one puts up with the bitter medicine through the hope of being restored to health. Now, many difficulties have to be faced on the way in which we fare towards beatitude, that is the bourn of all our desires: since virtue, which is the road to beatitude, is *about difficult things*. In order, then, that man might tend to beatitude with a lighter heart and greater readiness, it was necessary to give him the hope of obtaining beatitude.

Further. No man is moved towards an end which he deems impossible to obtain. Hence that a man may proceed towards a

certain end, it is necessary for him to think of that end as something possible for him to have: and this thought is afforded by hope. Since, then, man is directed by grace to the last end which is beatitude, it was necessary for the hope of obtaining beatitude to be engraved on man's thoughts by grace. Hence it is said (1 Pet. 1:3, 4): *Who ... hath regenerated us unto a lively hope ... unto an inheritance incorruptible ... reserved in heaven:* and (Rom. 8:24): *We are saved by hope.*

## CHAPTER CLIV

### OF THE GIFTS OF GRATUITOUS GRACE: WHEREIN IT IS TREATED OF THE DIVINATIONS OF DEMONS

WHEREAS what things man sees not by himself, he cannot know unless he receive them of one who sees them; and as faith is of things unseen by us: it behoves the things that are of faith to be received from one who sees them himself. Now, this one is God, who comprehends Himself perfectly, and sees His own essence naturally: for our faith is of God. Hence the things that we hold by faith must come to us from God. And whereas the things that are of God are enacted in a certain order, as we have shown above,<sup>2</sup> it behoved a certain order to be observed in the revelation of those things that are of faith: so that, to wit, some should receive them immediately from God, and others from these, and thus in orderly fashion down to the very last.

Now, wherever there is any kind of order in a number of things the nearer a thing is to the first principle the greater its efficacy. This is to be observed in the order of divine manifestations. Because the invisible things to see which is beatitude, and to believe is faith, are revealed first of all to the blessed angels, so that they see them clearly, as we have already said.<sup>4</sup>



Afterwards, by the ministry of the angels, they are made known to certain men, not so as to be seen clearly, but so as to be known with a certain assurance arising from the divine revelation.

Now, this revelation is made by a certain interior and intellectual light, which raises the mind to the perception of things that it cannot reach by means of its natural light. For just as by its natural light the intelligence is assured of what it knows in that light, for example first principles; so too of the things it knows in a supernatural light is it assured. And this assurance is necessary in order that things known by divine revelation be proposed to other men: for we have no assurance in proffering to others what we do not hold with certainty. Now, in addition to this same light that enlightens the mind inwardly, there are present sometimes in divine revelation, some outward or inward aids to knowledge; as when the words formed by divine power are heard outwardly by sense, or through God's agency are perceived inwardly by the imagination; or again as when God causes things to be seen outwardly by the eyes, or to be imagined inwardly: from which man, aided by the inward light that is shed on his mind, derives knowledge of divine things. Hence suchlike aids, without the inward light, do not suffice for the knowledge of divine things; whereas the inward light suffices without them. This revelation of the invisible things of God belongs to *wisdom*, which, properly speaking, is the knowledge of divine things. Wherefore it is said (Wis. 7:27, 28) that divine wisdom *through nations conveyeth herself into holy souls: ... for God loveth none but him that dwelleth with wisdom:* and again (Ecclus. 15:5): *The Lord hath filled him with the spirit of wisdom and understanding.*

But whereas *the invisible things of God are clearly seen ... being understood by the things that are made*, by divine grace not

only are divine things revealed to men, but also some things about creatures; and this apparently belongs to *knowledge*. Hence it is said (Wis. 7:17): *He hath given me the true knowledge of the things that are: to know the disposition of the whole world, and the virtues of the elements.* Again the Lord said to Solomon (2 Paralip. 1:12): *Wisdom and knowledge are granted to thee.* Again, man cannot conveniently communicate his knowledge to others except by speech. Since, then, according to the order established by God, those who receive God's revelation have to instruct others, it was also necessary that they should receive the *grace of the word*, in so far as it was required for the profit of those to be instructed. Hence it is said (Isa. 50:4): *The Lord hath given me a learned tongue, that I should know how to uphold by word him that is weary.* And our Lord said to His disciples (Luke 21:15): *I will give you a mouth and wisdom, which all your adversaries will not be able to resist and gainsay.*—For this same reason, as long as the truth of faith had to be preached in various countries by a few, certain ones were equipped with the gift of *speaking in divers tongues*, according to Acts 2:4: *They were all filled with the Holy Ghost, and they began to speak with divers tongues, according as the Holy Ghost gave them to speak.* Since, however, the proffered speech needs confirmation that it may be accepted, unless it be manifest in itself; and whereas things that are of faith are not clear to human reason: it was necessary to provide some means of confirming the utterances of those who preached the faith. But they could not be confirmed by being demonstrated from principles of reason, since matters of faith are above reason. Therefore the preachers' words needed to be confirmed by some kind of signs, whereby it was made evident that their words were from God, and that the preacher should do such works as

*healing the sick, and performing other deeds of power, which God alone can do. Hence our Lord, on the point of sending His disciples to preach, said (Matth. 10:8): Heal the sick, raise the dead, cleanse lepers, cast out devils: and (Mark 16:20) it is said: But they, going forth, preached everywhere: the Lord working withal, and confirming the word with signs that followed.*

There was also another manner of confirmation in that when the heralds of truth were found to speak the truth about such hidden things as could subsequently be made manifest, they were believed because they spoke truthfully of things beyond the ken of man. Hence the necessity of the gift of *prophecy*, whereby through divine revelation they were able to know and announce to others, the things that were to happen, and such things as are commonly hidden from man's knowledge: so that as they were found to speak the truth in these matters, they were believed in matters of faith. Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 14:24, 25): *If all prophesy, and there come in one that believeth not, or an unlearned person, he is convinced of all, he is judged of all: (for) the secrets of his heart are made manifest, and so, falling down on his face, he will adore God, affirming that God is among you indeed.*

Nevertheless the gift of prophecy were not a sufficient guarantee of faith, unless it be about things which God alone can know: even as miracles are such as God alone can do. The like here below are especially our secret thoughts, which God alone can know, as we proved above:<sup>2</sup> and future contingencies, which also are a matter of God's knowledge only, because he sees them in themselves, since to Him they are present by reason of His eternity, as we proved above.

Some future contingencies, however, can be known by men also: not indeed as future, but as already existing in their causes: for

when causes are known, whether in themselves or in certain manifest effects thereof that are called signs, it is possible for men to have foreknowledge of certain future effects. Thus a physician foresees death or health from the state of the forces of nature which he diagnoses from the pulse, urine, and other like signs. Such knowledge of the future is indeed partly certain, and partly uncertain. Because there are some pre-existent causes from which subsequent effects follow of necessity: thus death follows of necessity from the pre-existent composition of contrary elements in the animal. On the other hand, from some pre-existent causes subsequent effects follow, not of necessity, but frequently: thus from the seed of the male being discharged into the matrix, there results a perfect human being in the majority of cases: and yet sometimes monsters are begotten on account of some obstacle hindering the action of the forces of nature. Of the former effects one has certain foreknowledge: but of the latter no knowledge is infallibly certain. On the other hand the foreknowledge of the future, that is acquired from divine revelation by the grace of prophecy, is altogether certain; even as the divine foreknowledge is certain. For God foresees future things not only as in their causes, but infallibly as they are in themselves, as we have already proved. Wherefore in the same way prophetic knowledge of the future is given to man together with perfect certitude.—Nor is this certitude incompatible with the contingent nature of future things, as neither is the certitude of God's knowledge, as was proved above.<sup>2</sup>

Sometimes, however, future effects are revealed to prophets, not as they are in themselves, but as they are in their causes. And then if the causes are hindered from producing their effects, nothing prevents the prophets' foretelling from undergoing a change: thus Isaias foretold to the dying

Ezechias (Isa. 38:1): *Take order with thy house, for thou shalt die, and not live*, and yet he recovered: and the prophet Jonas foretold (Jonas 3:4) that after *forty days Nineveh shall be destroyed*, and yet it was not destroyed. Accordingly, Isaias foretold the future death of Ezechias with reference to the relation of his bodily condition and of other inferior causes to that effect; and Jonas foretold the destruction of Nineveh with reference to the exigency of its merits; but in each case the event proved otherwise according to God's operation of deliverance and healing. Hence prophetic foretelling of the future is a sufficient argument of faith: because, though men know some future things, foreknowledge, such as that of prophecy, of future contingencies has no certitude. For, even if at times a prophet receives a revelation according to the relation of certain causes to a certain effect, nevertheless at the same time, or afterwards, it is revealed to him how the fulfilment of the future effect is to be changed: thus the recovery of Ezechias was revealed to Isaias, and the deliverance of the Ninevites to Jonas.<sup>4</sup>

Now, as we proved above, wicked spirits, in the endeavour to corrupt the true of faith: abuse the working of miracles in order to lead men into error, and to weaken the proofs of the true faith: not however by working real miracles, but by doing things which appear to men miraculous. In the same way they abuse the foretellings of prophecy, not indeed by uttering real prophecies, but by foretelling things in accordance with an order of causes unknown to man, so as to appear to foresee future events in themselves. And though contingent effects arise from natural causes, these same spirits, by the acuteness of their intelligence, are able to know better than men when and how the effects of natural causes can be hindered: and so, in foretelling the future, they seem to be more wonderful and truthful

than the wisest of men. Now, among natural causes, the highest and furthest removed from our knowledge are the powers of heavenly bodies: and that these are known to the aforesaid spirits as regards the property of their nature, has been shown above. Since, then, all bodies in this lower world are ruled through the powers and movement of higher bodies,<sup>2</sup> the spirits in question are able, much better than any astrologer, to forecast future winds and storms, changes of weather, and other like events which occur through changes in these lower bodies brought about by the movement of the bodies above. And although heavenly bodies are unable to cause a direct impression on the intellective part of the soul, as we have proved, yet many there are who follow the bent of their passions and their bodily inclinations, which the heavenly bodies are clearly able to influence: for none but the wise, who are few, are able to curb these passions by their reason. Hence also they are able to foretell many things regarding human actions: albeit sometimes even they fail in their forecast, on account of free-will.

Moreover when they foretell what they foresee, they do not enlighten the mind, as God does when He reveals anything: for it is not their intention to perfect the human mind unto the knowledge of truth, but on the contrary to turn it away from the truth.

Their forecasts are sometimes connected with the working of the imagination; either during sleep, as when they draw indications of the future from dreams; or in waking, as when people in a trance or a fit foretell certain future events: sometimes their forecast is taken from external signs, for instance, by observing the flight and chattering of birds, by studying the entrails of animals, or the combination of certain dots, and by like practices, all of which seemingly depend on chance: and sometimes from visible apparitions, and foretelling the future in audible words. And

although in the last instance it is evident that wicked spirits must intervene, they strive to account for the other cases by referring them to natural causes. For they contend that since a heavenly body conduces by its movement to certain effects in this lower world; by the same agency, there appear signs of these effects in certain things: because different things receive the celestial influence in different ways. Accordingly, say they, the impression made by a heavenly body on one thing may be taken as a sign of the impression made on another. And so they assert that movements which are independent of the reason's deliberation, such as things seen by dreamers and lunatics, the flight and twittering of birds, and arrangements of dots when made at haphazard, are consequent to the impressions made by a heavenly body. And consequently they say that such things can be signs of the future events that are caused by the heaven's movement.

Since, however, there is but little reason in all this, we should judge rather that the forecasts made from such signs have their foundation in some intellectual substance, by whose power the aforesaid indeliberate movements are controlled, so as to be in keeping with the reading of the future. And though such things are sometimes controlled by the divine will through the ministry of good spirits, for God reveals many things by means of dreams, for instance to Pharaoh and Nabuchodonosor;<sup>2</sup> and in the words of Solomon: *Lots are cast into the lap, but they are disposed of by the Lord:* yet they do result sometimes from the operation of wicked spirits; for such is the teaching of holy doctors, and the opinion even of the heathens. Thus Valerius Maximus says that the observing of omens and dreams and the like belongs to a religion wherein idols are worshipped. Hence in the old Law, all these were forbidden together with idolatry, for it is said (Deut. 18:9–11): *Lest thou have a*

*mind to imitate the abominations of these nations, who, to wit, worshipped idols; neither let be found among you anyone that shall expiate his son or daughter, making them to pass through the fire; or that consulteth soothsayers, or observeth dreams and omens; neither let there be any wizard, nor charmer; nor any one that consulteth pythonic spirits, or fortune-tellers, or that seeketh the truth from the dead.* Prophecy bears witness also in another way to the preaching of the faith: when, namely, the preacher proclaims as articles of faith, events that take place in the course of time, such as Christ's birth, passion and resurrection, and the like: and lest people think such things to be invented by the preacher, or to have happened by chance, they are proved to have been foretold by the prophets a long time in advance. Wherefore the Apostle says (Rom. 1:1–3): *Paul a servant of Jesus Christ, called to be an apostle, separated unto the gospel of God, which He had promised before by His prophets in the holy scriptures, concerning His Son who was made to Him of the seed of David according to the flesh.*

Next in rank to those who receive revelation from God immediately, another degree of grace is necessary. For since God vouchsafes revelation to man not only for the present time, but also for the instruction of all in the time to come, it was necessary that the things revealed should be delivered not only by word of mouth to the present generation, but also by the written word for the instruction of the future generation. Hence the need for someone to *interpret* these writings. And this must be a divine grace, even as revelation itself was made by the grace of God. Wherefore it is said (Gen. 40:8): *Doth not interpretation belong to God?*

Then comes the last degree; of those, namely, who faithfully believe the things to others revealed, and by others interpreted:

and that this is God's gift has been shown above. Nevertheless, whereas the wicked spirits do works like those by which faith is confirmed, both in working signs and in revealing the future, as stated above;<sup>2</sup> lest men be deceived by such things and believe in falsehoods, it is necessary that, by the aid of divine grace, they be instructed in *the discerning of suchlike spirits*: according to 1 Jo. 4:1: *Believe not every spirit, but try the spirits if they be of God.*

These effects of grace intended for the instruction and confirmation of faith are enumerated by the Apostle, 1 Cor. 12:8–10, where he says: *To one indeed by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom: and to another, the word of knowledge, according to the same Spirit: to another, faith in the same Spirit: to another, the grace of healing in one Spirit: to another, the working of miracles: to another, prophecy: to another, the discerning of spirits: to another, divers kinds of tongues: to another, interpretation of speeches.*

Hereby we refute the error of certain Manicheans, who deny that miracles worked on bodies are done by God.—Likewise we refute the error of those who said that the prophets did not speak by the Spirit of God.—We also refute the error of Priscilla and Montanus, who said that the prophets, like men in a trance, understood not what they said. For this is incompatible with divine revelation, whereby the mind chiefly is enlightened.

Now we must observe a certain difference in the aforesaid effects of grace. For though the name of *grace* befits them all, in that they are bestowed *gratis*, without any preceding merit: the effect alone of love deserves furthermore the name of grace for this other reason, that it makes man pleasing (*gratum*) to God: for it is said (Prov. 8:17): *I love them that love Me.* Consequently faith and hope, and other things directed to faith, can be in sinners who are not pleasing to

God: but love alone is the peculiar gift of the righteous, because *he that abides in charity, abideth in God, and God in him* (1 Jo. 4:16). But there is yet another difference to be noticed in the aforesaid effects of grace. Because some of them are necessary to man during his whole life, seeing that without them he cannot be saved: for instance, faith, hope, charity, and obedience to God's commandments. For such effects man needs to have certain habitual perfections within him, in order that when it is time for him to do so, he may be able to act according to them.—Whereas the other effects are necessary, not during the whole of man's life, but at certain times and places: such as working miracles, foretelling the future, and so forth. For the like habitual perfections are not bestowed, but certain impressions are made by God which cease as soon as the act ceases; and must be repeated when there is need for the act to be repeated: thus the prophet's mind is enlightened with a new light in each revelation; and in each miraculous work there must be a renewal of the activity of the divine power.

## CHAPTER CLV

### THAT MAN NEEDS THE DIVINE AID IN ORDER TO PERSEVERE IN GOOD

MAN also needs the aid of divine grace in order to persevere in good.

Because everything that is changeable of itself, needs the aid of an immovable mover, in order to stand fast to one thing. Now, man is changeable from evil to good, and from good to evil. Therefore, that he may persevere unchangeably in good, in a word, that he may *persevere*, he needs the divine assistance.

Again. Man needs the aid of divine grace for that which exceeds the strength of free-will. But the free-will is not sufficiently strong to persevere in good to the end. This is proved as follows. The power of the free-

will extends to things which are a matter of choice: and that which is chosen is some particular thing to be done. A thing to be done in particular is something here and now. Therefore the power of the free-will is confined to something to be done now. But perseverance does not denote something to be done now, but a continuous operation that lasts all the time. Consequently this effect, namely to persevere in good, is above the power of the free-will. Therefore man needs the aid of divine grace, to persevere in good.

Besides. Although, by his will and faculty of self-determination, man is master of his actions, he is not master of his natural powers. And, consequently, though he is free to will or not to will a thing, in willing he is unable to make his will so will a thing that it stands fast to what it wills or chooses. Yet this is requisite for perseverance: namely, that the will stand fast in the good. Therefore perseverance is not in the power of the free-will: and consequently man needs the help of divine grace, in order to persevere.

Moreover. If there be several successive agents, one of which, namely, acts after the action of another: the continuation of their activity cannot result from any one of them, since none of them is always in action: nor can it result from them all, because they do not act together. Consequently it must result from some higher agent that is always in action. Thus the Philosopher (8 *Phys.* vi.) proves that the continuity of generation in animals is caused by some everlasting higher being. Now, let us suppose a man to be persevering in good. It follows that in him there are many movements of the free-will tending to the good, one after the other, until the end. Hence no one of these movements can be the cause of this continuity of good, namely perseverance; because none of them lasts continually. Nor can they all together be the cause of it: since, as they are not together, they cannot together

be the cause of anything. Therefore this continuity is caused by some higher being: and consequently man needs the aid of grace from above in order to persevere in good.

Further. If many things be ordered to one end, their whole order, until they reach the end, is from the first agent directing them to the end. Now, in the man who perseveres in good there are many movements and actions tending to one end. Consequently the whole order of these movements and actions must needs be directed by the first director to that end. But it has been shown above that men are directed to the last end by the aid of divine grace. Therefore in him who perseveres in good the whole order and continuation of good works is through the assistance of divine grace.

Hence it is said (Philip. 1:6): *He who hath begun a good work in you will perfect it unto the day of Christ Jesus:* and (1 Pet. 5:10): *The God of all grace, who hath called us unto His eternal glory ... after you have suffered a little, will Himself perfect you, and confirm you, and establish you.*

Moreover we find in Holy Writ many prayers by which perseverance is besought of God, for instance in Ps. 16:5, *Perfect thou my goings in Thy paths, that my footsteps be not moved;* and 2 Thess. 2:15, 16, *God our Father ... exhort your hearts, and confirm you in every good work and word.* The same petition is made in the Lord's prayer, especially when we say, *Thy kingdom come:* for God's kingdom will not come to us, except we persevere in good. Now, it would be absurd to ask of God that whereof He is not the giver. Therefore man's perseverance is from God.

Hereby we refute the error of the Pelagians, who said that the free-will suffices for man to persevere in good, and that he needs not the assistance of grace in order to do so.

It must be observed, however, that since even one who has grace, asks of God that he

may persevere in good; just as the free-will is not sufficient for this effect which is perseverance in good, without the external aid of God, so neither is an infused habit sufficient for the purpose. Because the habits that are infused into us by God, in the present state of life, do not wholly remove from the free-will its proneness to evil: albeit they do give the free-will a certain stability in good. Hence, when we say that man needs the help of grace for final perseverance, we do not mean that, in addition to habitual grace previously infused in order that he may do good works, he needs another grace besides in order to persevere: but we mean that even when he has all the infused gratuitous habits, man still needs the assistance of divine providence governing him externally.

## CHAPTER CLVI

THAT HE WHO FALLS AWAY FROM GRACE BY  
SIN, CAN RECOVER AGAIN BY MEANS OF  
GRACE

HENCE it may be shown that by the assistance of grace, even when a man has not persevered, and has fallen into sin, he can be restored to good.

For it belongs to the same force to maintain a man's health, and to mend it when broken: thus health is maintained in the body by the forces of nature, and by the same forces is restored when it is impaired. Now, as we have shown, man perseveres in good by the aid of divine grace. Therefore, if he has fallen through sin, he can be restored by the same assistance of grace.

Again. An agent that requires no disposition in the subject, is able to produce its effect in a subject no matter how disposed: and for this reason God, who in His action requires no disposition in the subject, is able to produce a natural form in a subject, without that subject being thereto disposed: as when He gives sight to the

blind, and life to the dead, and so forth. Moreover, as He requires no natural disposition in a corporeal subject, so neither does He require merit in the will, in order to bestow grace, since this is given apart from merit, as we have proved. Therefore God is able to give man sanctifying grace, whereby sins are taken away, even after his fall from grace by sin.

Further. Those things alone is man unable to recover after their loss, which he acquires in birth, such as his natural powers and limbs: because man cannot be born again. Now, the aid of grace is given to man not in birth, but when he is already in existence. Therefore after losing grace through sin, he can regain it so that his sins be wiped out.

Moreover. Grace is an habitual disposition in the soul, as we have shown. But habits acquired by means of acts, if they be lost, can be acquired anew by means of the acts whereby they were acquired. Much more, therefore, if we lose the grace which unites us to God and frees us from sin, can we regain it by the divine operation.

Moreover. In God's works, as in nature's, nothing is without a purpose; for even nature owes this to God. Now it would be useless for a thing to be moved, unless it were able to reach the end of the movement. Hence that which has a natural aptitude for being moved towards a certain end, must needs be able to reach that end. Now, after man has fallen into sin, as long as he remains in this state of life, he retains the aptitude for being moved to good: this is indicated by his desire for good, and his grief for evil, which remain in him after he has sinned. Therefore after he has sinned it is possible for man to return once more to good: and this is the effect of grace in man.

Further. In all nature there is not to be found a passive potentiality that is not reducible to actuality by some natural active power. Much less therefore is there in the

human soul a potentiality that cannot be brought to act by the active power of God. Now, even after sin, the human soul retains the potentiality for good: because sin does not deprive the soul of its natural powers whereby it is ordered to its good. Therefore, by God's power it can be restored to good, and consequently, by the aid of grace, man can receive forgiveness of his sins. Hence it is said (Isa. 1:18): *If your sins be as scarlet, they shall be made white as snow:* and (Prov. 10:12): *Charity covereth all sins.* This also we daily ask not in vain of the Lord, when we say: *Forgive us our trespasses.*

Hereby we refute the error of the Novatians who said that a man cannot obtain forgiveness for the sins committed by him after Baptism.

## CHAPTER CLVII

THAT MAN CANNOT BE FREED FROM SIN SAVE  
BY GRACE

FROM the same premisses it can be shown that man cannot arise from mortal sin except by grace.

Because by mortal sin man turns away from his last end: and by grace alone is man directed towards his last end. Therefore by grace alone can he arise from sin.

Again. Offence is not removed save by love. Now, by mortal sin man offends God: for it is written that *God hateth sinners,* inasmuch as it is His will to deprive them of the last end, which He prepares for those whom He loves. Therefore man cannot arise from sin except by grace, which causes a kind of friendship between God and man.

The same conclusion follows from all the arguments given above to prove the necessity of grace.

Hence it is said (Isa. 43:25): *I, even I, am He that blot out thy iniquities for My own sake:* and (Ps. 84:3): *Thou hast forgiven the iniquity of Thy people; Thou hast covered all their sins.*

Hereby is refuted the error of the Pelagians who said that man can arise from sin by his free-will.

## CHAPTER CLVIII

HOW MAN IS FREED FROM SIN

WHEREAS man cannot return to one of two opposites unless he go away from the other; in order by the aid of grace to return to the state of righteousness, he must withdraw from sin whereby he had abandoned the path of rectitude. And since it is chiefly by his will that man is directed to his ultimate end and turned away from it, it is necessary that he not only withdraw from sin in his external actions, by ceasing to sin, but also that he withdraw by his will, in order to rise from sin by grace. Now man withdraws from sin by his will, in repenting of the past sin, and purposing to avoid it for the future. Therefore in order to rise from sin man must both repent of past sins and purpose to avoid future sins. For did he not propose to sin no more, sin would not, in itself, be contrary to his will. And if he were willing to sin no more without repenting of his past sin, the sin itself that he committed would not be contrary to his will.—Now, the movement of recession from a thing is contrary to the movement of approach, as whitening is contrary to blackening. Hence in withdrawing from sin the will must take the contrary road to that which led it into sin. Now, it was led into sin by the desire and pleasure of things beneath it. Therefore it needs to turn away from sin by certain punishments, whereby it suffers for having sinned: for even as the will was drawn by pleasure to consent to sin, so by punishment it is confirmed in the detestation of sin.

Again. Fear of the whip deters even dumb animals from their greatest delights. Now the man who arises from sin must not only detest his past sin, but also avoid future sin. It is, therefore, right that he should be



punished for his sin, that he may be the more strengthened in his purpose to avoid sin.

Besides. The things we acquire with toil and pain are dearer to us, and we are more careful about keeping them: thus men who have enriched themselves by their own labours spend less than those who have received their riches from their parents or in any other way without labour. Now for the man who arises from sin it is most necessary that he be most careful to keep in the state of grace, which he carelessly lost by sinning. Therefore it is fitting that he suffer labour and pain for the sins he committed.

Further. The order of justice demands that punishment be awarded for sin. Now, the wisdom of God's government appears in the maintenance of order among things. Therefore it belongs to the manifestation of God's goodness and glory that punishment be the reward of sin. But the sinner by sinning acts against the divinely established order, for he transgresses the laws of God. Therefore it is right that he make compensation by punishing in himself that which had previously sinned: for thus he will be wholly freed of his disorder.

It is clear then that after man has by grace obtained the forgiveness of sin, and been restored to the state of grace, he remains, by virtue of God's justice, bound to suffer punishment for the sin he has committed. And if he, of his own accord, take this punishment on himself, he is said thereby to *satisfy* God: inasmuch as with labour and pain he follows the divinely established order by punishing himself for his sin, which same order by sinning he of his own accord had abandoned.—On the other hand if he fails to take this punishment on himself, since the things subject to divine providence cannot remain in disorder, this punishment will be inflicted on him by God. Nor will this punishment come under the name of satisfaction, since it will not be of the sufferer's choice: but it will be described

as *purgatorial*, because he will be purged, as it were, by another punishing him, and whatever was disorderly in him will be brought back to the right order.—Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 11:31, 32): *If we would judge ourselves, we should not be judged. But whilst we are judged, we are chastised by the Lord; that we be not condemned with this world.*

We must observe, however, that when the mind turns away from sin, it is possible for its detestation of sin to be so strong, and for it to cling so closely to God, that there remains no obligation to punishment. For, as may be gathered from what has been said, the punishment that one suffers after sin has been forgiven, is necessary in order that the mind may adhere to good more firmly, through being chastised by punishment; for punishment is a kind of medicine; and again that the order of justice may be maintained by the sinner being punished. Now, the love of God suffices to strengthen man's mind in good, especially if it be vehement; and when the intense detestation of past sin causes great sorrow. Consequently great love of God, and great hatred of past sin remove the need of punishment whether satisfactory or purgatorial: and even if the vehemence be not so great as to exclude all punishment, yet the greater the vehemence, the less punishment will be required.

Now, *what we do by our friends, we do apparently by ourselves*: because friendship, especially the love of charity, binds two persons together as one. Wherefore as a man can satisfy God by himself, so can he by another; especially when there is urgent need for it. For a man looks upon the punishment which his friend suffers for his sake, as though he suffered it himself: and so he is not without punishment, seeing that he suffers with his suffering friend, and he suffers all the more, according as he is the cause of his friend's suffering. Again, the love of charity in him who suffers for his

friend makes the satisfaction more acceptable to God, than if he suffered for himself: for the former comes of the eagerness of charity, but the latter comes of necessity. Hence we infer that one man may satisfy for another, so long as both remain in charity: wherefore the Apostle says (Gal. 6:2): *Bear ye one another's burdens, and so ye shall fulfil the law of Christ.*

## CHAPTER CLIX

THAT, ALTHOUGH MAN CANNOT BE CONVERTED TO GOD WITHOUT GOD'S GRACE, YET IT IS REASONABLY IMPUTED TO HIM, IF HE BE NOT CONVERTED

SINCE, without the aid of divine grace, man cannot be directed to his last end, as we have shown in the preceding chapters; and seeing that without it man can have none of the things required that he may tend to his last end, such as faith, hope, love, and perseverance; someone might think that man is not to be blamed if he lack the things in question: and especially because man cannot merit the assistance of divine grace, nor be converted to God unless God convert him: since no one is blamed for what depends on another. But, if this be granted, it is clear that several absurdities follow, For it would follow that a man without faith, or hope, or love of God, or perseverance in good, is not deserving of punishment: whereas it is said expressly (Jo. 3:36): *He that believeth not in the Son, shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him.*—And since no man obtains beatitude without these things, it would also follow that there are some who neither obtain beatitude from God, nor suffer punishment from Him. Whereas the contrary is proved from the words of Matth. 25:34–41, where we are told that to all who are present at God's judgement it will be said, *Come ... possess the kingdom prepared for you; or Depart ... into everlasting fire.*

In order to clear away this doubt, we must take note that, though a man is unable, by the movement of his free-will, to merit or acquire the divine grace, nevertheless he can hinder himself from receiving it. For it is said of some (Job 21:14): *Who have said to God: Depart from us; we desire not the knowledge of Thy ways:* and (*ibid.* 24:13): *They have been rebellious to the light.* And since it is in the power of the free-will, to hinder or not to hinder the reception of divine grace, he who places an obstacle in the way of his receiving grace is deservedly to be blamed. Because God, for His own part, is prepared to give grace to all, for *He will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth* (1 Tim. 2:4). But those alone are deprived of grace, who place in themselves an obstacle to grace: thus he who shuts his eyes while the sun is shining is to be blamed if an accident occurs, although he is unable to see unless the sun's light enable him to do so.

## CHAPTER CLX

THAT A MAN WHO IS IN SIN CANNOT AVOID SIN WITHOUT GRACE

THE statement that it is in the power of the free-will to offer no obstacle to grace, applies to those in whom the natural power retains its integrity. If however, through some previous disorder, it has turned aside to evil ways, it will not be wholly in its power to place no obstacles to grace. For though man, by his own power, is able to refrain at a certain moment, from a particular sinful act: yet if he be left to himself for long, he will fall into sin, whereby an obstacle to grace is set up. Because when the human mind has turned aside from the path of rectitude, it is clear that it has abandoned the direction to its due end. Consequently that which should stand first in its affections, as its last end, becomes less loved than the thing to which the mind

has inordinately turned as though it were its last end. Hence whenever something presents itself that is suitable for an inordinate end, and incompatible with the right end, it will be chosen, unless the mind be brought into right order, so that it places its last end before all: and this is the effect of grace. But as long as a thing is chosen that is incompatible with the last end, an obstacle is opposed to grace which directs us to our end. Wherefore it is evident that, after having sinned, man cannot refrain from all sin, before being restored to the right order by grace.

Again. Once the mind is inclined to something, it is no longer equally disposed towards either of two opposites, but is more disposed to that one to which it is inclined. Now, the mind chooses the thing to which it is more disposed, unless through the reason discussing the matter, it become disinclined thereto from motives of precaution: hence it is chiefly under unforeseen circumstances that a person's conduct is a sign of his interior disposition. Now, it is not possible for a man's mind to be continually so wide awake as to deliberate about everything that is to be willed or done. Hence it follows that sometimes the mind chooses the object to which it is inclined, because the inclination remains. And so, if it be inclined to sin, it will not stay long without sinning, through placing an obstacle to grace, unless it be restored to the state of rectitude.

To this also the impulse of the bodily passions conduces; also objects of sensible appetite, and occasions of evil-doing: for by these things man is easily incited to sin, unless he be held in check by a firm adherence to his last end, which is the effect of grace.

Hence we can see the absurdity of the opinion of the Pelagians, who held that man, while in a state of sin, is able to avoid sin without grace. The contrary of this may be gathered from the petition of the Psalm

(70:9): *When my strength shall fail, do not Thou forsake me. Moreover our Lord taught us to pray: And lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil.*

However, albeit those who are in sin cannot, of their own power, avoid placing an obstacle to grace, as we have proved, unless they be assisted by prevenient grace; nevertheless this is imputed to them as sin, because the defect in question remains in them through their preceding fault: even so a drunken man is not excused from murder committed through his being in a drunken state, which he incurred through his own fault.

Moreover, although a man who is in sin, has it not in his power to avoid sin altogether, yet it is in his power to avoid a particular sin at a given moment, as we have said. Hence, whatever sin he commits, he commits it deliberately. Consequently it is not undeservedly imputed to him as a sin.

## CHAPTER CLXI

THAT GOD DELIVERS SOME FROM SIN, AND LEAVES SOME IN SIN

NOW, though he that sins places an obstacle to grace, and so far as the order of things demands, ought not to receive grace: yet, since God can act independently of the order implanted in things, as when He enlightens the blind, or raises the dead, sometimes of the richness of his bounty, He comes to the assistance of those who put an obstacle in the way of grace, turns them from evil, and converts them to good. And even as He enlightens not all the blind, nor heals all the sick, in order that in those whom He restores the work of His power may be evidenced, and in the others, the order of nature be maintained; so too, He comes not to the assistance of all who hinder grace, that they may turn away from evil, and be converted to good; but of some, in whom He wishes His mercy to appear; while in the others the

order of justice is made manifest. Hence the Apostle says (Rom. 9:22): *God willing to show His wrath, and to make His power known, endured with much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction, that he might show the riches of His glory on the vessels of mercy, which He hath prepared unto glory.* And if of those who are held in thrall by sins God converts some by His prevenient grace, while others He suffers or allows, in the ordinary way, to continue sinning, we are not to ask why He converts certain ones and not others. For this depends on His simple will: even as it came from His simple will, that whereas all things were made out of nothing, some were made to rank higher than others: and just as it depends on the simple will of the craftsman that of the same matter similarly conditioned, He make some vessels for dignified purposes, and some for common purposes. Hence the apostle says (Rom. 9:21): *Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour?*

Hereby we refute the error of Origen who said that these are converted to God and not those, on account of certain works done by their souls before they were united to bodies. In the Second Book, we gave more particular attention to the refutation of this opinion.

## CHAPTER CLXII

### THAT GOD IS NOT THE CAUSE OF ANY MAN SINNING

ALTHOUGH God converts not certain sinners to Himself, but leaves them in their sins, as they deserve to be, yet He does not lead them to sin.

For man sins through wandering away from Him who is his last end, as we have already shown. Now, as every agent acts for an end proper and proportionate to it, it is impossible that God, by His own action, turn

anyone away from his last end, which is God. Therefore it is impossible that God make any man sin.

Again. Good cannot be a cause of evil. Now sin is man's evil: for it is contrary to man's proper good, which is to live according to reason. Therefore God cannot be the cause of a man sinning.

Further. All human wisdom and goodness flow from the divine wisdom and goodness, and are a kind of likeness thereof. Now it is incompatible with human wisdom and goodness, to make a man sin. Much more therefore is it incompatible with divine wisdom.

Moreover. All sin arises from a fault in the proximate agent, and not from the influence of the first agent: thus the fault of limping is due to a defect in the tibia, and not to the motive power; to which, however, is due whatever there is of the perfection of movement in limping. Now, the proximate agent in human sin is the will. Therefore the defect of sin arises from man's will and not from God, who is the first agent: although whatever pertains to the perfection of action in the sinful act is due to Him.

Hence it is said (Ecclus. 15:12): *Say not: He hath caused me to err: for He hath no need of wicked men:* and further on (verse 21): *He hath commanded no man to do wickedly, and He hath given to no man license to sin.* Also (James 1:13): *Let no man, when he is tempted, say that he is tempted by God: for God is not a tempter of evils.*

There are, however, a few passages in Scripture which would seem to indicate that, to some, God is the cause of their sinning. For it is said (Exod. 10:1): *I have hardened Pharaoh's heart and the heart of his servants:* and (Isa. 6:10): *Blind the heart of this people, make their ears heavy: lest they see with their eyes ... and be converted, and I heal them:* and (*ibid.* 63:17): *Thou hast made us to err from Thy ways: ... thou hast*

*hardened our heart, that we should not fear Thee.* Again it is said (Rom. 1:28): *God delivered them up to a reprobate sense, to do those things which are not convenient.* All these passages are to be understood in the sense that God does not assist some to avoid sin, whereas He does assist others.

This assistance is not only the infusion of grace, but also external protection whereby occasions of sin are warded off by divine providence, and incentives to sin restrained. God also assists man against sin by the natural light of reason and the other natural goods which He bestows on man. Hence when He withdraws these aids from some men, as their actions merit, according to the demands of His justice, He is said to harden their hearts or blind their eyes, or deal with them in some other way as described in the passages above quoted.

## CHAPTER CLXIII

### OF PREDESTINATION, REPROBATION, AND THE DIVINE ELECTION

WHEREAS we have proved that by the divine operation some are with the assistance of grace directed to their last end, while others fail to reach their last end through being deprived of grace: and since all that God does has been foreseen and ordered from eternity by His wisdom, as we have proved:<sup>2</sup> it follows of necessity that the aforesaid distinction among men has been ordered by God from eternity. Inasmuch as from eternity He has preordained some to be directed to their last end, He is said to have *predestined* them. Wherefore the Apostle says (Ephes. 1:5): *Who hath predestined us unto the adoption of children ... according to the purpose of his will.*—Those to whom from eternity He has decreed not to give grace, He is said to have *reprobated*, or to have *hated*, according to the words of Malachi 2, 3, *I have loved Jacob, but have hated Esau.*—By reason of this very

distinction, in that He has reprobated some and predestined others, we have the divine *election*, of which it is said (Ephes. 1:4): *He chose us in Him before the foundation of the world.*

Wherefore it is clear that predestination, election and reprobation form a part of divine providence, in reference to man's direction to his last end by divine providence. Consequently it may be shown that predestination and election do not involve necessity, for the same reasons as were employed to show that divine providence does not deprive things of their contingent nature.

That predestination and election are not founded on any human merits may be made clear, not only from the fact that God's grace, which is an effect of predestination, is not preceded by merits, but itself precedes all human merits, as we have proved: but also from the fact that the will and providence of God are the first cause of whatever is done; and nothing can be the cause of the divine will and providence,<sup>3</sup> although among the effects of providence, as also of predestination, one may be the cause of another. For, as the apostle says, *WHO HATH FIRST GIVEN HIM, AND RECOMPENSE SHALL BE MADE HIM? FOR OF HIM, AND IN HIM, AND BY HIM ARE ALL THINGS: TO HIM BE HONOUR AND GLORY FOR EVER. AMEN.*<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Thomas Aquinas, S., & Fathers of the English Dominican Province. (2010). *Vol. 4: Summa contra gentiles* (179–218). Bellingham, WA: Logos Research Systems, Inc.