Module 7

Assignment

1. An Aquinas Reader, Mary T. Clark – Selections in handout
2. The Thomist, The Authority of St. Thomas Aquinas – January 1952
3. DECREE ON PRIESTLY TRAINING, (OPTATAM TOTIUS) SECTION 15
4. DECLARATION ON CHRISTIAN EDUCATION (GRAVISSIMUM EDUCATIONIS) SECTION 10
5. ENCYCLICAL HUMANI GENERIS , PARAGRAPHS 2-5, 22-37

An AQUINAS READER

Edited with an Introduction and Five Sectional Essays by

MARY T. CLARK

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CONTENTS

PREFACE

The problems that concern persons today—the problem of love, of knowledge, of freedom, of God, of religion, of morality—were of intense interest to Thomas Aquinas. For this reason this Reader will prove useful as a basic text for courses in philosophical anthropology and philosophy of the human person.

In the newly revised first section of the Reader I have placed those texts which are most appropriate for a course in metaphysics and natural theology. There are also sections covering ethical principles and Christian faith.

The scope of the texts throughout the Reader can offer a sense of the total Aquinas: philosopher and theologian, man of reason and man of faith. Selections are presented not only from the well-known theological syntheses, but also from his commentaries on Aristotle's works; not only from the latter but also from the commentaries on Neoplatonic works; and, finally, not only from his religious prose, but also from his religious poetry.

A more profound and more extensive knowledge of the thought of Thomas Aquinas is needed in the third millennium, but few persons have the time to pursue the more than one hundred works he left as his legacy to humankind when he died at the age of forty-nine.

As this new edition goes to press, I wish to thank the three Executive Editors who have assisted at various times with the publication of this Reader: Mary Louis Birmingham, Patricia A. Kossmann, and Mary Beatrice Schulte.

Manhattanville College MARY T. CLARK

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INTRODUCTION

An examination of all the passages will show that the essential Aquinas is existential. This statement is intended not as paradox but as fact. Each creature has its own being; at the same time it is related not only to other beings but to God as well. These relationships are so essential to creatures that we may rightfully call them the necessary conditions of their existence. Such basic and indispensable relationships may never be looked upon as "accidents" in the Aristotelian way of classifying relations as "accidents." By looking at finite things without their ontological relationships, Aristotelians could see nature apart from God. It was this ancient view of nature that Augustine repudiated. Aquinas never returned to it, even when he accepted insights from Aristotle. Although it was Augustine who emphasized that without God nature cannot be itself, it was Thomas Aquinas whose metaphysical analysis made clear that the "act of existing" cannot come from anyone less than God and that when a finite person is recognized as receiving existence from God, the possibilities for change are great. This does not make the relation of nature to God intrinsic so that the relationship to God as giver of existence (First Cause in the language of physics) should enter into the definition of the thing caused. But this does make the relationship to God an inevitable consequence of being created or called by him.

No, the creature itself is robustly real, a center of autonomy. And yet St. Thomas is quick to tell us that the creature's kind of being— finite being— provides it with an open, dynamic relationship to Absolute creative Being. This relationship is not only the source of all existence but also the source of all development. And if this is what is meant by nature in process, a philosophy of existence is open to it.

But instead of using the word "process" to denote the ongoing and dynamic character of finite reality, Aquinas used the word "participated" to indicate that nature was "becoming," was dynamically open to the transcendent.

By revealing the essence/existence *(esse)* structure of creatures within a framework *of* existential relationship to God, Aquinas was able to retain the Platonic insistence upon exemplary causality (that all sensible reality is a reflection or imitation of intelligible reality, its exemplar or idea) as well as the Augustinian doctrine of creatures as images of God, a teaching taken from Genesis. Not all philosophy students have realized that by not remaining on the level of Aristotle's distinction between substance and accident—by going deeper through distinguishing essence from existence—Aquinas has escaped from the Aristotelian categories of substance and the nine accidents of quality, quantity, relation, etc. Existence as infinite becomes the exemplar of all finite participants. But the latter do not merely image their exemplar in some extrinsic fashion. The image theory that Plato had related to the forms and that Augustine related to the divine ideas was transposed by Aquinas into a doctrine of participation whereby creatures have an intrinsic, limited sharing of "existence" with all the perfection that existence brings with it. In this framework "to image" now means "to be" after the manner of the Supreme Exemplar—to be spiritual, to be unified, to know, to live, to be free. This is imaging God in existence, in action. It follows, moreover, that human evil is rooted in unlikeness to God.

What Aquinas did was identify a central perfection—*esse*—in which all

things participate. He then showed that the having of existence requires an efficient and formal exemplary cause, and since man is among these existents, his exemplar would be personal, unparticipated being, and all things are like God insofar as they have existence. This existence is, of course, the most intrinsic of all perfections. Without existence, there is nothing real. Because of this existential situation, which is echoed in the intellect's orientation toward Absolute Being in its life of knowledge, we may gain some positive knowledge of God by knowing creatures, inasmuch as the possession of existence is the foundation for an analogy between finite beings and Infinite Being.

By his metaphysics of an existence common to all and unique to each, Aquinas, like Augustine, saw man as radically existing "toward God" *(ad Deum),* and because he shares existence with all creatures, man is horizontally related to all as man-in-the-world. For the being *(esse)* by which each one is subsistent, distinct, unique is that being whereby it is united to all. Personal uniqueness in this perspective is not opposed to human community. Therefore, the Thomistic metaphysics of reality may never be rightly classified as a doctrine of isolated substances or as a system of static concepts without doing violence to the Thomistic texts. With this in mind I present here rather full texts from a wide choice of works so that it may become readily apparent that not only in metaphysical topics but also in his treatment of God and man-in-the-world as well as in his discussion of the human person as ethical or religious, the essential Aquinas is existential.

Life

To know St. Thomas is to know the medieval mind at its finest, its most powerful, and, indeed, its most modern. For he is timeless and timely, a man for all ages. His thought has influenced such diverse artists as Dante and T S. Eliot and James Joyce, such different theologians as John Courtney Murray and Karl Rahner, such unlike philosophers as Edith Stein and Jacques Maritain, such a political figure as Eugene McCarthy. Modern man is more rooted than he realizes. And if, as John H. Randall says in *Studies in Civilization,* the first modern philosopher is not Descartes but Aquinas, we may justly say that at least some of our roots are within the fertile ground of Thomistic thought. And for that reason we owe it to ourselves to know something of this remarkable man.

We tend to think of Thomas Aquinas as a teacher. It seems pretty remarkable to me that anyone, especially a teacher, could produce some one hundred works of closely textured, carefully reasoned, and invariably creative thinking during forty-nine years of life. His, to be sure, was an age without the distractions of communications media and without the contemporary clamor for speakers on panels and convention platforms. Probably the most disturbing element to one's own study was the scholarly pursuits of others in the same field who were following an opposing tradition of thought.

In a real sense Aquinas's work was his life, for his life was an interior one, a life of the mind and the spirit. And yet it was an exciting life: the imprisonment for a year; the darling of at least one pope; a center of controversy in university life and philosophical thought; an intellectual innovator not wholly appreciated by his own fellow Dominicans or by Church authorities; a precursor of the ecumenical movement to end the East-West split; an explorer of original sources with even more urgency than that of today's theologians and philosophers; a seminary reformer; a *peritus* at Church Councils and

General Chapters; a professor at three universities—surely he fulfilled a long life in a short time!

Honorius III was pope and Frederick II was emperor when Thomas was born in the county of Aquino near Naples about the year 1225, youngest son of a Norman mother, Teodora D'Aquino, second wife of Landolfo, a Lombard who had at least eight children. At the age of five Thomas was escorted to the Abbey of Monte Cassino as a Benedictine oblate and there he remained until obliged to leave the politically endangered abbey when he was fourteen, but not before he had experienced his own authentic attraction toward religious life. Matriculation at the Imperial University in Naples introduced Thomas to two future forces in his life—Aristotle and the Dominicans. His instructor in natural philosophy, Peter of Ireland, was a careful commentator of Aristotle, and we may credit him with making Aquinas dissatisfied with the paraphrasing method of his future teacher Albert the Great. To this university where the Dominicans taught theology came the Dominican master general, Jordan of Saxony, and it is quite possible that young Thomas was among the students listening to his preaching. But we know that with the advice of another Dominican, John of San Giuliano, Thomas at seventeen became a Dominican novice. Fearful of family opposition, his superiors planned that Thomas would go from Naples to Rome and then to Paris. Before this was accomplished, the brothers of Aquinas, instigated by their mother, overtook the travelers and kidnapped Thomas, taking him to Roccasecca, the family castle. There they detained, distracted, disturbed, and finally tempted him through a woman—so the story goes—to forsake his religious vocation. With a firebrand he frightened his tempters out of the room and set to work to deepen his knowledge of Scripture, to study Peter Lombard's Four Books *of the Sentences,* and even to produce after reading Aristotle a brief treatise called *Fallacies.*

The rock-fastness of Aquinas's commitment to God brought release after a year, and with his detainment counting for the vocation trial period known as the "novitiate year," Aquinas soon reached Rue St. Jacques in Paris for a three-year stretch of early theological studies. There followed four more years of seminary study at Cologne under Albert the Great, who had accompanied him from Paris, a period during which Aquinas was ordained at the Cologne Cathedral. Here at Cologne Aquinas's great gifts of mind were discovered when, quite by accident, Albert read an extremely subtle and original commentary on *The Divine Names* in the handwriting of Aquinas. At Paris once again for four years of advanced theological studies, Aquinas was successively Bachelor of the Bible and Scripture lecturer, completing his work leading to the Master of Theology degree by 1256. That his appointment, as well as Bonaventure's, as university master awaited Alexander IV's intervention in 1257 is part of the complex situation that catapulted Thomas Aquinas into the center of controversy—academic, ecclesiastical, philosophical, theological.

And so it was that Aquinas's first intellectual assignment was conditioned by the transitional status of the thirteenth century, which was witnessing the rebirth of the evangelical spirit that grew into great mendicant orders. These orders, very much in the spirit of the Vatican II document on the *Church and the Modem World,* were sending out their friars on the medieval highways and byways to meet the people wherever they clustered. And since education had traveled, through the gradual development of cathedral schools into universities, from the country to the city, the Franciscans and Dominicans

went on foot to Paris and other cities. As mendicants they looked upon their poverty not with a pharisaically "see how holy we are" complex, but as preparation for alacrity in moving quickly wherever the Gospel needed preaching. Their riches were their relevancy. In this spirit Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas made themselves relevant to the university, although this required the possession of manuscripts! Now at this very time the diocesan priests who taught under the administration of the bishop at the University *of* Paris had gone on strike in public protest over existing university conditions. The conflict that was precipitated when the mendicant friars replaced them at the university lasted through the next decade and invited Aquinas to his first dialogue.

The secular priests had immediately challenged the right of mendicant friars to do any teaching at the university. At a deeper level, this was a revelation of their failure to understand the changes taking place in the Church of their day, for they were resisting the new Christianity emerging from a review of the nature and structure of the Church, to which there corresponded the change from the monastic to the mendicant mentality. Such inflexibility inevitably spawned a depreciation of the value of religious life itself. The bitterness of the opposition to the mendicant friars' right to teach and to religious life was expressed by a secular master at Paris, William of St. Amour, in a work *Contemporary Dangers.* In his answer, An *Apology for Religious Orders,* Aquinas shows himself completely aware of the Parisian academic L*ebenswelt,* plagued as it was by growing pains. Although William was condemned at Rome in 1256, he continued his struggle against the mendicants, and during Aquinas's absence from the university, in a renamed and revised copy of his early work, William renewed the attack, but not without some effect upon university morale. The Franciscan Thomas of York wrote a defense of religious life that was attacked in 1269 by Gerald of Abbeville in a pamphlet called *Against Christian Perfection.* Not only did Bonaventure answer this new attack, but its title also accounts for the name given by Aquinas to his second attempt to dialogue with these unwilling listeners: On *the Perfection of Religions Life.* In it Aquinas discusses the value of the three religious vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience. The discussions resulting from this treatise are synthesized in a work *Against the Dangerous Doctrine Drawing Young Men Away from Religious Life.* The calm serenity of these works gives witness to Thomas's skill in speaking persuasively to protagonists of another view—always with the hope of arriving at mutual understanding.

It was, however, endemic to Aquinas to talk *with* those who disagreed with him rather than to refute them. This dialogical attitude was as natural to Thomas as it is to our century and characterized not only his manner of carrying on an argument but also the style of his own summas and treatises as well as his techniques as commentator.

And because Aquinas freely and fully dedicated himself to the intellectual interests of his age, the story of his life is a tale of encounters with Parisian professors, questioning bishops, disciples of Mohammed and Greek Orthodox teachers, classical and contemporary thinkers, patristic and avant-garde theologians.

In any age when the Church is attempting to renew her self-understanding there will be a concern for Christian unity in response to Christ's appeal "that all may be one." And so it should come as no surprise that in order to reconcile Rome and Constantinople, mediation was attempted by a Greek

bishop of southern Italy, who wrote a work Against *the Errors of the Greek Church.* Thomas reviewed this book at the request of Urban IV. Another attempt to find common ground with Greeks, Armenians, and Mohammedans is the *Letter to the Cantor of Antioch,* in which moral and philosophical reasons on behalf of the Catholic faith are offered. It is noteworthy also that as the *peritus* of Urban IV, Aquinas was directed to bring together the various commerits of the Greek and Latin Fathers upon the Four Gospels. The result was a continuous commentary by twenty-two Latin and fiftyseven Greek Fathers edited under the title Catena *Aurea.* These writings and a major one, the *Summa contra Gentiles,* were intended to promote Christian unity. And Thomas's own theological thought, deeply influenced as it was by the Eastern Christian mystic Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite, had its part in making him receptive to Eastern orientations. After all, it was a Greek Father of the Church, Maximus the Confessor, who had led the way in blending Eastern and Western mentalities. Symbolic indeed was Thomas Aquinas's last trip, taken for the purpose of attending at Lyons the Church Council called to promote unity of faith between East and West.

Through his various *Commentaries* Aquinas appears as a student who aims to discuss with rather than triumph over a deeply respected author. He therefore seeks to understand the basic principles that structure the author's thought processes. If he finds these principles to be intellectually viable, he will ignore many of the conclusions with which he may not agree and stoutly declare himself in fundamental agreement with the author. By empathy he discovers the developments that the historical positions allow and at times credits the author with these positions. The ecumenical endeavor of Aquinas the commentator in dealing with such radically contradictory texts as those of Boethius, Dionysius, Aristotle, and Proclus is paramount in the whole project. So when we hear Aquinas accused of being unhistorical in his handling of the texts we should remember that an author is judged by his aim. In the case of Aquinas the aim was philosophical understanding for the promotion of intellectual harmony rather than historical scholarship. Aquinas sensed that mental rapport, common ground, was the prerequisite of any dialogue that hopes to arrive at consensus.

And yet Aquinas's conviction that every man should be allowed to speak for himself made him dissatisfied with the translations that ushered Aristotle into thirteenth-century Europe. Because these works had gone from Greek to Syrian to Arabic to Latin, it was doubtful that they could be called original texts or first sources. Aquinas secured a Greek expert, William of Moerbeke, to translate Aristotle's original Greek texts into Latin. Anyone studying the record of Aquinas's commitments would readily acknowledge that there was absolutely no time for him to be his own translator, and it was necessary to have the work in Latin if the commentary was to be read by students at the University of Paris, where all the teaching took place in Latin. This itself was a step in the direction of authentic texts. And Aquinas, as a matter of fact, had a keen historical sense. He was the first to declare, in 1268, that the work On *Causes,* which was circulated in Europe as part of the Aristotelian corpus, was actually the *Elements of Theology* written by Proclus. If he had discovered this before writing his *Commentary on Dionysius's Divine Names,* he would have realized that in that work Dionysius is quoting directly from Proclus and could not therefore be the first-century disciple of St. Paul he was reputed to be. Perhaps Aquinas felt at home in his dialogue with Dionysius precisely because of the Neoplatonic spirit the latter shared with Augustine, whom

Aquinas revered. Because Peter Lombard's *Sentences* are said to be 80 percent from Augustine, Aquinas does not profoundly disagree; but his *Commentary* is a very interesting dialogue and at times reveals disagreement with contemporaries such as Albert and Bonaventure.

Now, the very fact that translation schools were set up at Toledo and Sicily signals the eagerness of medieval scholars to learn from Mohammedans and Jews. And learn Aquinas did. First from Avicenna, who opened up a new stream of Platonism and Neoplatonism with its great philosophic contributions—the notion of "going forth and return" of the universe, procession and conversion, and especially "participation," the theory that lower things in the world of the "many" share in the perfection of the one ideal form that they more or less remotely resemble. Aquinas was never *completely* to reject this, inasmuch as he accepts its implication that all sensible and finite beings come from one supreme source of reality. And, in fact, the novel Thomistic theory of analogy/causality presupposes the notion of "participation." It Aquinas gained greatly from reading the philosophical works of Avicenna, with his insistence that "existence" was not included in "essence," there was never total agreement. This made dialogue necessary. It was somewhat the same with Moses Maimonides. From him Aquinas was happy to borrow profusely in the question of demonstrating God's existence, but he could not agree with Moses that the various attributes of God were merely synonyms. This required discussion. At the suggestion of a former Dominican master general, St. Raymond of Pefiafort, Aquinas devoted his *Summa contra Gentiles* to a reasoned discussion with those who did not accept the Catholic faith—pagans, Jews, Greek schismatics, but especially Mohammedans, with whom Aquinas was forced to keep to the philosophical level, as in most of the first three books. Some historians also think that the opuscule *Power of God* is structured to deal with questions raised by Avicenna.

When in 1266 Aquinas began his *Summa Theologiae,* he already had at hand many of the Greek-Latin translations of Aristotle's works. The importance of this lies not merely in all that they could contribute to this major *opus* of synthesizing the insights available from the greatest thinkers of West and East, but above all because they provided Aquinas with the primary sources he needed to meet the greatest test of his intellectual life. This was to be the encounter with Siger of Brabant, a Belgian priest-professor in the University of Paris Arts Department who was strenuously teaching the Averroistic version of Aristotle. According to this version (1) there was only one possible, i.e., thinking intellect or soul, common to all (monopsychism, a position not explicitly stated in Aristotle's On *the Soul),* with the inevitable conclusion that Aristotle (who for Siger was equivalent to "philosophy") taught that man was mortal, although the opposite was held by the Christian faith; (2) the material world was eternal; (3) the will is a passive power, merely activated by knowledge; (4) there are many intermediaries between God and man, making the doctrine of divine Providence an unreality.

It was because such positions were being inferred from the Arabian Aristotle that the Aristotelian works had been forbidden in 1210, the *Physics* and Metaphysics banned in 1215. Although the record shows that the whole of the Aristotelian corpus was to be found in the Paris Curriculum in 1255, the prohibition was renewed by Urban IV in 1263.

When Thomas returned to the University of Paris in 1269 for his second professorate, he was deeply disturbed to find Siger of Brabant imposing his

Averroistic interpretations of Aristotle upon the Parisian students, who could not read the original texts and whose undeveloped minds ill prepared them to detect sophistry. So began the most delicate and demanding of all the Thomistic dialogues, and this time it was not with a dead authority but with a colleague very much alive, who insisted not merely on Aristotelian principles but on the conclusions and interpretations drawn by Averroes as well. Aquinas the man of faith, fortified by years of concentration on Aristotle, just having written his great theological witness to the inner harmony of faith and reason, faces Siger the rationalist, leader of the "heterodox Aristotelians," or "Latin-Averroists" as they were once called. The argument was forced to be philosophical. It was not enough to insist with the Catholic Siger that from Scripture we derive teachings quite opposed to those of Averroes. Siger admitted this. But he did not particularly care, adding that a position arrived at philosophically could be true even when it contradicted what Christians believed. Both could be true. This is referred to in many histories as the "double truth theory."

Aquinas's task was clear. To converse with such an avowed Aristotelian he must dissociate Aristotelian principles from Arabic interpretations and then demonstrate that conclusions in perfect harmony with Christian beliefs were derivable from Aristotle's principles. He would then go on to indicate, as far as the actual text warranted, that Aristotle himself had drawn such conclusions. This is precisely what he did in that powerful work On *a Common Intellect,* where he proved that Aristotle attributed to each man his own intellect. Within the year, the teaching of Siger, defender of Averroistic Aristotelianism, was condemned by Stephen Tempier, Archbishop of Paris. There was at the same time some questioning of Aquinas about his doctrines, which many of his day failed to distinguish from Siger's. In an effort to clarify his position, Thomas wrote *On the Eternity of the World against the Grumblers,* in which he pointed out that Aristotle never really demonstrated but merely presupposed the world's eternity. Thomas further claimed that neither the world's eternity nor its noneternity is philosophically demonstrable, and it is intellectual honesty to admit this. Believers in the Bible have learned from Genesis I that the world began in time. Thomas hastened to complete his own work called *The Soul,* which was directed against the Averroistic interpretations of Aristotle's treatise on this same topic. If F. van Steenberghen is right, the conversation that Aquinas kept up with his university colleague led Siger to modify some of his original positions. But this did not keep back the falling of the final blow against Averroism, a blow struck by the same Stephen Tempier who this time included twenty Thomistic propositions among the 219 theses condemned at Paris in 1277. In the autumn Siger was summoned before the French Inquisitor Simon du Val, and from there he proceeded to the papal court of Orvieto to plead his cause. There he was absolved of formal heresy but directed to remain in Orvieto, where one day his mentally deranged secretary stabbed him to death.

The condemnation of Averroism in 1270 did not mean for Aquinas the end to controversy. We must remember that while he was in open forum confronting the liberals of his day—those whom Renan called the thirteenth-century Parisian freethinkers—he himself was opposed by the conservatives of his day, the Franciscans and secular priests who called themselves "Augustinian." They feared that Aristotelian ideas would destroy the purity of Christian faith. Between 1270 and 1272 Aquinas devoted himself to instructing these "Augustinians" by writing On *the Virtues in General, On*

Hope, and *On* the *Cardinal Virtues.* These works should have calmed their fears.

Anyone who fears that Aquinas might be too slavish a student of Aristotle should read his work On *Truth*—one of his earliest— concerned with knowledge and reality and God's being and action. There one sees him coming to grips in a profound and original way with contradictory and complementary, ancient and modern currents of thought—Augustinian, Aristotelian, Arabic, Neoplatonic. This was in fact the first of the sixty-two *disputed questions* that admirably reveal a philosopher at work, developing through dialogue. These regular discussions throughout the university year provided one of the best opportunities for living dialogue between faculty and students, faculty and their colleagues. In addition, there were twelve holiday debates, impromptu inquiries similar to our open question periods.

Serenity, intellectual poise, and respect for the opinion of others characterize Aquinas's dialogues with his pagan and Jewish predecessors and colleagues, and these qualities doubtless have their source in an utter at-homeness with scriptural orientations that provided him with a happy combination of sureness and freedom. Never, from the beginning of his intellectual life until the last two years as professor at the University of Naples, did Aquinas cease to meditate on and comment on the Holy Bible. And by this drinking from the same source that nourished Augustine, and, like him, enamored of that New Wisdom binding together faith and reason, Aquinas thought of himself as Augustine's collaborator, never his opponent. Thus, the fears of the so-called Augustinians were groundless.

Whereas today the Church is passing through a phase that some refer to as a deinstitutionalizing process, the thirteenth century was caught up in a reverse movement. The mendicant friars—Franciscan and Dominican—dramatize the back-to-the-Gospel movement that characterized the spiritual renaissance of the high Middle Ages. As the first years of the divine romance passed with the death of Francis and Dominic, both religious orders were faced with the need to institutionalize the spirit of the Order. As a son of St. Dominic, and a brilliant one, Thomas Aquinas was given an active part in the shaping of the Dominican lifestyle to bring the Dominican ideal into structures that would preserve it for the future. In his day the training of priests had been carried on with a minimum of long-range planning. Aquinas gave his attention, therefore, to seminary reform. As early as 1259 Thomas Aquinas attended his Order's General Chapter at Valenciennes, where he helped to formulate the plan of studies for Dominican religious. It was decided that the seminary program would in the future include a philosophy course. Thomas saw philosophy as desirable, not detrimental to Christian believers.

At the 1260 Provincial Chapter at Naples Thomas Aquinas was named preacher-general, and many sermons survive from this period of preaching at Orvieto and Viterbo, close to the papal court, first of Urban IV, later of Clement IV . A wider responsibility for shaping Dominican religious life came with his appointment in 1267 as *definitor* for the Roman Province while he continued to teach theology, this time at the University of Bologna. He therefore represented the Roman Province at the Parisian General Chapter in May of 1269, where weighty intellectual and apostolic issues were up for decision. He remained on at Paris as second-time professor of theology for the next three years and took final leave to attend his last General Chapter at Florence in 1272. Although there was a request for his return to the University of Paris, he was assigned to the University of Naples, where he spent the last

year and a half of his life teaching theology and writing the *Summa* and various opuscules and commentaries.

On December 6, 1273, Thomas Aquinas put down his pen and declared: "I cannot; such things have been revealed to me that all that I have written seems to me as so much straw." Summoned to Lyons by Gregory X to attend the Church Council that aimed at reunion with the Greek Church, Aquinas in weakened health took to the road but fell ill on the way. Taken from his sister's house to the Cistercian monastery of Fossanuova, he died listening to the Canticle of Canticles. As he received the last rites he prayed: "I receive Thee, ransom of my soul. For love of Thee have I studied and kept vigil, toiled, preached, and taught. . . ." The year was 1274

And he could have added, "and prayed." Many in the Catholic world have studied the thought of Thomas Aquinas, often, alas, in forms he would have repudiated, but many more have sung his prayers: the *Adoro Te* and the *Pange Lingua,* which includes the *Tantum Ergo.* These come from the Office, Mass, Sequence, and hymns for the Feast of Corpus Christi, first celebrated in 1264. It is said that Urban IV agreed to establish this feast to honor Christ's presence in the Blessed Sacrament at the urging of Thomas Aquinas. This he asked for when, upon being offered the cardinal's hat, he refused it and then was told that he might ask for anything else within the pope's power.

And so we see that Aquinas's career in higher studies ended where it had begun—at the University of Naples. His religious life likewise ended where it had begun—in a monastery. Famous as a Dominican and as a master at Paris, Aquinas was to be at home in all religious orders whose rationale he had so ably argued, and at all universities dedicated to free inquiry.

The University of Paris requested that his body be sent there, but it remained for a time at the Cistercian monastery. Later his bones were taken to the Dominican house in Toulouse, whence during the French Revolution they were removed to the Church of St. Semin in Toulouse.

In 1325 Bishop Stephen Bourret of Paris reversed the condemnation of his predecessor. The Thomistic doctrines were removed from the list of Averroistic propositions condemned. The reversal had come when Aquinas's teachings were reevaluated and his personal life examined. In 1323 the Church raised up Thomas Aquinas as a scholar-saint.

The significance of his scholarship is more obvious in the twentieth century than it was in the nineteenth. He had welcomed and worked with Aristotle's world view. The admission of all of Aristotle's works into Christian thought was an admission of "all the natural values of human social activity." In a sense this was a rejection of that type of Platonic other-worldliness that implied repudiation of "this world"; and because it was an option for a thoroughgoing Incarnationism, it was an acceptance of human values without a forsaking of Platonic transcendence, which reached its true realization in the One Exemplar—the God-man, source, norm, and end of human history. In this sense Aristotle assisted Thomas to be more Christian, not less so.

And so if Catholic thought in modern times was considered to be excessively other-worldly, we should remember that Thomism did not penetrate and influence the modern centuries. Only in the twentieth century, with the Neo-Thomistic revival originally stimulated during the pontificate of Leo XIII, did Thomas Aquinas reenter the universities and then only, very often, in the sketchy form of manuals, somewhat distorted by an imposed thesis format, shorn of his intellectual *Lebenswelt,* pulled out of perspective. From the time of Scotus and Ockham, through Nicholas of Autrecourt, Luther, Hobbes,

Hume, and Montaigne, the scope of reason had been narrowed to confine itself eventually to the sensibly empirical. If the Scholastics did have too restricted a conception of human experience, the principles of Thomism that effectively united this-world values with other-worldly values could have provided built-in correctives operating in the course of time. Instead, religious reaction to wholesale empiricism showed itself in an overstress of ultimates. Christians concerned themselves not with persons but with souls. But because Aquinas offered a robust and buoyant philosophy of reality in opposition to the philosophy of signs and symbols (which short-circuited this world to arrive immediately at the next) favored by other medievals, there is ample reason for honoring him today as one whose existential realism makes him not only a scholar-saint but a saint of the secular—one who saw the sacred value of time, of this world.

Aquinas would be pleased also to have us recognize in him an upholder of unity—the ecumenical unity of East and West, the historical unity of time and eternity, the religious unity of created and Creator. It was on behalf of such unity that Aquinas made and used his fruitful philosophical distinctions. This unity of mankind, he would be the first to realize, is more than a theological task, more than an economic or political achievement; it is in fact a work of love. But then Thomas Aquinas's total theological framework was grounded not on static ideas but on a movement of exodus and apocalypse, outgo and return through the dynamism of love—the divine love of Creation and Redemption initiating that human love that reaches God by participating in the power of the Resurrection.

Editor's Note: When not otherwise indicated, the translations have been made by the Editor from the Parma edition, or the Leonine edition where this exists (as of 1972).

Author references found in each sectional Introduction refer to books listed in the Bibliography at the end of the book.

CHART I



Adapted, with permission, from: C. Fabro, *La Nozione Metafisca di Partecipazione Secondo* S. *Tommaso a"Aquino,* Rome, Societa Editrice Internazionale.

In Chart I we see at a glance the major philosophical influences undergone by Aquinas. It is obvious that Neoplatonic influences predominate, directly through Porphyry as well as indirectly through Neoplatonic interpretations of Aristotelian texts as well as through Boethius, who inherited a Western Christian Neoplatonism from Marius Victorinus. We note a direct and full knowledge of Aristotle, but much indirect knowledge of Plato as well as the possibility that there was access to the *Timaeus, Phaedo,* and *Meno* that existed in Latin.

CHART II



Adapted, with permission, from: C. Fabro, *La Nozione Metafisica di Partecipazione Secondo S. Tommaso d'Aquino*, Rome, Società Editrice Internazionale. pp. 118–119.

Chart II has assembled the main intellectual influences upon Aquinas. By now historical studies have sufficiently advanced to make it pure folly to identify Thomism with Aristotelianism or with any previous philosophy. The chart indicates that Aquinas had access to Neoplatonism through Augustine, Boethius, Proclus, Dionysius the PseudoAreopagite, Maximus through Scotus Eriugena's translation, and to John Scotus Erigena himself. By studying the Greek Fathers, Aquinas met other sources of Neoplatonism. The link through Augustine has long been known. The enormous influence of

4. CHRIST

Incarnation *On the Union of the Incarnate Word*, q. 1, a. 1

The Mode of the Union of the Word Incarnate. State of the question.

1. The question concerns the mode of union of the Word incarnate. First, it is asked whether the union of the Word incarnate was accomplished in the person or in the nature. Indeed, it seems that it occurred in the nature. As Athanasius says (in the symbol of

faith), just as the rational soul and flesh constitute one man, so God and man are one Christ. But the rational soul and flesh are united in one human nature; therefore, God and man are joined in the one nature *of* Christ.

2. Moreover, Damascene says in Book III, Ch. 3: This is the error of the heretics, that they call nature and hypostasis the same thing. But this does not seem false, for in anything simple, and especially in God, the *suppositum* and the nature are identical. Therefore, do heretics speak falsely, because if the union is accomplished in the person, is it not accomplished in the nature?

3. Moreover, Damascene says in Book III that the two natures are united without conversion, without alteration, but on the contrary, as two natures. But the union of natures seems to cause a natural union. Therefore, the union is accomplished in the nature.

4. Again, in all beings in which the *suppositum* has something besides the nature of the species (be it an accident or an individual nature), it is necessary that the *suppositum* be different from the nature, as is clear through the Philosopher *(Metaphysics* VII, c. 20, 21). But if the union of the human nature to the Word is not accomplished in the human nature, it will not lie in the nature of the very species of the Word. Therefore, it will follow that the *suppositum* of the Word is something other than the divine nature. This conclusion is impossible. Therefore, it seems that the union occurred in the nature.

5. Moreover, a oneness follows upon a uniting. But since oneness of the person of the Word is eternal, it is not subsequent to the union that is accomplished in the fullness of time. Therefore, the union is not accomplished in the person.

6. Again, the union achieves a certain additional something: thus, union cannot be accomplished in anything that of itself is consummate simplicity. But the person of the Word, since he is truly God, is of consummate simplicity. Therefore, union cannot be accomplished in the person of the Word.

7. Also, two things not of the same genus cannot be united in one thing; from a line and whiteness one unity cannot be made. But human nature differs from divine nature much more than do things not of the same genus differ. Therefore, the human and the divine natures cannot be united together in one person.

8. Again, the person and the nature of the Word differ only in the manner of being comprehended, inasmuch as the relation of origin is attributed to the person of the Word, not to the nature. But through

the relation of origin, the Word is not related to human nature, but to the Father. Therefore, in the same manner, the person of the Word and his nature are considered to be assumed to the human nature. If, therefore, the union was accomplished in the person, the union will be accomplished in the nature.

9. Again, the incarnation stimulates us to love God incarnate. But one ought not to love one divine person more than another; for the love should be equal for those whose goodness is the same. Therefore, the union of the incarnation was accomplished in the nature common to the three persons.

10. Moreover, according to the Philosopher (On *the Soul* I, 37), to live is to be. But in Christ, life is twofold: the human and the divine. There are, therefore, two existences and, consequently, two persons: for "to be" *(esse)* is proper to the complete substance or the person. Hence, the union is not accomplished in the person.

11. Again, as the form of a part is comparable to its matter, so the form of the whole is comparable to the complete substance. But the form of the part cannot exist except in its proper matter. Therefore, the form of the whole, which is its nature, cannot exist except in its proper complete substance, which is the human person. Similar reasoning goes for the divine nature in a divine person. If two natures are present in this union, two persons are also present.

12. Moreover, what is truly predicated of anything is able to substitute for the thing itself. But divine nature is truly predicated of the person of the Word. Therefore, nature is synonymous with person. If, therefore, the union is accomplished in the person, it can truly be said that the union is accomplished in the nature.

13. Moreover, whatever is united to anything is joined to it either essentially or accidentally. But human nature is not united to the Word accidentally, because in this way it would retain its own complete individuality, and there would be two persons: for a substance added to another retains its own singularity, as one clothed with a garment, as a rider on a horse. Therefore, it [the human nature] is united essentially to the essence or to the nature of the Word. Therefore, the union is accomplished in the nature.

14- Besides, nothing apprehended under one thing is extended beyond, for a thing bound by a place is not outside the place. But a complete substance of any nature is comprehended under that very nature, and the thing is said to be of the nature in question:

for just as the species is comprehended under the genus, so the individual is comprehended under the species. Therefore, since the Word is a complete substance of divine nature, it cannot go beyond that nature to become a complete substance of another nature.

15. Moreover, nature is related to the complete substance as being more formal, more simple, more constitutive. But human nature cannot be in this way related to the person of the Word. Therefore, the person of the Word cannot be a person of human nature.

16. Besides, action is attributed to a complete substance or to a person, because actions are from the individual, according to Aristotle *(Metaph.* I, 1). But in Christ there are two actions, as Damascene proves (III, 15). Therefore, there are two persons. Hence, the union has not been accomplished in the person.

17. Moreover, "person" is defined as "nature of a special kind." If, therefore, the union is in the person, it follows that the union was accomplished in the nature.

Response: But on the contrary, as Augustine (Fulgentius) says *(On Faith):* "It remains true that there are in Christ two natures, but one person."

Moreover, to Orosius he says: "We recognize two natures in the one person of the Son."

I answer that to provide evidence for answering this question, we must consider: 1. what a nature is; 2. what a person is; 3. how the union of the incarnate Word is accomplished in the person, not in the nature.

It is necessary, therefore, to know that the term "nature" is taken from "a proceeding or originating"; hence, first of all, nature has been spoken of as something born, the very coming into being of living things, such as animals or plants; then the term has been applied to the principle of an interior movement like that spoken of in *Physics* II, 1—i.e., nature itself is a principle of motion from within and not from without. And because the natural motion, especially in generation, is terminated at the essence of the species, and, further, the essence of the species that the definition specifies is called nature, whence it is that Boethius says in the book *On Two Natures* that "Nature is the specific difference that gives form to a thing," in this way nature is here understood. Moreover, to understand what a person is, it is necessary to consider this: If there is anything in which there is nothing other than the specific essence, that very specific essence will subsist

individually on its own *(per se);* and so in a being of this kind, the complete substance and the nature will be in reality one same thing, differing only mentally insofar as the nature is considered the essence of the species, and the complete substance is said truly to subsist on its own. If, however, there should be something within the *res* besides the essence specified by the definition—whether it be other as an accident or individuating matter—then the complete substance will not wholly coincide with the nature, but will have something additional. This is especially evident in those things that are composed of matter and form. And what has been said about the complete substance must be understood of the person of rational nature, since a person is nothing other than a complete substance of a rational nature, as Boethius says in *On Two Natures:* that a person is an individual substance of rational nature.

Therefore, what prevents something from being united not in nature but in person? For the individual substance of a rational nature has something not belonging to the specific nature, and this something is united to it personally, not naturally. In this way, therefore, must it be understood that the human nature is united to the Word of God in person, not in nature, for if the human nature does not belong to the person of the divine nature, it yet does belong to the person of the divine nature insofar as the person of the Word joined to himself a human nature by assuming it. But about the manner of this union we have doubt and disagreement.

Usually with created things one is joined to another in two ways, accidentally and essentially. Thus, Nestorius, and before him Theodore, bishop of Mopsuestia [writings condemned by the Fifth General Council, 553] held that human nature was joined to the Word accidentally, as by an indwelling of grace. They held that the Word of God was united to the man Christ, dwelling in him as in his temple. But we see that any substance joined accidentally to another retains separately its own proper singularity of nature —for example, a garment on a man, or an inhabitant of a house. It follows, then, that the man would have his own proper singularity of nature, that is, his personality. Thus, according to Nestorius it followed that in Christ there was the person of the man distinct from the person of the Word; and that the one person was the son of man, and the other the Son of God. Wherefore, he did not confess that the Blessed Virgin was the mother of God but the mother of man. However, this is altogether absurd. First, certainly, sacred Scripture speaks in one way about men in

whom the Word of God dwelt by grace, and in another about Christ. Of the former it says that the word of the Lord was spoken to such a Prophet; but of Christ it says: "the Word was made flesh," that is, man as if the very Word in Person became man. Again, the Apostle Paul in his second epistle to the Philippians calls the union the emptying of the Son of God. It is manifest, moreover, that the indwelling of grace does not satisfy the idea of emptying; otherwise, "emptying" should be attributed not only to the Son, but also to the Father and to the Holy Spirit, of whom the Lord spoke: "He shall abide with you and shall be in you"; and concerning himself and the Father (v. 23): "We will come to him, and will make our abode with him. . . ."

Therefore, on account of this and much else the aforesaid error was condemned in the Council of Ephesus. Some indeed, holding with Nestorius that human nature had accidentally come to the Word, wished to avoid a duality of persons which Nestorius had proposed; proposing that because the Word assumed a soul and body not mutually united, that a human person was not established from soul and body. But from this there followed a greater inconvenience; that Christ was not truly man, since the meaning of man consisted in the union of soul and body. And so this error was likewise condemned under Alexander III in the Council of Turonensi.

Others indeed took another position, arguing that human nature had come essentially to the Word, as though united in one nature or essence out of the divine nature and human nature. And toward this a certain Apollinaris of Laodicensis proposed three dogmas as Pope Leo declared in a certain letter to the men of Constantinople: the first of these was that the soul was not united in Christ, but the Word took its place; and so from the Word and the flesh there was made one nature, just as there are body and soul in us. In this teaching Apollinaris followed Nestorius. But because the Holy Scripture (Jn. 8: 18) speaks of Christ's soul: "I have the power to lay it down and I have the power to take it up again," a second teaching arose, which proposed a sensitive but not a rational soul to be in Christ; the Word was in the man Christ in the place of intellect. But this is inconsistent; for, according to it, the Word would not have assumed a human nature, but an animal nature, as St. Augustine argues in *Eighty-three Questions,* 80. His third teaching held that the flesh of Christ was not taken from woman but made from the Word, who was changed and turned into flesh. Yet this is in the highest degree impossible, because the Word of God

insofar as he is truly God is altogether immutable. Hence, in the Council of Constantinople Apollinaris was condemned for these doctrines; Eutyches, who held his third teaching, had been condemned in the Council of Chalcedon.

Again, if union is not accomplished in the person, but merely a habitation, as Nestorius holds, nothing new occurred in the incarnation of Christ. That the union was accomplished in the nature, as Apollinaris and Eutyches held, is wholly impossible since, in truth, species are like numbers in which additions or subtractions alter the unity of the species, as stated in *Metaph.* VIII. It is impossible for a complete nature to receive the addition of another nature; were it to receive the addition, it would no longer be the same nature, but another. However, divine nature is supremely complete; in fact, even human nature is complete as a species, so that the entrance of another nature cannot be allowed. If it were possible, what would be produced from both would be neither divine nature nor human. Thus, Christ would be neither man nor God, which is inadmissible.

It remains, therefore, that human nature is united to the Word neither accidentally nor essentially, but substantially, in the sense that substance signifies a rational single substance according to person, or personally. In created things there is no example of such union closer than that of the rational soul and body, as Athanasius points out (in his Creed). Nor certainly does he mean it in the sense that the soul is the form of the body (for the Word is not able to be the form of matter), but in the sense that the body is an instrument of the soul, not indeed extrinsic and adventitious, but innate and conjoined. Thus, Damascene says (Book III, 15), "Human nature is the instrument of the Word." Still, there was something rather like this, as St. Augustine says in his treatise *Against Felicianus,* 12, if we may imagine, as very many wish to, that there is in the world a cosmic soul that makes the matter potential to various natures become one person with itself. However, all examples of this kind fall flat because instrumental union is accidental. But this incarnation is a unique union beyond all modes of union known to us. As God is goodness itself and is his own being, so also is he unity itself in his essence. Likewise, his virtue is not limited to those modes of goodness and being that are in creatures, but he is able to make new modes of goodness and being not known to us. Furthermore, by his infinite power he has been able to make a new mode of union wherein the human nature is united to the person of the Word, yet not accidentally,

although no satisfying example of this is found among creatures.

Whereupon, speaking of this mystery, Augustine says in a letter to Volusianus: "To one demanding reasons, let us admit that here we have a marvel! To one seeking precedents, admit that this is extraordinary. Let us grant that God can do something we cannot trace out; for in such things the whole explanation of the fact lies in the power of the Doer." Also, Dionysius says (On *the Divine Names,* 2): "Jesus as we consider him is a divine composition" (that is, union), "and unutterable in any word, unknown to any mind, even to the highest of the angels."

Answers to objections:

1. Analogy does not extend to the point of there being but one nature in man composed of soul and flesh, but to the point of one person's being constituted of both.

2. Granted that in divinity nature and supposit or person do not differ in reality, yet they differ according to reason, as it is said. And, whereas there is the same subsistence in human nature and in the divine nature, nevertheless, the same essence is not united in both. Hence, union has been accomplished in the person to whose meaning it belongs to subsist; not, however, to the nature that expresses the essence of the thing.

3. The natures certainly are united in Christ—not, however, in the nature, but in the person. From this very fact it is clear that the natures are said to be united unchangeably and unalterably.

4- The heretics who say that the union has not been made in the person and may have been made in the nature did not weigh the truth that person is one thing, and nature another, both in reality and in reason. So they were deceived.

5. Strictly speaking, for union, one thing is said to be united to another; for unity, it is said to be one with it. Therefore, union is not understood to be directed to the divine person, for that person has been one within itself from eternity, but in time the person has been united to a human nature. Thus, in our consideration, union precedes the person, not as the person is one but as it is united.

6. Union is not said to be made in the divine person, as if that very person were made of two mutually united, for this is repugnant to supreme simplicity. But the union is said to have been made in the person, inasmuch as a simple divine person subsists in two natures, the divine and the human.

7. Two beings, different in genus, are not united in

one essence or nature; nevertheless, nothing prevents them from being united in one supposit. For example, an essence is not made from string and whiteness, yet they are found in one supposit.

8. The person of the Son of God can be considered in a twofold manner: in one way, according to the usual understanding of "person" as it signifies a certain subsisting, and in this sense union was accomplished in the person according to the understanding of person, as we said above. In another way there can be considered in the person of the Son what is proper to the person of the Son: the relation of the Son to the Father. For this meaning is not denoted by the hypostatic union of two natures.

9. As the incarnation adds no goodness to the divine person, so also it adds no lovableness; hence, the person of the Word incarnate must not be loved more than the person of the eternal Word, strictly. He should be loved for another reason, that he is included under the universal goodness of the Word. Wherefore, it does not follow that since the union of the incarnation has been accomplished in one person and not in others that that person should be loved more than the other persons.

10. Being is characteristic both of the person subsisting and of the nature in which the person subsists as having being according to that nature. Therefore, the being of the person of the Word incarnate is one on the part of the subsisting person, but not, however, on the part of the natures.

11. Nature is not related to the complete substance as form to matter; for matter is constituted in being only through form, and for that reason, form requires determinate matter to be actual. But a complete substance not only is constituted by the specific nature but has other realities as well. Therefore, nothing prevents one nature's being possessed by a complete substance of another nature.

12. The divine nature is predicated of a divine person because of identity of being, but not according to strict logical requirements. Therefore, one term cannot be used interchangeably for the other in propositions. So we can say of God that a person begets, but we may not say that the divine nature begets.

13. Human nature is united to the Word neither accidentally nor even essentially (as if belonging to the divine nature of the Word), but substantially, that is, according to substance, as if belonging to the substance or person of the Word.

14. The person of the Word is included in the nature of the Word; nor can it be extended to

nevertheless neither seen nor touched unless it is written upon paper. Likewise, as soon as the Word of God became flesh, he was made both visible and tangible. And just as the paper on which a king's word is written is spoken of as the word of the king, so likewise man, to whom the Word of God is united in one person (hypostasis), is called the Son of God. "Take thee a great book and write it with a man's pen" (Is. 8: 1). Therefore, the holy Apostles stated: "Who was conceived by the Holy Spirit, born of the Virgin Mary."

Many errors arose around this point (Origen, Photius, Manes, Ebion, Valentinus, Arius, Apollinaris, Nestorius), and to eliminate these errors the holy Fathers at the Council of Nicaea added a number of things in that other creed. . . .

Something is gained from all this:

1. Our faith is strengthened. For we would not believe someone who reported about a foreign land he had never visited to the extent that we would believe him had he been there. Now, the patriarchs and prophets and John the Baptist told something about God before Christ came into the world. But men did not believe them to the extent that they believed Christ, who was with God, or, rather, was one with God. And so our faith is firmer with respect to what Christ himself tells us: "No one hath seen God at any time; the only-begotten Son who is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him" (Jn. 1: 18). Hence, before the coming of Christ many mysteries *of* our faith were hidden from us, and these are now illuminated.

2. Our hope is uplifted. The son of man, in assuming our flesh, certainly did not come to us for any light reason, but for our very great benefit. For he, as it were, traded with us by assuming a living body and deigning to be born of the Virgin so that we may participate in his divinity. And so he became man in order to make man divine.

3. Our charity is stirred up. There is no clearer proof of divine charity than that God, the Creator of all, becomes a creature, that Our Lord becomes our brother, and that the Son of God becomes the son of man: "For God so loved the world as to give his only-begotten Son" (Jn. 3: 16). Reflection upon all this should re-enkindle our love for God and inflame us.

4. We are led to preserve the purity of our souls. By its union with God our nature was exalted and dignified to the extent of being taken up into union with a divine person.

In fact, after the incarnation the angel would not allow St. John to adore him, although this was allowed

to even the greatest patriarch; so that anyone who reflects upon this dignifying of his nature and is ever aware of it should scorn any cheapening or lowering of himself and his nature by sin. So St. Peter says: "By whom he hath given us most great and precious promises; that by these you may be made partakers of the divine nature; flying the corruption of that concupiscence which is in the world" (2 P. 1:4).

Finally, our desire to come to Christ is intensified by reflection upon all this. If a king had a brother separated by a great distance from him, that brother would desire to come to the king to see him, be near him, and live with him. So, likewise, Christ is our brother, and we should desire to be with him and be united to him. "Wheresoever the body shall be, there shall the eagles also be gathered together" (Mt. 24: 28).

The Apostle desired "to be dissolved and to be with Christ" (Ph. 1: 23), and this desire increases within us as we meditate upon the incarnation of Christ.

Priesthood of Christ *Summa Theologiae,* III, q. 22, a. 1,c

It is proper to a priest to be a mediator between God and the people: namely, insofar as he bestows divine realities on the people, so that *sacerdos* (priest) signifies a giver of sacred things *(sacra dans)* (Mal. 2: 7): "They shall seek the law at his (i.e., the priest's) mouth"; and again insofar as he offers up the people's prayers to God and, in a way, makes satisfaction to God for their sins; hence, the Apostle says (Heb. 5: 1): "Every high priest taken from among men is ordained for men in the things that belong to God, that he may offer up gifts and sacrifices for sins." Now, this is most suitable to Christ, for through him are gifts

bestowed on men (2 P. 1: 4): "By whom (i.e., Christ) he hath given us most great and precious promises, that by these you may be made partakers of the divine nature." Moreover, he reconciled the human race to God (Col. 1: 19-20): "In him (i.e., Christ) it hath well pleased (the Father) that all fullness should dwell, and through him to reconcile all things unto himself."

Therefore, it is most fitting that Christ should be a priest.

Christ a Victim for Sin *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 22, a. 2,c

As Augustine says *(City of God,* X, 5): "Every visible sacrifice is a sacrament, that is a sacred sign of the invisible sacrifice." Now, the invisible sacrifice is that by which a man offers his spirit to God (Ps. 50: 19): "A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit." So that whatever is offered to God with the purpose of raising man's spirit to him may be called a sacrifice.

Now, man should offer sacrifice for three reasons. First, for the remission of sin, which separates him from God. Thus, the Apostle says (Heb. 5:1) that it belongs to the priest "to offer gifts and sacrifices for sins." Second, that man may remain in the state of grace by cleaving to God, which constitutes his peace and salvation. . . . Third, so that the spirit of man may be perfectly united to God; this will be most perfectly achieved in glory. . . .

Now, these benefits were achieved for us by Christ's humanity. For, first of all, our sins were erased (Rm. 4: 25): "Who was delivered up for our sins." Second, through him we received the grace of salvation (Heb. 5: 9): "He became to all who obey him the cause of eternal salvation." Third, through him we have acquired the perfection of glory (Heb. 10: 19): "We have a confidence in the entering into the holies (i.e., the heavenly glory) through his blood."

Therefore, Christ himself as man was not only priest but also a perfect victim for sin, a victim for a peace-offering, and a holocaust.

Summa Theologiae III, q. 22, a. 5, ad. 2

Although Christ's passion and death are not to be repeated, nevertheless the virtue of that victim lasts forever, since, as it is written (Heb. 10: 14): "By one oblation he hath perfected forever them who are sanctified."

Christ as Mediator *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 26, a. 1,c

Strictly speaking, a mediator is one who joins together and unites those between whom he mediates; for extremes are united in the mean. But to unite men to God belongs to Christ, through whom men are reconciled to God (2 Co. 5: 19): "God was in Christ

reconciling the world to himself." And so only Christ is the perfect mediator of God and men, in that through his death he reconciled the human race to God. Thus, the Apostle, after saying, "Mediator of God and man, the man Christ Jesus," added: "who gave himself as redemption for all."

But nothing stops others from being mediators in some fashion between God and man insofar as they collaborate in uniting men to God, either dispositively or instrumentally.

Function of Mediator *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 26, a. 2, c

We may reflect on the two aspects of a mediator: first, that he is a mean; second, that he joins together others. Now, by nature a mean is distant from each extreme, so that it unites by communicating to one what pertains to the other. Now, only as man and not as God can either of these aspects of the mean be applied to Christ. For as God he does not differ from the Holy Spirit in nature and ruling power, nor have the Father and the Holy Spirit anything not had by the Son, so that he should be able to communicate to others something belonging to the Father and the Holy Spirit but not to him. But both can be applied to him as man. For as man he is distant both from God by nature and from man by dignity in respect to grace and glory. Moreover, it is proper to him as man to unite men to God by communicating to men both commandments and gifts and by offering satisfaction and prayers to God for men. And, therefore, as man he is most truly spoken of as mediator.

Effectiveness of Christ's *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 48, a. Passion 1, c

Grace was given to Christ not only as an individual but insofar as he is head of the Church, so that it might flow over into his members; and so Christ's works are referred to himself and to his members, just as the works of any other man in a state of grace are referred to himself. But it is clear that whoever suffers for the sake of justice when in a state of grace thereby merits his salvation (Mt. 5: 10): "Blessed are they who suffer persecution for justice's sake."

Therefore, Christ by his passion merited salvation not only for himself, but likewise for all his members.

Atonement of Christ Summa Theologiae III, q. 48, a. 2,c

He atones appropriately for an offense who offers whatever the offended one equally loves, or loves more than he detested the offense. But Christ by suffering out of love and obedience gave to God more than was required to compensate for the offense of

the whole human race. First, by reason of the tremendous charity from which he suffered; second, by reason of the dignity of his life, which he gave up in atonement, for this was the life of one who was both God and man; third, on account of the extent of the passion and the greatness of the sorrow suffered. . . . And so Christ's passion was not merely a sufficient but also a superabundant atonement for the sins of the human race: according to "He is the propitiation for our sins; and not for ours only, but also for those of the whole world" (1 Jn. 2: 2).

Sacrifice of Christ *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 48, a. 3,c

A sacrifice, strictly speaking, is something done to give due honor to God in order to appease him, and so Augustine says *(City of God* X): "A true sacrifice is every good work done in order that we may cling to God in holy fellowship, yet referred to that consummation of happiness wherein we can be truly blessed." But, as is added in the same spot, "Christ offered himself up for us in the passion: and this voluntary enduring of the passion was most acceptable to God, as coming from charity." Therefore, it is clear that Christ's passion was a true sacrifice. . . .

Cause of Salvation: Christ *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 48, a. 6,c

There is a twofold efficient agency: namely, the principal and the instrumental. Now, the principal efficient cause of man's salvation is God. But because Christ's humanity is the instrument of the Godhead, all Christ's actions and sufferings act instrumentally in virtue of his Godhead for the salvation of men. And so Christ's passion achieves man's salvation effectively.

Actions of Christ *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 19, a. 1,c

As was previously said (q. 18, a. 1), the aforementioned heretics who argued that there was one will in Christ argued that there was one action in Christ. Now, to clarify their wrong opinion, we should remember that wherever there are numerous mutually directed agents, the inferior is moved by the superior, as man's body is moved by his soul, and his lower powers by reason. And, thus the inferior agent's actions and motions are acted upon rather than being actions; thus, we speak of man's walking, which pertains to his feet, and touching, which pertains to his hand, as things exercised by the man—one exercised by the soul through the feet, the other through the hands. And because the same soul is

acting in both cases, there is but one indifferent action on the part of that which is acting, namely, the first moving principle; but difference occurs through what is acted upon. Now, just as in a mere man, the body is moved by the soul, and the sensitive by the rational tendency, so the human nature in the Lord Jesus Christ is moved and ruled by the divine. So they said that there is one indifferent action of the acting God, but variety in what is acted upon, since Christ as God through himself did one thing, that is, by conserving all things through the Word of his power, and another thing through his human nature by walking in a body. Thus, the Sixth Council quotes the statement of Severus the heretic: "Whatever things were done and wrought by the one Christ differ greatly; for some are suitable to God and some are human, but to give strong steps to sickly limbs wholly unable to walk on the ground is suitable to God. Yet one, i.e., the incarnate Word, wrought one and the other—neither was this from one nature, and that from another; nor can we justly affirm that because there are distinct things achieved there are therefore two acting natures and forms."

But in this they were mistaken, for whatever is moved by another has a double action—one from its own form—the other as moved by another; hence, an ax's own action is to chop, but as moved by the carpenter, its action is to make benches. So the action belonging to anything by its form is proper to it, nor does it belong to the mover except in the measure that he uses the particular thing for his work: hence, to heat is fire's proper action, but not a smith's, except in the measure that he uses fire to heat iron. But the action belonging to anything as moved by another is not distinct from the mover's action; so to make a bench is not the ax's action independent of the carpenter. Consequently, the mover's action must be distinct from the proper action of the moved whenever the mover and the moved have diverse forms or active powers; yet the moved participates in the mover's action, and the mover makes use of the action of the moved and, accordingly, each acts in communion with the other.

Hence, in Christ human nature has its proper form and power whereby it acts, and so has the divine; so that human nature has its proper action distinct from the divine, and vice versa. Yet the divine nature makes use of the action of the human nature as of the action of its instrument; and, likewise, the human nature participates in the action of the divine nature as an instrument participates in the action of the principal agent. And this is what Pope Leo says (Ep. *ad*

Flavian, 28): "Both forms (i.e., both the divine and the human nature in Christ) do what is proper to each in union with the other, i.e., the Word does what belongs to the Word, and the flesh does what belongs to flesh."

But if the action of the Godhead and manhood in Christ were only one, then we would either have to say that the human nature was without its proper form and power (for this could never be said of the divine), so that consequently there would be in Christ only the divine action; or we would have to say that one power resulted from the divine and human power. But both are impossible positions. The first would imply that the human nature in Christ is imperfect, and the second would imply a confusion of the natures. Thus, with reason the Sixth Council (Act. 18) condemned this view, and stated this: "We confess two natural, indivisible, inconvertible, unconfused, and inseparable actions in the same Lord Jesus Christ our true God, i.e., the divine action and the human action."

Charity of Christ *Commentary on Epistle to Ephesians* III, 5

He says: "You ought to be so rooted and founded in charity, dearly beloved, *that you may be able to comprehend, with all the saints, what is the breadth and length and height and depth. . . .*"

Thus, you may be able to comprehend in the sense of perfectly attaining to, with all the saints, what is the *breadth* with which your charity should extend even to enemies, what is the *length* during which it never ceases, its *height* in loving God for his own sake, and the *depth* of the divine predestination [from which it springs].

At this point it should be realized that it was within Christ's power to choose what type of death he wanted. And since he underwent death out of charity, he chose the death of the cross, in which the aforesaid four dimensions are present. The cross beam has *breadth,* and to it his hands were nailed, because through charity our good works ought to stretch out even to adversaries: "The Lord brought me forth into a broad place" (Ps. 17: 20). The trunk *of* the cross has *length* against which the whole body leans, since charity ought to be enduring, thus sustaining and saving man: "He who shall persevere unto the end, he shall be saved" (Mt. 10: 22). The projection of wood against which the head is thrown back has *height,* since our hope must rise toward the eternal and the divine: "The head of every man is Christ" (1 Co. 11: 3). The cross is braced by its *depth,* which lies concealed beneath the ground; it is not

seen because the depth of the divine love, which sustains us, is not visible insofar as the plans of predestination, as was said above, are beyond our intelligence. . . .*

Christ's Passover Action: Summa Theologian III, q. 50, a.

Death; Resurrection; 6, c

Ascension

Christ's death may be considered in two ways: in *becoming* and *in fact*. Death is referred to as *in becoming* when anyone from natural or

Translated by R. F. Larcher, O.P.

compulsory suffering tends toward death; and thus to speak of Christ's death is like speaking of his passion, so that Christ's death is in this sense the cause of our salvation in accord with what has been already said of the passion (q. 48). But death is considered in fact when the separation of soul and body has already occurred, and we are now speaking of Christ's death in this sense. In this sense it is not possible for Christ to cause our death through merit but only through causality, i.e., because the Godhead was not separated from Christ's flesh by death; and so even when the soul had left the flesh, whatever happened to Christ's flesh was on behalf of salvation in virtue of the united Godhead. But a cause's effect is properly judged according to its similarity to the cause. Therefore, because death is a kind of loss of one's own life, the effect of Christ's death is considered in reference to the withdrawal of impediments to our salvation: and these are the death of the soul and of the body. Thus in us Christ's death is said to have destroyed both the soul's death, caused by sin: "He was delivered up for our sins" (Rm. 4: 25) and the body's death, which is the withdrawal of the soul: "Death is swallowed up in victory" (1 Co. 15: 54).

The Risen Christ *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 53, a. 1.c

It was suitable for Christ to arise for five reasons. First, in the interest of divine justice, which appropriately exalts those who humble themselves for God's sake; "He hath put down the mighty from their seat, and hath exalted the humble" (Lk. 1: 52). Therefore, since Christ humbled himself even unto the death of the cross out of love and obedience to God, he was fittingly exalted by God to a glorious resurrection; thus, in his person it is said: "Thou hast known, [i.e., favored] *my sitting down* [i.e., my humiliation and passion] and *my rising up* [i.e., my glorification in the resurrection]" (Ps. 138: 2), as the gloss explains.

Second, for our instruction in the faith, because our belief in Christ's divinity is confirmed by his arising, since (2 Co. 13: 4): "Although he was crucified through weakness, yet he liveth by the power of God." And so it is written (1 Co. 15: 14): "If Christ be not risen again, then is our preaching vain, and our faith is also vain" and (Ps. 29: 10): "What profit is there in my blood?" that is, in the shedding of my blood, while I go down, as by various degrees of evils, into corruption? As though he were to answer, "None." "For if I do not at once rise again but my body be corrupted, I shall preach to no one, I shall gain no one," as the gloss explains.

Third, to raise our hope, because by seeing Christ our head rise again we hope that we also shall rise again. Thus, it is written (1 Co. 15: 12): "Now, if Christ be preached that he rose from the dead, how do some among you say that there is no resurrection of the dead?" And (Jb. 19: 25): "I know [that is, with certainty of faith] that my redeemer, [i.e., Christ] liveth, having risen from the dead; and therefore in the last day I shall rise out of the earth: . . . this my hope is laid up in my bosom."

Fourth, to bring order into the lives of the faithful (Rm. 6: 4): "As Christ is risen from the dead by the glory of the Father, so we also may walk in newness of life"; and farther on, "Christ rising from the dead dieth now no more; so do you also reckon that you are dead to sin, but alive to God."

Fifth, to bring the work of our salvation to perfection; for just as in dying he endured evil things to deliver us from evil, so was he glorified in rising again to perfect us with good things (Rm. 4: 25): "He was delivered up for our sins, and rose again for our justification."

Summa Theologiae III, q. 53, a. 2,c

Christ's resurrection was needed for the instruction of our faith, but our faith with respect to Christ's divinity and humanity, for believing one without the other is insufficient. . . . Therefore, to confirm our faith in the truth of his divinity, he was required to arise speedily and not put off the resurrection until the world's end. But to confirm our faith with respect to the truth of his humanity and death, some interval between his death and arising was needed. . . .

Resurrection Articles *of Faith,* Art. 5

Fifth Article: "The third day he rose again from the dead."

We can learn four things from this.

1. First, let us try to arise spiritually from the soul's death, brought on by our sins, to that life of justice had through penance: "Rise, thou who sleepest, and

arise from the dead; and Christ shall enlighten thee" (Ep. 5: 14). This is the first resurrection: "Blessed and holy is he who hath part in the first resurrection" (Jn. 20: 6).

2. Second, let us not put off rising until our death, but do it now, since Christ arose on the third day: "Delay not to be converted to the Lord; and defer it not from day to day" (Ecc. 5: 8). When overcome by illness you will not be able to attend to what is involved in salvation, and in addition you will by persevering in sin be unable to participate in all the good accomplished in the Church, and you will bring about many evils. In fact, the longer the devil possesses you, the harder it is to evacuate him, as St. Bede tells us.

3. Third, let us arise again to an incorruptible life so as never to die again, resolving to sin no more. "Knowing that Christ, rising again from the dead, dieth now no more. Death shall no more have dominion over him. ... So do you also reckon that you are dead to sin, but alive unto God, in Christ Jesus Our Lord. Neither yield ye your members as instruments of iniquity unto sin; but present yourselves to God, as those who are alive from the dead" (Rm. 6: 9).

4- Fourth, let us again rise to a new and glorious life by avoiding everything that formerly was an occasion and cause of our death and sin: "As Christ is risen from the dead by the glory of the Father, so we also may walk in newness of life" (Rm. 6: 4). This new life is the life of justice renewing the soul and leading it to the life of glory.

Our Resurrection Rooted in *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 56, a.

Christ's 1, c

As expressed in Metaphysics II, 4: "Whatever is first in any order is the cause of all that come after it." But Christ's resurrection was the first in the order of all resurrection. . . . Thus, Christ's resurrection must be the cause of ours; and this the Apostle says (1 Co. 15: 20): "Christ is risen from the dead, the first fruits of them that sleep; for by a man came death, and by a man the resurrection of the dead."

And this is reasonable. For the principle of human life-giving is the Word of God, of whom it is said (Ps. 35: 10): "With thee is the fountain of life"; thus, he himself says (Jn. 5: 21): "As the Father raiseth up the dead and giveth life, so the Son also giveth life to whom he will." Now, the divinely established natural order is that every cause acts first upon what is nearest to it, and through it upon others that are more remote, just as fire first heats the nearest air and

through the air bodies that are more distant; and God himself first illuminates those substances closer to him, and through them others that are more distant, as Dionysius says *(Heavenly Hierarchy,* 13). Therefore, the Word of God first gives immortal life to that body naturally united with himself, and through it activates the resurrection in all other bodies.

Resurrection Grace Affects Summa *Theologiae* III, q. 56, a.
Soul and Body 2, c

Christ's resurrection acts in virtue of the divinity. Now, this virtue extends not only to the resurrection of bodies, but also to that of souls; for from God it comes about that the soul lives by grace and that the body lives by the soul. Therefore, Christ's resurrection is instrumentally effective not only with respect to the resurrection of bodies but also with respect to the resurrection of souls. Likewise, it is an exemplary cause with respect to the resurrection of souls, since even in our souls we must be conformed with the rising Christ; as the Apostle says (Rm. 6: 4-11): "Christ is risen from the dead by the glory *of* the Father, so we also may walk in the newness of life: and as he, rising again from the dead, dieth now no more, so let us reckon that we are dead to sin, that we may live together with him."

Christ's Ascension *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 57, a.
1,c

The place should be suitable with whatever is within it. Now, through his resurrection Christ began an immortal and incorruptible life. But although our situation is one of generation and corruption, the heavenly situation is one of incorruption. And so it was not suitable for Christ to remain on earth after the resurrection, but it was suitable for him to ascend into heaven.

Effects of Ascension Summa *Theologiae* III, q. 57, a.
6,c

Christ's ascension is the cause of our salvation in two ways first, on our part; second, on his.

It is on our part because through the ascension our souls are upraised to him, since his ascension promotes first, faith; second, hope; third, charity; and fourth, our reverence for him is thus increased when we consider him no longer an earthly man but the God of heaven; hence the Apostle says (2 Co. 5: 16): "If we have known Christ according to the flesh-that is, as mortal, whereby we reputed him as a mere man," as the gloss explains the words, "but now we know him so no longer."

It is on his part in respect to what he did on ascending for our salvation. First, he prepared the

way for our ascent into heaven, according to his own saying (Jn. 14: 2): "I go to prepare a place for you," and the words of Micheas (2: 13): "He shall go up that shall open the way before them." Because he is our head, the members must follow where the head has gone; thus he said (Jn. 14: 3): "That where I am, you also may be." To signify this he took the souls of the saints delivered from hell to heaven (Ps. 67: 19): "Ascending on high, he led captivity captive," because he took with him to heaven those who had been held captives by the devil, to heaven as to a place alien to human nature; captives certainly of a happy capture acquired by his victory.

Second, since as the high priest in the Old Testament entered the holy place to stand before God on behalf of the people, so likewise Christ entered heaven "to make intercession for us," as is said (Heb. 7:25).

For the very manifesting of himself in the human nature in which he entered heaven is a pleading for us; so that because God so exalted human nature in Christ, he may take pity on them for whom the Son of God assumed human nature. Third, that once settled in his heavenly seat as God and Lord, he might pour down gifts upon men (Ep. 4: 10): "He ascended above all the heavens, that he might fill all things," that is, "with his gifts," according to the gloss.

Single Salvific Action *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 57, a. 6, ad. 2

Christ's passion is the cause of our ascending into heaven, strictly speaking, by withdrawing the obstacle that is sin, and also through merit. But Christ's ascension is the direct cause of our ascension through our beginning it in him, who is our head, and with whom the members have to be united.

Lordship of Christ *Commentary on Epistle to Ephesians,* c. I, lect. 8

. . . The divine activity in Christ is the form and exemplar of the divine activity in us. . . . In Scripture we frequently read that we will

be exalted in the likeness of Christ's exaltation. For example (Rm. 8: 17): "If we suffer with him, that we may also be glorified with him." . . .
The Apostle has previously dealt with the exaltation of Christ both from the viewpoint of his passing over from death to life (1: 20a), and from that of his exaltation to the highest glory (1: 20b-21). Now he treats of the immense power of his exaltation. . . .

He affirms that, with respect to the whole of creation, Christ has universal power, since God the Father hath subjected all things under his feet. . . .

He speaks of the relation of the Church to Christ, which is his body, inasmuch as she is subject to him, receives his influence, and shares the same nature with Christ. . . .
Since the Church was instituted on account of Christ, the Church is called the fullness of Christ. Everything that is virtually in Christ is, as it were, filled out in some way in the members of the Church; for all spiritual understanding, gifts, and whatever can be present in the Church—all of which Christ possesses superabundantly—flow from him into the members of the Church, and they are perfected in them. . . .
c. II, lect. 2

. . . When a man's love is caused from the goodness of the one he loves, then that man who loves does so out of justice, inasmuch as it is just that he love such a person. When, however, love causes the goodness in the beloved, then it is a love springing from mercy. The love with which God loves us produces goodness in us; hence, mercy is presented here as the root of the divine love: "I will remember the tender mercies of the Lord. . . ."*

5. The Sacraments

Christ Active in the *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 19, a. 2, Sacraments c and ad. 1
The power of achieving something is present both in the instrument used and in the principal agent, but since it is more perfectly in the

*ASC 2, translated by Matthew L. Lamb.

latter, it is not present in both in the same way. Now, our power of the keys is, like other sacramental powers, instrumental; but it is present in Christ as principal agent in saving us, as God by authority and as man by merit. The very idea of key connotes a power of opening and closing, whether done by a principal agent or by an instrument. Accordingly, we should conclude that Christ had the key, but in a way

superior to his ministers, so that he is spoken of as having the key of *excellence*.

ad. 1. A "character" implies that one thing is derived from another, so that the power of the keys that we receive from Christ comes from that "character" whereby we are conformed to Christ, but in Christ it comes not from any character, but rather from the principal form.

Summa Theologiae III, q. 64, a. 3,c

Christ as God and as man produces the interior sacramental effect, but not in the same way. As God, he acts by authority in the sacraments, yet as man his action brings about the interior sacramental effects meritoriously and efficiently but instrumentally. For it was affirmed that Christ's passion, belonging to him by his human nature is, meritoriously and efficiently, the cause of justification—not as its principal cause, i.e., by his own authority, but as instrumental cause, insofar as his humanity is the instrument of his Godhead, as declared previously.

Yet as instrument joined to the Godhead in the unity of person, it possesses a certain headship and efficiency in relation to extrinsic instruments—the ministers of the Church and the sacraments themselves. ... So Christ has the principal power of ministry, i.e., the power of excellence, just as he has as God the power of authority over the sacraments.

There are four aspects of this power of excellence. First, the merit and power of his passion act in the sacraments. And because the power of the passion is communicated to us by faith (Rm. 2: 25): "Whom God hath proposed to be a propitiation, through faith in his blood," and we proclaim this faith by calling upon the name of Christ, the second aspect is that the sacraments are sanctified by invoking his name. And inasmuch as the sacraments draw their power from their institution, the third aspect of the excellence of Christ's power is seen in the fact that the sacramental power comes from the one who instituted them. And since cause does not depend upon effect, but, conversely, it pertains to the excellence of Christ's power that he could bestow the sacramental effect without conferring the exterior sacrament. . . .

Christ's Sacramental Sign *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 60, a.

1,c

... A thing may be spoken of as a sacrament either because it has a certain hidden holiness, and in this sense a sacrament is a sacred secret; or from having some relation to this holiness, that of a cause or of a sign or any other relation. But we are now referring to sacraments in a special way as implying a signifying

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Christ's Sacramental Sign *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 60, a.

l,c

... A thing may be spoken of as a sacrament either because it has a certain hidden holiness, and in this sense a sacrament is a sacred secret; or from having some relation to this holiness, that of a cause or of a sign or any other relation. But we are now referring to sacraments in a special way as implying a signifying

disposition; and in this sense a sacrament is a kind of sign.

Meaning of Sacrament *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 60, a. 2,c

Signs are made to men for whom it is proper to learn the unknown from the known. So that, strictly speaking, a sacrament is the sign of some sacred thing referring to man; so that a sacrament in the strict sense defined here is the *sign of a holy thing insofar as it makes men holy.*

Sacraments and Sanctification *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 60, a. 3,c

Strictly speaking, a sacrament is that which is directed toward signifying our sanctification. There are three aspects here: the cause itself of our sanctification, which is Christ's passion; the form of our sanctification, which is grace and the virtues; and the ultimate end of our sanctification, which is eternal life. And all these are signified by the sacraments. Therefore, a sacrament is a sign that is both a reminder of the past, i.e., Christ's passion; an indication of what is achieved in us through Christ's passion, namely, grace; and a prognosis, that is, a prediction of future glory.

Sensible Signs Needed *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 60, a. 4,c

Divine wisdom provides for everything in accord with its manner of being; thus, it is written (Wi. 8: 1): "She . . . ordereth all things sweetly." So also we are told (Mt. 25: 15): "She gave to everyone according to his own ability." Now, it is natural for man to gain knowledge of the intelligible from the sensible. But a sign is that whereby one gains knowledge of something else. Therefore, since the sacred realities signified by the sacraments are the spiritual and intelligible goods whereby man is sanctified, the sacramental signs consequently consist in sensible things. . . .

Sacraments Exist by Divine *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 60, a. 5, c

Choice

There are two aspects in the use of the sacraments: the worship of God and the sanctification of man. The former has to do with man as related to God, and the latter has to do with God in respect to man. Now, no one may determine about what is in another's power, only about what is in his own. Since, then, the sanctification of man is within the power of God, who sanctifies, man should not decide what things must be used for his sanctification, but this should be

determined by divine institution. So that in the sacraments of the New Law by which man is sanctified: (1 Co. 6: 11): "You are washed, you are sanctified," we must make use of those things determined by divine institution.

Words Suitably Added to *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 60, a.

Sacramental Signs 6, c

The sacraments are used as signs for man's sanctification. Therefore, they can be considered in three ways and in each way it is suitable for words to be added to the sensible signs. First of all, they can be considered in reference to the cause of sanctification, which is the Word incarnate, to whom the sacraments are somewhat conformed insofar as the word is united to the sensible sign, just as the Word of God in the mystery of the incarnation is united to sensible flesh.

Second, sacraments may be considered with reference to the man who is sanctified and who is made up of soul and body, to whom the sacramental remedy is suited insofar as through the sensible element it touches the body, and through faith in the words it reaches the soul. . . .

Third, a sacrament may be considered with reference to the sacramental signification. Now, Augustine says *(On Christian Doctrine* II), "words are the chief signs used by men"; for words can be formed variously to signify diverse mental ideas, so that we can through words express our thoughts with greater precision. And so to make the sacramental signification perfect, it was required to determine the signification of sensible things through definite words. For water may signify both a cleansing on account of its humidity, and refreshment by its coolness; but when we say, "I baptize thee," it is clear that we use water in baptism to signify a spiritual cleansing.

Definite Word Formula *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 60, a.

7,c

. . . The words are as form and sensible things are as matter in the sacraments. In everything made up of matter and form, the determining principle is the form, which is, so to speak, the end and the terminus of the matter. For anything to exist, a determinate form is needed before there is any need of determinate matter, which must be adapted to the determinate form. Hence, because definite sensible things are needed as sacramental matter in the sacraments, there is greater need of a definite form of words.

Necessity for Sacraments *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 61, a.

l,c

There are three reasons why sacraments are necessary for man's salvation. The first is found in the human condition, which is such that it must be brought to spiritual and intelligible reality through corporeal and sensible things. So divine wisdom aptly provides man with salvific means in the corporeal and sensible signs called sacraments.

The second reason is in the situation of man whose sinning subjected him to corporeal things by his affections. But any healing remedy must be given to man so as to reach the part affected by disease. So it was suitable for God to provide man with a spiritual medicine through definite corporeal signs; for if man were offered spiritual realities unhidden, his mind distracted by the material world could not attend to them.

The third reason comes from the fact that man tends to direct his actions principally toward material things. To avoid the difficulty of removing man completely from physical actions, bodily motions were made available to him in the sacraments, thereby disciplining him to avoid superstitious practices or the worship of demons and all destructive action or sinful acts.

So that by the institution of the sacraments man in harmony with his nature learns through sensible things. He is humbled by admitting that he is subject to corporeal things, inasmuch as he gets help through them. And he is even preserved from physical harm through the healthy partaking of the sacraments.

Sacraments, Instrumental *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 62, a.

Causes of Grace 1, c

We must then assert against this that an efficient cause is twofold, principal and instrumental. The principal cause acts by the power of its form, to which the effect is likened, as fire through its own heat makes a thing hot. In this way only God can cause grace, for grace is no other than a participated likeness of the divine nature (2 P. 1: 4): "He hath given us great and precious promises that we may be partakers of the divine nature." But the instrumental cause acts not through the power of its form but only through the motion by which the principal agent moves it, so that the effect is likened not to the instrument but to the principal agent; for example, the bed is not like the ax, but like the art in the carpenter's mind. And in this way the sacraments of the New Law cause grace, for they are instituted by God to be used for the giving of grace. So Augustine says *(Against Faustus,* xix): "All these things [e.g., pertaining to the

sacraments] are done and pass away, but the power [i.e., of God], which acts by them, remains forever." Now, strictly speaking, that is an instrument by which someone acts; so it is written (Tit. 3: 5): "He saved us by the laver of regeneration."

Special Sacramental Grace *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 62, a.

2, c

. . . Grace, in itself, perfects the soul's essence, since it is a certain participated likeness of the divine nature. And just as the soul's powers result from its essence, so certain perfections of these powers result from grace—namely, virtues and gifts perfecting the powers in relation to their acts. Now, the sacraments are directed to special effects needed for Christian life. Thus, Baptism is directed to a certain spiritual rebirth, whereby man dies to vice and becomes a member of Christ, and this effect is a special addition to the actions of the soul's powers; and it is the same with the other sacraments. Therefore, just as the virtues and gifts give in addition to what is generally called grace a certain special perfection directed to the powers' proper actions, so does sacramental grace give something in addition to the grace of the virtues and gifts.

Sacraments Bring Virtue of *Summa* Theologian III, q. 62, a.

Passion 5, c

Those who maintain that the sacraments cause grace only by a certain coincidence deny that sacaments have a power sacramentally effective, maintaining that the divine power aids the sacraments and produces their effect. But if we hold that a sacrament is an instrumental cause of grace, we must admit in the sacraments a certain instrumental power of achieving the sacramental effects. Now, this power is proportionate with the instrument, and so it is related to the complete and perfect power of anything as the instrument to the principal agent. For an instrument . . . does not act unless moved by the principal agent, which acts of itself. And so the principal agent's power exists in nature completely and perfectly; but the instrumental power has a being that goes from one thing into another, and is incomplete, just as motion is an imperfect act passing from agent to patient.

. . . Christ delivered us from our sins chiefly by his passion, not only by way of efficiency and merit but also by way of satisfaction. By his passion also he originated the rites of the Christian religion by offering "himself—an oblation and a sacrifice to God" (Ep. 5: 2). So it is clear that the sacraments of the

Church receive their power especially from Christ's passion, and the virtue of this is somehow united to us when we receive the sacraments. In sign of this there flowed from the side of Christ hanging upon the cross water and blood, the former belonging to Baptism, the latter to the Eucharist—and these are the leading sacraments.

Sacramental Character *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 63, a. 3,c

. . . Each of the faithful is destined to receive or to give to others realities having to do with God's worship. And this, strictly speaking, is the purpose of the sacramental character. Now, the entire rite of the Christian religion is drawn from Christ's priesthood. Therefore, it is evident that the sacramental character is specially the character of Christ, to whose character the faithful are likened through the sacramental characters, which are not other than certain participations of Christ's priesthood poured out from Christ himself.

Character Present in Powers *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 63, a. 4,c

A character is a kind of seal by which the soul is marked, enabling it to give or receive realities having to do with divine worship. Now, divine worship comprises certain actions, and the soul's powers are properly directed to actions, just as the essence is directed to existence. So a character inheres in the soul's power, not in its essence.

Priesthood of People *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 63, a. 5,c

In a sacramental character Christ's faithful participate in his priesthood; for as Christ has the full power of a spiritual priesthood, so his faithful are conformed to him by participating a certain spiritual power referring to the sacraments and to realities related to divine worship. Thus, it is unsuitable for God to have a character, but his priesthood is related to a character as a complete and perfect reality is related to some participation in it. Now, Christ's priesthood is eternal (Ps. 109: 4): "Thou are a priest forever according to the order of Melchisedech."

Therefore, all sanctification effected by his priesthood is perpetual, lasting as long as the sanctified reality lasts. This is evident even with inanimate things; for the consecration of a church or of an altar lasts forever unless they are destroyed. Since, then, a character resides in the intellective part of the soul... it is evident that since the intellect is perpetual and incorruptible, a character cannot be eradicated from the soul.

Conferring of Character *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 63, a.
6, c

. . . But it [the Eucharist] contains within itself Christ, in whom there is not the character but the plenitude of the priesthood.

But it is the sacrament of Order that relates to sacramental agents. Through this sacrament men are charged with giving sacraments to others, whereas the sacrament of Baptism relates to recipients, since to man it gives the power to receive the other sacraments of the Church; so it is called the *door of the sacraments.* In a sense Confirmation is also directed to the same end. . . . Thus these three sacraments—Baptism, Confirmation, and Order—imprint a character.

Christ Acts in Sacraments: *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 64, a.
Man Is Minister 1, c

There are two ways of producing an effect: first, as a principal agent, second, as an instrument. As principal agent only God produces the interior sacramental effect. ... In the second way the interior sacramental effect can be produced by man inasmuch as he acts as a minister. For a minister is of the nature of an instrument, since the action of both reaches something extrinsic, whereas the interior effect is produced through the power of the principal agent or God.

Summa *Theologiae* III, q. 64, a.
2,c

. . . The power of the sacrament is from the sacrament's institutor. Thus, since the power of the sacrament is from God alone, only God consequently can institute sacraments.

Ministers of Sacraments Act *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 64, a.
Instrumentally 5, c

The ministers of the Church act instrumentally in the sacraments, for in a sense a minister is instrumental in nature. But ... an instrument acts not through its own form but through the power of the one moving it. So that whatever form or power beyond being an instrument exists in an instrument is accidental to it: for example, that a doctor's body, the instrument of his soul where his medical art resides, is healthy or sickly; or that a pipe for the transmission of water is silver or leaden. Therefore, even when the ministers of the Church are evil, they can give the sacraments.

Intention of Church Required *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 64, a. 8,
ad. 1

An inanimate instrument has no intention with respect to the effect; but in the intention's place is the motion by which the principal agent moves it. But an animate instrument like a minister not only is moved but somehow moves himself, in that by his will he moves his bodily members to act. Therefore, it is required that he have the intention of subjecting himself to the principal agent—that is, it is necessary for him to intend to do that which Christ and the Church do.

Reason for Sacraments *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 65, a.

1,c

The sacraments of the Church were instituted for two reasons: to perfect man in those things concerned with God's worship in accord with the religion *of* Christian life, and to be a cure for the evils caused by sin. For both these reasons, seven sacraments are suitable. . . .

The number of the sacraments can be gleaned also from their institution as a remedy against the evil caused by sin. For Baptism is intended to remedy the absence of spiritual life; Confirmation remedies the weakness of the recently born soul; the Eucharist remedies the soul's tendency to sin; Penance remedies the actual sin committed after Baptism; Sacrament of the Sick remedies the remainders of sins —of those sins not altogether removed by Penance, whether on account of negligence or ignorance; Order remedies divisions in the community; Matrimony remedies concupiscence in the individual and the numerical deficit brought about by death.

Other people see in the number of sacraments a certain harmony with virtues and evils and punishments for sin. They assert that Baptism harmonizes with faith and is directed to the cure of original sin; Sacrament of the Sick, to hope, directed against venial sin; the Eucharist, to charity, directed against the punishment of malice; Order, to prudence, directed against ignorance; Penance, to justice, directed against mortal sin; Matrimony, to temperance, directed against concupiscence; Confirmation, to fortitude, directed against weakness.

Eucharist *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 65, a.

3,c

Absolutely speaking, the sacrament of the Eucharist is the greatest of all the sacraments, as is evident in three ways. First, because it contains Christ himself substantially, while the other sacraments have a certain instrumental power that is a participation in Christ's power. . . . Now, that which is essentially such is always greater than that which is such by

participation.

Second, this becomes evident when we examine how the sacraments are related to one another, for all the other sacraments seem to be directed to this one as to their end. Clearly, the sacrament of Order is directed to the consecration of the Eucharist, and the sacrament of Baptism to the reception of the Eucharist; while man is perfected by Confirmation to remove the fear of approaching this sacrament. Penance and Sacrament of the Sick prepare man to receive the body of Christ worthily. And Matrimony, at least in its signification, affects this sacrament in that it signifies the union of Christ with the Church, and of this union the Eucharist is a figure, so that the Apostle says (Ep. 5: 32): "This is a great sacrament, but I speak of Christ and *of* the Church." . . .

Necessity of Sacraments for *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 65, a.

Salvation 4, c

Necessity of end is twofold, and we are now speaking of this. First, a thing may be so necessary that the end cannot be attained without it; thus is food necessary for human life. And this is simple necessity of end. Second, something is called necessary if the end is more suitably attained through it; in this way a horse is necessary for a journey. But this is not simple necessity of end.

In the first way, three sacraments are necessary for salvation. Two of them are necessary to the individual: Baptism, simply and absolutely; Penance, if mortal sin is committed after Baptism; whereas the sacrament of Order is necessary to the Church, because "where there is no governor the people shall fall" (Pr. 11: 14).

But in the second way, the other sacraments are necessary; for Confirmation in a sense perfects Baptism; Sacrament of the Sick perfects Penance; whereas Matrimony preserves the numbers in the Church through propagation.

6. The People of God

The Holy Spirit in God's Articles *of Faith,* Art. 8
People
The Word of God is, as we said, the Son of God almost the way the word of man is the concept of his intellect. But often man has a word that is lifeless. This occurs, for example, when he conceives what he ought to do without willing to do it or when he believes but does not practice; then his faith is called dead, as St. James shows (Jm. 2: 17). Yet the Word of God is alive: "For the word of God is living" (Heb. 4: 12). There must, therefore, be both will and love in God. So St. Augustine declares: "The Word of God we intend to speak is knowledge with love" *(On the Trinity* IX, 10). Now, just as the Word of God is the Son of God, so God's love is the Holy Spirit. And so anyone loving God possesses the Holy Spirit: "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, who is given to us" (Rm. 5: 5). . . .
The Holy Spirit brings us many gifts.

1. He releases us from our sins. This is because what anyone has made, he must remake. Now, the soul is made through the Holy Spirit, inasmuch as through him God has made all things; for by loving his goodness, God created everything: "Thou lovest all things that are, and hatest none of the things that thou hast made" (Wis. 11: 25). Hence, Dionysius says: "Divine love did not allow him to be without offspring" (On *the Divine Names* IV). Consequently, the hearts of men that were destroyed by sin had to be renewed through the Holy Spirit: "Thou shalt send forth thy Spirit, and they shall be created; and thou shalt renew the face of the earth" (Ps. 103: 30). Nor should we be surprised that the Spirit releases from sin, because all sins are removed through love: "Many sins are forgiven her, because she hath loved much" (Lk. 7: 47). "Charity covereth all sins" (Pr. 10: 12). And likewise: "Charity covereth a multitude of sins" (I Pt. 4: 8).

2. The Holy Spirit enlightens the mind because whatever we know is known through the Holy Spirit: "But the Paraclete, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in my name, he will teach you all things and bring all things to your mind, whatsoever I shall have said to you" (Jn. 14: 26). Also: "His unction teacheth you all things" (II Jn. 2: 27).

3. He aids us and to some extent insists that we keep the commandments. Unless one loves God, he cannot keep the commandments: "If anyone love me, he will keep my word" (Jn. 14: 23). Hence, the Holy

Spirit makes us love God: "And I give you a new heart and put a new spirit within you; and I will take away the heart of stone from within you and give you a heart of flesh. And I will put my Spirit in the midst of you; and I will cause you to walk in my commandments and to keep my judgments and do them" (Ezech. 36: 26-27).

4. He confirms the hope for eternal life in us since he is the pledge of our destiny: "You were signed with the Holy Spirit of promise, who is the pledge of our inheritance" (Ep. 1: 13). He is, so to speak, the guarantee of our eternal life. This is because eternal life is man's insofar as he becomes the son of God, which is accomplished by his being made like unto Christ, and this follows from his having the Spirit of Christ, who is the Holy Spirit: "For you have not received the spirit of bondage again in fear; but you have received the spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: *Abba* (Father). For the Spirit himself giveth testimony to our spirit that we are the sons of God" (Rm. 8: 15). And likewise: "Because you are sons, God hath sent the Spirit of his Son into your hearts, crying: *Abba* (Father)" (Gal. 4: 6).

5. In our doubt he counsels us, teaching us what is the will of God: "He that hath an ear, let him hear what the Spirit saith to the churches" (Rv. 2: 7). Also: "I may hear him as a master" (Is. 1: 4).

The Apostles' Creed: *Articles of Faith*, Art. 10

Communion of Saints

The Tenth Article: "The communion of saints, the forgiveness of sins."

As in our natural body one member's action works for the good of the whole body, so likewise with a spiritual body like the Church. Because all the believers are one body, the good of one member is communicated to another: "And all members one of another" (Rm. 12: 5). Hence, that there is a common sharing of good in the Church is among the articles of faith handed down by the Apostles. This is expressed by the words, "the communion of saints." Among the Church's many members, the principal member is Christ, since he is the head: "He hath made him head over all the Church, which is his body" (Ep. 1: 22). As the power of the head is communicated to all the members, so Christ communicates his good.

This communication occurs through the sacraments of the Church, wherein the merits of Christ's passion are active for the giving of grace unto the remission of sins. These sacraments of the Church are seven in number. . . .

We should also realize that not only the power of the passion of Christ is communicated to us, but

likewise the merits *of* his life; and, in addition, all the good that all the saints have done is communicated to all in the state of grace, since all are one: "I am a partaker of all them that fear thee" (Ps. 118: 63).

Therefore, whoever lives in charity participates in all the good that is done in the whole world; but since one man can certainly make satisfaction for another, he for whom some good work is done benefits in a special way.

There is, then, a twofold benefit from this communion. One is that Christ's merits are communicated to all, while the other is that each one's good is communicated to another. Since those who are excommunicated are cut off from the Church, they forfeit their share of all the good that is done, and this is a far greater loss than that of all material things. . . .

Authority in the Church *Summa contra Gentiles* IV, 76

Now, all these orders are conferred with a sacrament . . . , and the Church's sacraments necessitate some ministers to confer them. So in the Church there must exist a higher power with a superior ministry conferring the sacrament of Order. Such is the episcopal power which, whereas it does not extend beyond the priest's power to consecrate the body of Christ, does extend beyond the priest's power in whatever concerns believers. For the priestly power itself comes from the episcopal power, and anything very specially difficult to be done on behalf of believers is reserved to the bishops; and by their authority priests are even authorized to do their own tasks. Thus, even in these tasks, priests use things consecrated by bishops; so, in the Eucharistic consecration, they use a chalice, an altar, and a pall consecrated by a bishop. It is, therefore, evident that part of the dignity of the bishops is their chief direction of the believers.

But it is likewise evident that, although people are situated in various dioceses and states, nevertheless, inasmuch as the Church is one, so must the Christian people be one. So that inasmuch as every special

Church congregation requires one bishop as head of that Church, so the whole Christian people should have one who is head of the whole Church.

Moreover, the Church's unity requires agreement on the faith among all believers. But questions often arise about matters of faith. A difference in decrees would divide the Church unless kept in unity through the promulgation of one. So the unity of the Church requires one to be the head of the whole Church. In these needs Christ has clearly not forsaken the Church he loved and for whom he shed his blood, since even of the synagogue the Lord said: "What is there that I ought to do more to my vineyard that I have not done to it?" (Is. 5: 4). We should not, therefore, doubt that there is one who is the head of the whole Church, and this by Christ's command.

7. The Commandments

The Fourth Commandment *Sermon on the Two Commandments of Charity and the Ten Commandments of the Law*

"Honor thy father and thy mother, that thou mayest be long-lived upon the land that the Lord thy God will give thee" (Exod. 20: 12; Deut. 5: 16).

Man's perfection consists in loving God and neighbor. Now, the three Commandments written upon the first tablet refer to the love of God; with respect to the love of neighbor there were seven Commandments on the second tablet. But we should "love, not in word nor in speech, but in action and in truth" (I Jn. 3: 18). To love in this way a man must do two things: avoid evil and do good.

Some Commandments prescribe good acts, whereas others forbid evil acts. And we should realize that it is within our power to avoid evil, but we cannot do good to everyone. So St. Augustine tells us that we should love all, although we are not obliged to do good to all. But among those to whom we are obliged to do good are those in any way united to us. Hence, "if any man have not care of his own and especially of those of his house, he hath denied the faith" (I Tm. 5: 8). Now, there are no closer relatives to us than our father and mother. "We ought to love God first," states St. Ambrose, "then our father and mother." So God has given us the Commandment: "Honor thy father and thy mother."

The philosopher also cites another reason for honoring parents, inasmuch as we can make no equal return to our parents for the great benefits they have given us; and so an offended parent has the right to

send away his son, but the son has no such right.

Parents, in fact, give their children three things. First, they brought them into existence: "Honor thy father, and forget not the groanings of thy mother; remember that thou hadst not been born but through them" (Ecclus. 7: 29). Second, they provide them with food and the support needed for life. For a child comes into the world naked, as Job says (1: 21), but he is provided for by his parents. The third is education: "We have had fathers of our flesh for instructors" (Heb. 12: 9). "Hast thou children? Educate them" (Ecclus. 7: 25).

Hence, parents should not delay to educate their children, because "A young man according to his way, even when he is old, will not depart from it" (Pr. 22: 6). And again: "It is good for a man when he hath borne the yoke from his youth" (Lm. 3: 27). Now, the instruction given by Tobias to his son was: "Fear the Lord and resist sin." This is certainly contrary to those parents who condone their children's bad behavior. And so children receive from their parents birth, nourishment, and instruction.

Now, because we are indebted to our parents for our birth, we should honor them above every superior from whom we receive only temporal things. "He that feareth the Lord honoreth his parents, and will serve them as his masters that brought him into the world. Honor thy father in work and word and all patience, that a blessing may come upon thee from him" (Ecclus. 3: 10). And in so doing, you will honor yourself, since "The glory of a man is from honor of his father, and a father without honor is the disgrace of his son" (Ecclus. 3: 13).

Moreover, because in our childhood we receive food from our parents, in their old age we should support them. "Son, support the old age of thy father, and grieve him not in his life. And if his understanding fail, have patience with him; and despise him not when thou art in thy strength. ... Of what an evil fame is he who forsaketh his father! And he is cursed of God who angereth his mother" (Ecclus. 3: 14, 15, 18). For the humiliation of those who act otherwise, Cassiodorus tells how young storks whose parents have lost their feathers by the onslaught of old age and cannot find suitable food, make the parent storks comfortable with their own feathers, bringing them food for their tired bodies. "And so by this affectionate exchange the young ones repay their parents for what they received when young" (Epist.

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Because our parents have educated us, we should obey them. "Children, obey your parents in all things"

(Col. 3: 20). This obviously excludes those things opposed to God. In such cases the only loyalty is to be cruel, says St. Jerome: "If any man hate not his father and mother ... he cannot be my disciple" (Lk. 14: 26). This is really saying that in the truest sense God is our Father: "Is not he thy father who hath possessed thee, and hath made thee and created thee?" (Dt. 32: 6).

"Honor thy father and thy mother." Only this Commandment among them all has the added words: "that thou mayest be long-lived upon the land." This is because it is a natural obligation, and so it could be thought that honoring parents went unrewarded.

The first reward is grace for the present life and glory in the future life, and these, certainly, are greatly to be desired: "Honor thy father . . . that a blessing may come upon thee from God, and his blessing may remain in the latter end" (Ecclus. 3: 9). Exactly the opposite happens to those who dishonor their parents; in fact, they are cursed in the law by God (Dt. 27: 16). It is likewise written: "He that is unjust in that which is little is also unjust in that which is greater" (Lk. 16: 10). But our natural life is as nothing when compared with the life of grace. Hence, if you do not admit the blessing of the natural life for which you are indebted to your parents, then you are unworthy of what is greater—the life of grace—and all the more unworthy of the life of glory, the greatest of all blessings.

The second reward is a long life: "That thou mayest be long-lived upon the land." For "he that honoreth his father shall enjoy a long life" (Ecclus. 3: 7). Now, a long life is a full life, and it is not measured by time but by action, as the Philosopher notes. It is the life of virtue that is full; thus, a man who is virtuous and holy enjoys a long life even if he dies young in respect to body: "Being perfect in a short space, he fulfilled a long time; for his soul pleased God" (Wi. 4: 23). So a good merchant is one who does in one day as much business as another would do in a year. And remember that it sometimes happens that a long life may lead to spiritual as well as bodily death, as with Judas. Hence, a long life for the body is the reward for keeping this Commandment. But the contrary, i.e., death, is the fate of those who dishonor parents. From them we receive life, and just as soldiers owe loyalty to the king and lose their rights by treachery, so likewise those who dishonor their parents deserve to forfeit their lives: "The eye that mocketh at his father and that despiseth the labor of his mother in bearing him, let the ravens pick it out, and the young eagles eat it" (Pr. 30: 17). Here "the ravens" refer to officials

of kings and princes, who are the "young eagles." But even if such are not bodily punished, they cannot escape death in respect to the soul. A father, then, should not give too much power to his children: "Give not to son or wife, brother or friend, power over thee while thou livest; and give not thy estate to another, lest thou repent" (Ecclus. 33: 20).

The third reward is to have in turn grateful and pleasing children. For a father naturally cherishes his children, but the reverse is not always so. "He that honoreth his father shall have joy in his own children" (Ecclus. 3: 6). Again: "With what measure you mete, it shall be measured to you again" (Mt. 7: 2).

The fourth reward is a good reputation: "For the glory of a man is from the honor of his father" (Ecclus. 3: 13). And again: "Of what an evil fame is he that forsaketh his father?" (Ecclus. 3: 18).

The fifth reward is wealth: "The father's blessing establisheth the houses of his children, but the mother's curse rooteth up the foundation" (Ecclus. 3: 11).

Summary of the Ten Commandments

The Ten Commandments

Such are the ten precepts to which Our Lord referred when saying: "If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments" (Mt. 19: 17). The two main principles of all the Commandments are love of God and love of neighbor. A man who loves God must do three things:

1. He must have no other God. And to assist this we have the command: "Thou shalt not have strange gods."
2. He must totally honor God. And thus it is commanded: "Thou shalt not take the name of God in vain."
3. He must freely rest in God. Hence: "Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath day."

But one must first of all love one's neighbor in order to love God worthily. Hence: "Honor thy father and thy mother." Then one must avoid harming one's neighbor by act. "Thou shalt not kill" refers to our neighbor's person; "Thou shalt not commit adultery" refers to the person united in marriage to our neighbor; "Thou shalt not steal" refers to our neighbor's external goods. We must also avoid injuring our neighbor by word, "Thou shalt not bear false witness," and by thought, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's goods" and "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife."

of kings and princes, who are the "young eagles." But even if such are not bodily punished, they cannot escape death in respect to the soul. A father, then, should not give too much power to his children: "Give not to son or wife, brother or friend, power over thee while thou livest; and give not thy estate to another, lest thou repent" (Ecclus. 33: 20).

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Summary of the Ten Commandments

The Ten Commandments

Such are the ten precepts to which Our Lord referred when saying: "If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments" (Mt. 19: 17). The two main principles of all the Commandments are love of God and love of neighbor. A man who loves God must do three things:

1. He must have no other God. And to assist this we have the command: "Thou shalt not have strange gods."
2. He must totally honor God. And thus it is commanded: "Thou shalt not take the name of God in vain."
3. He must freely rest in God. Hence: "Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath day."

But one must first of all love one's neighbor in order to love God worthily. Hence: "Honor thy father and thy mother." Then one must avoid harming one's neighbor by act. "Thou shalt not kill" refers to our neighbor's person; "Thou shalt not commit adultery" refers to the person united in marriage to our neighbor; "Thou shalt not steal" refers to our neighbor's external goods. We must also avoid injuring our neighbor by word, "Thou shalt not bear false witness," and by thought, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's goods" and "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife."

THE THOMIST

A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

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THE AUTHORITY OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

RECENTLY Pope Pius XII, in the Encyclical *Humani Generis* of August 12, 1950 and in an Allocution delivered on September 17 of the same year and directed to those at the Third International Thomistic Congress held in Rome, seriously and repeatedly warned Catholic theologians and philosophers to abandon the vagaries of novel theology and philosophy infected with materialism, historicism, immanentism and existentialism. They were to direct their attention to the safe and sound doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas in which salvation and truth are found.

Pius X had done the same when Modernism became strong, especially in the Encyclical *Pascendi dominici gregis* of September 8, 1907. Likewise, Leo XIII, in an effort to turn the human mind from the errors of pantheism, rationalism, ontologism and extreme traditionalism, against which the Vatican Council had taken action, considered that there was no better

1. *Those who openly condemn or minimize the philosophical and theological doctrine of Thomas, and attempt to impugn it and to hold it up to derision.* As Pius XII says:

> How deplorable it is that this philosophy accepted and honored by the Church is scorned by some and shamefully rejected as being outdated in form and rationalistic in its method of thought. They say that this philosophy of ours upholds the perverse notion that there is an absolutely true metaphysic. And, on the contrary, they hold that reality, especially transcendent reality, cannot better be expressed than by disparate teachings which mutually complete each other, although in a way mutually opposed. So they concede that our traditional philosophy with its clear exposition and solution of questions, its accurate definition of terms, and its clear-cut distinctions, can indeed be useful as a preparation for scholastic theology, though it is more suited to the mentality of the Middle Ages. Yet it does not offer a method of philosophy suited to the needs of modern culture.
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> Then, they allege that our perennial philosophy is only a philosophy of immutable essences, whereas the modern mind must look to the 'existence' of things, and to life, which is ever in flux. While scorning our philosophy they praise others, ancient and modern, oriental and occidental, by which they seem to imply that any philosophy or theory, graced with a few corrections or additions if need be, can be reconciled with Catholic dogma. No Catholic can doubt that this is entirely false, especially where there is question of those fictitious theories they call immanentism, idealism, historic or dialectical materialism, and even existentialism, whether atheistic or simply the type that denies the validity of reason in metaphysics.
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> Finally, they reproach the philosophy taught in our schools for regarding only the intellect in the process of cognition and neglecting the function of the will and the emotions. This is simply not true. Christian philosophy has never denied the usefulness and efficacy of good dispositions of soul for perceiving and embracing fully moral and religious truths. In fact, it has always taught the lack of such dispositions can be the reason why the intellect, influenced by the passions and evil inclinations, is so darkened that it cannot see clearly. Indeed, St. Thomas holds that the intellect can in some way perceive higher goods of the moral order, whether natural or supernatural in that it experiences in the soul a certain 'connaturality' with these goods whether this be natural

or the result of grace;[277] and it is clear how much even this somewhat obscure knowledge can help reason in its investigations.

But it is one thing to recognize the power of the dispositions of the will in helping reason to reach a more certain and solid knowledge of moral truths; it is quite another to contend, as these innovators do, that the appetitive and affective faculties have a certain power of understanding, and that man, since he cannot decide with certainty based on reason itself what is true and therefore to be embraced, turns to his will, by which he freely chooses among opposite opinions.

It is not at all surprising that these new opinions constitute a dangerous influence for the two philosophical sciences which are by nature closely connected with the doctrine of the faith, namely theodicy and ethics. They maintain that the function of these sciences is not to prove with certitude anything about God or any other transcendental being, but rather to show that what faith teaches about a personal God and His precepts is perfectly consistent with the necessities of life and therefore are to be embraced by all to avoid despair and to attain eternal salvation. All of these opinions are openly contrary to documents of Our predecessors Leo XIII and Pius X, and cannot be reconciled with the decrees of the Vatican Council.

It would be unnecessary to deplore these aberrations from the truth, if all, even in philosophy, directed their attention with proper reverence to the Teaching Authority of the Church. It is the mission of the Church, by divine institution, not only to safeguard and interpret the deposit of divinely revealed truth but also to watch over the philosophical sciences in order to prevent Catholic dogma from being harmed because of erroneous opinions.[278]

2. *They err by defect and disobey the commands of the Church, who, under any pretext whatever, withdraw from the doctrine of Thomas, or do not study him with proper sincerity, but rather spend their time in looking for his defects, if there are any, and not in attempting to discover his genuine doctrine and to explain it.* As Leo XIII said: "to depart unadvisedly and rashly from the wisdom of the Angelic Doctor is not only against Our will, but is *fraught with danger* as well."[279] Pius X

[277] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 1, a. 4, ad 3; q. 45, a. 2.
[278] *Humani Generis*, *loc. cit.*, 573-575.
[279] Letter to the Minister General O. F. M., *loc. cit.*

added, "it is true even today that when someone parts company with Thomas, he seems to be ultimately aiming at *parting company with the Church*."[280]

Pius XI advised Professors:

> To be persuaded that then only will they satisfactorily discharge their duty and Our expectation when, after long and diligent perusal of his writings, they begin to feel an intense devotion for the Doctor Aquinas and by their exposition of him succeed in inspiring their pupils with like fervor and train them to kindle a similar zeal in others.[281]

Pius XII concludes:

> Wherefore, beloved sons, *fill your souls full with love and zeal for St. Thomas: strive with all your powers to perceive his clear doctrine with your minds; freely embrace whatever has a clear connection with it and is supposed by a sound reason in his doctrine.*[282]

St. Augustine wisely set up this law for understanding and interpreting the works of any author—first, that the authors themselves should at least not be despised and, secondly, that they should be loved. "Who ever thought that the obscure and hidden books of Aristotle ought to be interpreted by one of his enemies?"[283] A man who wrote his works with such labor and care as St. Thomas is especially entitled to the same degree of diligence in one who is studying or explaining him. Otherwise we can suitably apply to him that saying of St. Augustine, "If you believe that I am in error, carefully consider again what was said, lest perhaps you fall into error."[284]

3. *They also err by defect who admit the great and powerful authority of St. Thomas for other times, though not for our times which present new problems. According to them the historian of philosophy and theology should attribute a great*

[280] Letter to Fr. Th. Pègues, *loc. cit.*
[281] *Studiorum ducem*, *loc. cit.*, 323.
[282] Discourse to the clerical students at Rome, *loc. cit.*
[283] *De utilitate credendi*, cap. 6, no. 18, *ML* 42, 74.
[284] *De dono perseverantiae*, cap. 21, no. 68, *ML* 45, 1031.

position to him in noting the doctrines of the Middle Ages, but the modern philosopher and theologian should recognize only his archaeological value.

On the contrary Leo XIII asserted:

This is a great accomplishment, that his doctrine is founded upon and provided with principles enjoying the widest possible extension, *is fitted to the needs* not alone of one particular age but *of all ages*, and is especially accommodated to the destruction of errors which perpetually arise.[255]

Benedict XV wrote:

The Apostolic See's famous praises of Thomas Aquinas allow no Catholic to doubt that he was divinely raised up *that the Church might have a Teacher whose doctrine should be followed for all time*;[256] a Teacher indeed and a Doctor who never grows old.[257]

St. Thomas, in the words of Pius XII, "is *always* a most skilful guide and a *never-failing light*"; the structure he has erected "is living perpetually, above and beyond all time, and is even now a strong and powerful bulwark to protect the deposit of Catholic faith."[258] Therefore, it is never lawful "to overthrow [even one of his philosophical doctrines] or contaminate it with false principles, or regard it as a great, but obsolete relic."[259]

4. *They err by defect who acknowledge and praise the supreme authority of St. Thomas by words, and state that it is valid even in our time, but deny and disparage his authority by deeds, insofar as they consider it to be merely symbolic, as if Thomas was not a singular individual person but represented all scholastic writers indifferently. And so that highest doctrinal authority would affect scholastic doctrine indistinctly, and not especially the doctrine of Thomas himself, though it would*

[255] *Cum hoc sit*, *loc. cit.*, 112.
[256] Letter to Fr. Pègues, *loc. cit.*, cf. note 119.
[257] Letter of Pius X to Fr. Hugon O.P., July 16, 1913, *AAS* 5 (1913), 187.
[258] Allocution to the Dominican General Chapter, *loc. cit.*
[259] *Humani generis*, *loc. cit.*, 572.

be named after Thomas since he was the most outstanding of the scholastics; or even if they accept him really and as himself, they equate his authority with that of other ecclesiastical writers in such a way that Thomas' authority and that of these others is practically the same. So there is no special obligation to follow Aquinas as guide, but rather every kind of liberty is given in a sort of eclectic manner to embrace several kinds of doctrine at once, even including contrary doctrines.

Indeed, as they say, the doctrine of St. Thomas is held up by the Roman Pontiffs as safe and sound; yet this does not prevent the doctrine of other writers, though inconsistent with and contrary to Aquinas' teaching from being called safe and sound. Indeed, it may be safer and sounder! It is merely scholastic doctrine that is being approved and commanded by the Church when she extolls Aquinas, rather than Thomistic doctrine.

Such people have sadly deceived themselves. The documents of the Church clearly and positively exclude opinions of this kind. It is sufficient to refer to only a few among a great number.

Leo XIII said:

When We declare that one should receive with a willing and glad mind whatever has been wisely said, or whatever is profitable no matter by whom it is discovered or thought out, We exhort all of you, Venerable Brethren, with the greatest earnestness for the safety and glory of the Catholic faith, for the good of society, and for the increase of all knowledge, to restore the golden Wisdom of St. Thomas and to spread it as widely as possible.

We said the wisdom of St. Thomas, for it is not by any reason in Our mind to set before this age, as a standard, those things which may have been inquired into by scholastic doctors with too great subtlety or taught with too little consideration, not agreeing with the investigations of a later age; or, lastly, anything that is not probable. Let these teachers carefully chosen by you do their best to instill the doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas into the minds of their hearers; and let them point out clearly its solidity and excellence above all other teaching.[260]

[260] *Aeterni Patris*, *loc. cit.*, 72, 71.

DECREE ON PRIESTLY TRAINING
OPTATAM TOTIUS
PROCLAIMED BY HIS HOLINESS
POPE PAUL VI
ON OCTOBER 28, 1965

15. The philosophical disciplines are to be taught in such a way that the students are first of all led to acquire a solid and coherent knowledge of man, the world, and of God, relying on a philosophical patrimony which is perennially valid and taking into account the philosophical investigations of later ages. This is especially true of those investigations which exercise a greater influence in their own nations. Account should also be taken of the more recent progress of the sciences. The net result should be that the students, correctly understanding the characteristics of the contemporary mind, will be duly prepared for dialogue with men of their time.

The history of philosophy should be so taught that the students, while reaching the ultimate principles of the various systems, will hold on to what is proven to be true therein and will be able to detect the roots of errors and to refute them.

In the very manner of teaching there should be stirred up in the students a love of rigorously searching for the truth and of maintaining and demonstrating it, together with an honest recognition of the limits of human knowledge. Attention must be carefully drawn to the necessary connection between philosophy and the true problems of life, as well as the questions which preoccupy the minds of the students. Likewise students should be helped to perceive the links between the subject-matter of philosophy and the mysteries of salvation which are considered in theology under the higher light of faith.

GRAVISSIMUM EDUCATIONIS
Declaration on Christian Education
Second Vatican Council

DECLARATION ON CHRISTIAN EDUCATION
GRAVISSIMUM EDUCATIONIS
PROCLAIMED BY
POPE PAUL VI
ON OCTOBER 28, 1965

10. Catholic Colleges and Universities

The Church is concerned also with schools of a higher level, especially colleges and universities. In those schools dependent on her she intends that by their very constitution individual subjects be pursued according to their own principles, method, and liberty of scientific inquiry, in such a way that an ever deeper understanding in these fields may be obtained and that, as questions that are new and current are raised and investigations carefully made according to the example of the doctors of the Church and especially of St. Thomas Aquinas,(31) there may be a deeper realization of the harmony of faith and science. Thus there is accomplished a public, enduring and pervasive influence of the Christian mind in the furtherance of culture and the students of these institutions are molded into men truly outstanding in their training, ready to undertake weighty responsibilities in society and witness to the faith in the world.(32)

In Catholic universities where there is no faculty of sacred theology there should be established an institute or chair of sacred theology in which there should be lectures suited to lay students. Since science advances by means of the investigations peculiar to higher scientific studies, special attention should be given in Catholic universities and colleges to institutes that serve primarily the development of scientific research.

The sacred synod heartily recommends that Catholic colleges and universities be conveniently located in different parts of the world, but in such a way that they are outstanding not for their numbers but for their pursuit of knowledge. Matriculation should be readily available to students of real promise, even though they be of slender means, especially to students from the newly emerging nations.

Since the destiny of society and of the Church itself is intimately linked with the progress of young people pursuing higher studies,(33) the pastors of the

Church are to expend their energies not only on the spiritual life of students who attend Catholic universities, but, solicitous for the spiritual formation of all their children, they must see to it, after consultations between bishops, that even at universities that are not Catholic there should be associations and university centers under Catholic auspices in which priests, religious and laity, carefully selected and prepared, should give abiding spiritual and intellectual assistance to the youth of the university. Whether in Catholic universities or others, young people of greater ability who seem suited for teaching or research should be specially helped and encouraged to undertake a teaching career.

Note to Novices: Read especially bolded text

ENCYCLICAL
HUMANI GENERIS
OF THE HOLY FATHER
PIUS XII
TO OUR VENERABLE BRETHREN,
PATRIARCHS, PRIMATES,
ARCHBISHOPS, BISHIOPS,
AND OTHER LOCAL ORDINARIES
ENJOYING PEACE AND COMMUNION
WITH THE HOLY SEE
CONCERNING SOME FALSE OPINIONS
THREATENING TO UNDERMINE
THE FOUNDATIONS
OF CATHOLIC DOCTRINE

Venerable Brethren,
Greetings and Apostolic Benediction

Disagreement and error among men on moral and religious matters have always been a cause of profound sorrow to all good men, but above all to the true and loyal sons of the Church, especially today, when we see the principles of Christian culture being attacked on all sides.

2. It is not surprising that such discord and error should always have existed outside the fold of Christ. For though, absolutely speaking, human reason by its own natural force and light can arrive at a true and certain knowledge of the one personal God, Who by His providence watches over and governs the world, and also of the natural law, which the Creator has written in our hearts, still there are not a few obstacles to prevent reason from making efficient and fruitful use of its natural ability. The truths that have to do with God and the relations between God and men, completely surpass the sensible order and demand self-surrender and self-abnegation in order to be put into practice and to influence practical life. Now the human intellect, in gaining the knowledge of such truths is hampered both by the activity of the senses and the imagination, and by evil passions arising from original sin. Hence men easily persuade themselves in such matters that what they do not wish to believe is false or at least doubtful.

3. It is for this reason that divine revelation must be considered morally necessary so that those religious and moral truths which are not of their nature beyond the reach of reason in the present condition of the human race, may be known by all mean readily with a firm certainty and with freedom from all error.[1]

4. Furthermore the human intelligence sometimes experiences difficulties in forming a

judgment about the credibility of the Catholic faith, notwithstanding the many wonderful external signs God has given, which are sufficient to prove with certitude by the natural light of reason alone the divine origin of the Christian religion. For man can, whether from prejudice or passion or bad faith, refuse and resist not only the evidence of the external proofs that are available, but also the impulses of actual grace.

5. If anyone examines the state of affairs outside the Christian fold, he will easily discover the principle trends that not a few learned men are following. Some imprudently and indiscreetly hold that evolution, which has not been fully proved even in the domain of natural sciences, explains the origin of all things, and audaciously support the monistic and pantheistic opinion that the world is in continual evolution. Communists gladly subscribe to this opinion so that, when the souls of men have been deprived of every idea of a personal God, they may the more efficaciously defend and propagate their dialectical materialism.

6. Such fictitious tenets of evolution which repudiate all that is absolute, firm and immutable, have paved the way for the new erroneous philosophy which, rivaling idealism, immanentism and pragmatism, has assumed the name of existentialism, since it concerns itself only with existence of individual things and neglects all consideration of their immutable essences.

7. There is also a certain historicism, which attributing value only to the events of man's life, overthrows the foundation of all truth and absolute law, both on the level of philosophical speculations and especially to Christian dogmas.

8. In all this confusion of opinion it is some consolation to Us to see former adherents of rationalism today frequently desiring to return to the fountain of divinely communicated truth, and to acknowledge and profess the word of God as contained in Sacred Scripture as the foundation of religious teaching. But at the same time it is a matter of regret that not a few of these, the more firmly they accept the word of God, so much the more do they diminish the value of human reason, and the more they exalt the authority of God the Revealer, the more severely do they spurn the teaching office of the Church, which has been instituted by Christ, Our Lord, to preserve and interpret divine revelation. This attitude is not only plainly at variance with Holy Scripture, but is shown to be false by experience also. For often those who disagree with the true Church complain openly of their disagreement in matters of dogma and thus unwillingly bear witness to the necessity of a living Teaching Authority.

9. Now Catholic theologians and philosophers, whose grave duty it is to defend natural and supernatural truth and instill it in the hearts of men, cannot afford to ignore or neglect these more or less erroneous opinions. Rather they must come to understand these same theories well, both because diseases are not properly treated unless they are rightly diagnosed, and because sometimes even in these false theories a certain amount of truth is contained, and, finally, because these theories provoke more subtle discussion and evaluation of philosophical and theological truths.

10. If philosophers and theologians strive only to derive such profit from the careful examination of these doctrines, there would be no reason for any intervention by the Teaching

Authority of the Church. However, although We know that Catholic teachers generally avoid these errors, it is apparent, however, that some today, as in apostolic times, desirous of novelty, and fearing to be considered ignorant of recent scientific findings, try to withdraw themselves from the sacred Teaching Authority and are accordingly in danger of gradually departing from revealed truth and of drawing others along with them into error.

11. Another danger is perceived which is all the more serious because it is more concealed beneath the mask of virtue. There are many who, deploring disagreement among men and intellectual confusion, through an imprudent zeal for souls, are urged by a great and ardent desire to do away with the barrier that divides good and honest men; these advocate an "eirenism" according to which, by setting aside the questions which divide men, they aim not only at joining forces to repel the attacks of atheism, but also at reconciling things opposed to one another in the field of dogma. And as in former times some questioned whether the traditional apologetics of the Church did not constitute an obstacle rather than a help to the winning of souls for Christ, so today some are presumptive enough to question seriously whether theology and theological methods, such as with the approval of ecclesiastical authority are found in our schools, should not only be perfected, but also completely reformed, in order to promote the more efficacious propagation of the kingdom of Christ everywhere throughout the world among men of every culture and religious opinion.

12. Now if these only aimed at adapting ecclesiastical teaching and methods to modern conditions and requirements, through the introduction of some new explanations, there would be scarcely any reason for alarm. But some through enthusiasm for an imprudent "eirenism" seem to consider as an obstacle to the restoration of fraternal union, things founded on the laws and principles given by Christ and likewise on institutions founded by Him, or which are the defense and support of the integrity of the faith, and the removal of which would bring about the union of all, but only to their destruction.

13. These new opinions, whether they originate from a reprehensible desire of novelty or from a laudable motive, are not always advanced in the same degree, with equal clarity nor in the same terms, nor always with unanimous agreement of their authors. Theories that today are put forward rather covertly by some, not without cautions and distinctions, tomorrow are openly and without moderation proclaimed by others more audacious, causing scandal to many, especially among the young clergy and to the detriment of ecclesiastical authority. Though they are usually more cautious in their published works, they express themselves more openly in their writings intended for private circulation and in conferences and lectures. Moreover, these opinions are disseminated not only among members of the clergy and in seminaries and religious institutions, but also among the laity, and especially among those who are engaged in teaching youth.

14. In theology some want to reduce to a minimum the meaning of dogmas; and to free dogma itself from terminology long established in the Church and from philosophical concepts held by Catholic teachers, to bring about a return in the explanation of Catholic doctrine to the way of speaking used in Holy Scripture and by the Fathers of the Church. They cherish the hope that when dogma is stripped of the elements which they hold to be extrinsic to divine revelation, it will compare advantageously with the dogmatic opinions of those who are

separated from the unity of the Church and that in this way they will gradually arrive at a mutual assimilation of Catholic dogma with the tenets of the dissidents.

15. Moreover, they assert that when Catholic doctrine has been reduced to this condition, a way will be found to satisfy modern needs, that will permit of dogma being expressed also by the concepts of modern philosophy, whether of immanentism or idealism or existentialism or any other system. Some more audacious affirm that his can and must be done, because they hold that the mysteries of faith are never expressed by truly adequate concepts but only by approximate and ever changeable notions, in which the truth is to some extent expressed, but is necessarily distorted. Wherefore they do not consider it absurd, but altogether necessary, that theology should substitute new concepts in place of the old ones in keeping with the various philosophies which in the course of time it uses as its instruments, so that it should give human expression to divine truths in various ways which are even somewhat opposed, but still equivalent, as they say. They add that the history of dogmas consists in the reporting of the various forms in which revealed truth has been clothed, forms that have succeeded one another in accordance with the different teachings and opinions that have arisen over the course of the centuries.

16. It is evident from what We have already said, that such tentatives not only lead to what they call dogmatic relativism, but that they actually contain it. The contempt of doctrine commonly taught and of the terms in which it is expressed strongly favor it. Everyone is aware that the terminology employed in the schools and even that used by the Teaching Authority of the Church itself is capable of being perfected and polished; and we know also that the Church itself has not always used the same terms in the same way. It is also manifest that the Church cannot be bound to every system of philosophy that has existed for a short space of time. Nevertheless, the things that have been composed through common effort by Catholic teachers over the course of the centuries to bring about some understanding of dogma are certainly not based on any such weak foundation. These things are based on principles and notions deduced from a true knowledge of created things. In the process of deducing, this knowledge, like a star, gave enlightenment to the human mind through the Church. Hence it is not astonishing that some of these notions have not only been used by the Oecumenical Councils, but even sanctioned by them, so that it is wrong to depart from them.

17. Hence to neglect, or to reject,or to devalue so many and such great resources which have been conceived, expressed and perfected so often by the age-old work of men endowed with no common talent and holiness, working under the vigilant supervision of the holy magisterium and with the light and leadership of the Holy Ghost in order to state the truths of the faith ever more accurately, to do this so that these things may be replaced by conjectural notions and by some formless and unstable tenets of a new philosophy, tenets which, like the flowers of the field, are in existence today and die tomorrow; this is supreme imprudence and something that would make dogma itself a reed shaken by the wind. The contempt for terms and notions habitually used by scholastic theologians leads of itself to the weakening of what they call speculative theology, a discipline which these men consider devoid of true certitude because it is based on theological reasoning.

18. Unfortunately these advocates of novelty easily pass from despising scholastic theology to

the neglect of and even contempt for the Teaching Authority of the Church itself, which gives such authoritative approval to scholastic theology. This Teaching Authority is represented by them as a hindrance to progress and an obstacle in the way of science. Some non-Catholics consider it as an unjust restraint preventing some more qualified theologians from reforming their subject. And although this sacred Office of Teacher in matters of faith and morals must be the proximate and universal criterion of truth for all theologians, since to it has been entrusted by Christ Our Lord the whole deposit of faith - Sacred Scripture and divine Tradition - to be preserved, guarded and interpreted, still the duty that is incumbent on the faithful to flee also those errors which more or less approach heresy, and accordingly "to keep also the constitutions and decrees by which such evil opinions are proscribed and forbidden by the Holy See,"[2] is sometimes as little known as if it did not exist. What is expounded in the Encyclical Letters of the Roman Pontiffs concerning the nature and constitution of the Church, is deliberately and habitually neglected by some with the idea of giving force to a certain vague notion which they profess to have found in the ancient Fathers, especially the Greeks. The Popes, they assert, do not wish to pass judgment on what is a matter of dispute among theologians, so recourse must be had to the early sources, and the recent constitutions and decrees of the Teaching Church must be explained from the writings of the ancients.

19. Although these things seem well said, still they are not free form error. It is true that Popes generally leave theologians free in those matters which are disputed in various ways by men of very high authority in this field; but history teaches that many matters that formerly were open to discussion, no longer now admit of discussion.

20. Nor must it be thought that what is expounded in Encyclical Letters does not of itself demand consent, since in writing such Letters the Popes do not exercise the supreme power of their Teaching Authority. For these matters are taught with the ordinary teaching authority, of which it is true to say: "He who heareth you, heareth me";[3] and generally what is expounded and inculcated in Encyclical Letters already for other reasons appertains to Catholic doctrine. But if the Supreme Pontiffs in their official documents purposely pass judgment on a matter up to that time under dispute, it is obvious that that matter, according to the mind and will of the Pontiffs, cannot be any longer considered a question open to discussion among theologians.

21. It is also true that theologians must always return to the sources of divine revelation: for it belongs to them to point out how the doctrine of the living Teaching Authority is to be found either explicitly or implicitly in the Scriptures and in Tradition.[4] Besides, each source of divinely revealed doctrine contains so many rich treasures of truth, that they can really never be exhausted. Hence it is that theology through the study of its sacred sources remains ever fresh; on the other hand, speculation which neglects a deeper search into the deposit of faith, proves sterile, as we know from experience. But for this reason even positive theology cannot be on a par with merely historical science. For, together with the sources of positive theology God has given to His Church a living Teaching Authority to elucidate and explain what is contained in the deposit of faith only obscurely and implicitly. This deposit of faith our Divine Redeemer has given for authentic interpretation not to each of the faithful, not even to theologians, but only to the Teaching Authority of the Church. But if the Church does exercise this function of teaching, as she often has through the centuries, either in the ordinary or in the extraordinary way, it is clear how false is a procedure which would attempt to explain what is

clear by means of what is obscure. Indeed, the very opposite procedure must be used. Hence Our Predecessor of immortal memory, Pius IX, teaching that the most noble office of theology is to show how a doctrine defined by the Church is contained in the sources of revelation, added these words, and with very good reason: "in that sense in which it has been defined by the Church."

22. To return, however, to the new opinions mentioned above, a number of things are proposed or suggested by some even against the divine authorship of Sacred Scripture. For some go so far as to pervert the sense of the Vatican Council's definition that God is the author of Holy Scripture, and they put forward again the opinion, already often condemned, which asserts that immunity from error extends only to those parts of the Bible that treat of God or of moral and religious matters. They even wrongly speak of a human sense of the Scriptures, beneath which a divine sense, which they say is the only infallible meaning, lies hidden. In interpreting Scripture, they will take no account of the analogy of faith and the Tradition of the Church. Thus they judge the doctrine of the Fathers and of the Teaching Church by the norm of Holy Scripture, interpreted by the purely human reason of exegetes, instead of explaining Holy Scripture according to the mind of the Church which Christ Our Lord has appointed guardian and interpreter of the whole deposit of divinely revealed truth.

23. Further, according to their fictitious opinions, the literal sense of Holy Scripture and its explanation, carefully worked out under the Church's vigilance by so many great exegetes, should yield now to a new exegesis, which they are pleased to call symbolic or spiritual. By means of this new exegesis of the Old Testament, which today in the Church is a sealed book, would finally be thrown open to all the faithful. By this method, they say, all difficulties vanish, difficulties which hinder only those who adhere to the literal meaning of the Scriptures.

24. Everyone sees how foreign all this is to the principles and norms of interpretation rightly fixed by our predecessors of happy memory, Leo XIII in his Encyclical "Providentissimus Deus," and Benedict XV in the Encyclical "Spiritus Paraclitus," as also by Ourselves in the Encyclical "Divino Afflante Spiritu."

25. It is not surprising that novelties of this kind have already borne their deadly fruit in almost all branches of theology. It is now doubted that human reason, without divine revelation and the help of divine grace, can, by arguments drawn from the created universe, prove the existence of a personal God; it is denied that the world had a beginning; it is argued that the creation of the world is necessary, since it proceeds from the necessary liberality of divine love; it is denied that God has eternal and infallible foreknowledge of the free actions of men - all this in contradiction to the decrees of the Vatican Council.[5]

26. Some also question whether angels are personal beings, and whether matter and spirit differ essentially. Others destroy the gratuity of the supernatural order, since God, they say, cannot create intellectual beings without ordering and calling them to the beatific vision. Nor is this all. Disregarding the Council of Trent, some pervert the very

concept of original sin, along with the concept of sin in general as an offense against God, as well as the idea of satisfaction performed for us by Christ. Some even say that the doctrine of transubstantiation, based on an antiquated philosophic notion of substance, should be so modified that the real presence of Christ in the Holy Eucharist be reduced to a kind of symbolism, whereby the consecrated species would be merely efficacious signs of the spiritual presence of Christ and of His intimate union with the faithful members of His Mystical Body.

27. Some say they are not bound by the doctrine, explained in Our Encyclical Letter of a few years ago, and based on the Sources of Revelation, which teaches that the Mystical Body of Christ and the Roman Catholic Church are one and the same thing.[6] Some reduce to a meaningless formula the necessity of belonging to the true Church in order to gain eternal salvation. Others finally belittle the reasonable character of the credibility of Christian faith.

28. These and like errors, it is clear, have crept in among certain of Our sons who are deceived by imprudent zeal for souls or by false science. To them We are compelled with grief to repeat once again truths already well known, and to point out with solicitude clear errors and dangers of error.

29. It is well known how highly the Church regards human reason, for it falls to reason to demonstrate with certainty the existence of God, personal and one; to prove beyond doubt from divine signs the very foundations of the Christian faith; to express properly the law which the Creator has imprinted in the hearts of men; and finally to attain to some notion, indeed a very fruitful notion, of mysteries.[7] But reason can perform these functions safely and well only when properly trained, that is, when imbued with that sound philosophy which has long been, as it were, a patrimony handed down by earlier Christian ages, and which moreover possesses an authority of an even higher order, since the Teaching Authority of the Church, in the light of divine revelation itself, has weighed its fundamental tenets, which have been elaborated and defined little by little by men of great genius. For this philosophy, acknowledged and accepted by the Church, safeguards the genuine validity of human knowledge, the unshakable metaphysical principles of sufficient reason, causality, and finality, and finally the mind's ability to attain certain and unchangeable truth.

30. Of course this philosophy deals with much that neither directly nor indirectly touches faith or morals, and which consequently the Church leaves to the free discussion of experts. But this does not hold for many other things, especially those principles and fundamental tenets to which We have just referred. However, even in these fundamental questions, we may clothe our philosophy in a more convenient and richer dress, make it more vigorous with a more effective terminology, divest it of certain scholastic aids found less useful, prudently enrich it with the fruits of progress of the human mind. But never may we overthrow it, or contaminate it with false principles, or regard it as a great, but obsolete, relic. For truth and its philosophic expression cannot change from day to day, least of all where there is question of self-evident principles of the human mind or of those propositions which are supported by the wisdom of the ages and by divine

revelation. Whatever new truth the sincere human mind is able to find, certainly cannot be opposed to truth already acquired, since God, the highest Truth, has created and guides the human intellect, not that it may daily oppose new truths to rightly established ones, but rather that, having eliminated errors which may have crept in, it may build truth upon truth in the same order and structure that exist in reality, the source of truth. Let no Christian therefore, whether philosopher or theologian, embrace eagerly and lightly whatever novelty happens to be thought up from day to day, but rather let him weigh it with painstaking care and a balanced judgment, lest he lose or corrupt the truth he already has, with grave danger and damage to his faith.

31. If one considers all this well, he will easily see why the Church demands that future priests be instructed in philosophy "according to the method, doctrine, and principles of the Angelic Doctor,"[8] since, as we well know from the experience of centuries, the method of Aquinas is singularly preeminent both of teaching students and for bringing truth to light; his doctrine is in harmony with Divine Revelation, and is most effective both for safeguarding the foundation of the faith and for reaping, safely and usefully, the fruits of sound progress.[9]

32. How deplorable it is then that this philosophy, received and honored by the Church, is scorned by some, who shamelessly call it outmoded in form and rationalistic, as they say, in its method of thought. They say that this philosophy upholds the erroneous notion that there can be a metaphysic that is absolutely true; whereas in fact, they say, reality, especially transcendent reality, cannot better be expressed than by disparate teachings, which mutually complete each other, although they are in a way mutually opposed. Our traditional philosophy, then, with its clear exposition and solution of questions, its accurate definition of terms, its clear-cut distinctions, can be, they concede, useful as a preparation for scholastic theology, a preparation quite in accord with medieval mentality; but this philosophy hardly offers a method of philosophizing suited to the needs of our modern culture. They allege, finally, that our perennial philosophy is only a philosophy of immutable essences, while the contemporary mind must look to the existence of things and to life, which is ever in flux. While scorning our philosophy, they extol other philosophies of all kinds, ancient and modern, oriental and occidental, by which they seem to imply that any kind of philosophy or theory, with a few additions and corrections if need be, can be reconciled with Catholic dogma. No Catholic can doubt how false this is, especially where there is question of those fictitious theories they call immanentism, or idealism or materialism, whether historic or dialectic, or even existentialism, whether atheistic or simply the type that denies the validity of the reason in the field of metaphysics.

33. Finally, they reproach this philosophy taught in our schools for regarding only the intellect in the process of cognition, while neglecting the function of the will and the emotions. This is simply not true. Never has Christian philosophy denied the usefulness and efficacy of good dispositions of soul for perceiving and embracing moral and religious truths. In fact, it has always taught that the lack of these dispositions of good will can be the reason why the intellect, influenced by the passions and evil inclinations, can be so obscured that it cannot see clearly. Indeed St. Thomas holds that the intellect

can in some way perceive higher goods of the moral order, whether natural or supernatural, inasmuch as it experiences a certain "connaturality" with these goods, whether this "connaturality" be purely natural, or the result of grace;[10] and it is clear how much even this somewhat obscure perception can help the reason in its investigations. However it is one thing to admit the power of the dispositions of the will in helping reason to gain a more certain and firm knowledge of moral truths; it is quite another thing to say, as these innovators do, indiscriminately mingling cognition and act of will, that the appetitive and affective faculties have a certain power of understanding, and that man, since he cannot by using his reason decide with certainty what is true and is to be accepted, turns to his will, by which he freely chooses among opposite opinions.

34. It is not surprising that these new opinions endanger the two philosophical sciences which by their very nature are closely connected with the doctrine of faith, that is, theodicy and ethics; they hold that the function of these two sciences is not to prove with certitude anything about God or any other transcendental being, but rather to show that the truths which faith teaches about a personal God and about His precepts, are perfectly consistent with the necessities of life and are therefore to be accepted by all, in order to avoid despair and to attain eternal salvation. All these opinions and affirmations are openly contrary to the documents of Our Predecessors Leo XIII and Pius X, and cannot be reconciled with the decrees of the Vatican Council. It would indeed be unnecessary to deplore these aberrations from the truth, if all, even in the field of philosophy, directed their attention with the proper reverence to the Teaching Authority of the Church, which by divine institution has the mission not only to guard and interpret the deposit of divinely revealed truth, but also to keep watch over the philosophical sciences themselves, in order that Catholic dogmas may suffer no harm because of erroneous opinions.

35. It remains for Us now to speak about those questions which, although they pertain to the positive sciences, are nevertheless more or less connected with the truths of the Christian faith. In fact, not a few insistently demand that the Catholic religion take these sciences into account as much as possible. This certainly would be praiseworthy in the case of clearly proved facts; but caution must be used when there is rather question of hypotheses, having some sort of scientific foundation, in which the doctrine contained in Sacred Scripture or in Tradition is involved. If such conjectural opinions are directly or indirectly opposed to the doctrine revealed by God, then the demand that they be recognized can in no way be admitted.

36. For these reasons the Teaching Authority of the Church does not forbid that, in conformity with the present state of human sciences and sacred theology, research and discussions, on the part of men experienced in both fields, take place with regard to the doctrine of evolution, in as far as it inquires into the origin of the human body as coming from pre-existent and living matter - for the Catholic faith obliges us to hold that souls are immediately created by God. However, this must be done in such a way that the reasons for both opinions, that is, those favorable and those unfavorable to evolution, be weighed and judged with the necessary seriousness, moderation and measure, and provided that all are prepared to submit to the judgment of the Church, to whom Christ

has given the mission of interpreting authentically the Sacred Scriptures and of defending the dogmas of faith.[11] Some however, rashly transgress this liberty of discussion, when they act as if the origin of the human body from pre-existing and living matter were already completely certain and proved by the facts which have been discovered up to now and by reasoning on those facts, and as if there were nothing in the sources of divine revelation which demands the greatest moderation and caution in this question.

37. When, however, there is question of another conjectural opinion, namely polygenism, the children of the Church by no means enjoy such liberty. For the faithful cannot embrace that opinion which maintains that either after Adam there existed on this earth true men who did not take their origin through natural generation from him as from the first parent of all, or that Adam represents a certain number of first parents. Now it is in no way apparent how such an opinion can be reconciled with that which the sources of revealed truth and the documents of the Teaching Authority of the Church propose with regard to original sin, which proceeds from a sin actually committed by an individual Adam and which, through generation, is passed on to all and is in everyone as his own.[12]

38. Just as in the biological and anthropological sciences, so also in the historical sciences there are those who boldly transgress the limits and safeguards established by the Church. In a particular way must be deplored a certain too free interpretation of the historical books of the Old Testament. Those who favor this system, in order to defend their cause, wrongly refer to the Letter which was sent not long ago to the Archbishop of Paris by the Pontifical Commission on Biblical Studies.[13] This letter, in fact, clearly points out that the first eleven chapters of Genesis, although properly speaking not conforming to the historical method used by the best Greek and Latin writers or by competent authors of our time, do nevertheless pertain to history in a true sense, which however must be further studied and determined by exegetes; the same chapters, (the Letter points out), in simple and metaphorical language adapted to the mentality of a people but little cultured, both state the principal truths which are fundamental for our salvation, and also give a popular description of the origin of the human race and the chosen people. If, however, the ancient sacred writers have taken anything from popular narrations (and this may be conceded), it must never be forgotten that they did so with the help of divine inspiration, through which they were rendered immune from any error in selecting and evaluating those documents.

39. Therefore, whatever of the popular narrations have been inserted into the Sacred Scriptures must in no way be considered on a par with myths or other such things, which are more the product of an extravagant imagination than of that striving for truth and simplicity which in the Sacred Books, also of the Old Testament, is so apparent that our ancient sacred writers must be admitted to be clearly superior to the ancient profane writers.

40. Truly, we are aware that the majority of Catholic doctors, the fruit of whose studies is being gathered in universities, in seminaries and in the colleges of religious, are far removed from those errors which today, whether through a desire for novelty or through a certain immoderate zeal for the apostolate, are being spread either openly or covertly. But we know

also that such new opinions can entice the incautious; and therefore we prefer to withstand the very beginnings rather than to administer the medicine after the disease has grown inveterate.

41. For this reason, after mature reflexion and consideration before God, that We may not be wanting in Our sacred duty, We charge the Bishops and the Superiors General of Religious Orders, binding them most seriously in conscience, to take most diligent care that such opinions be not advanced in schools, in conferences or in writings of any kind, and that they be not taught in any manner whatsoever to the clergy or the faithful.

42. Let the teachers in ecclesiastical institutions be aware that they cannot with tranquil conscience exercise the office of teaching entrusted to them, unless in the instruction of their students they religiously accept and exactly observe the norms which We have ordained. That due reverend and submission which in their unceasing labor they must profess toward the Teaching Authority of the Church, let them instill also into the minds and hearts of their students.

43. Let them strive with every force and effort to further the progress of the sciences which they teach; but let them also be careful not to transgress the limits which We have established for the protection of the truth of Catholic faith and doctrine. With regard to new questions, which modern culture and progress have brought to the foreground, let them engage in most careful research, but with the necessary prudence and caution; finally, let them not think, indulging in a false "irenism," that the dissident and the erring can happily be brought back to the bosom of the Church, if the whole truth found in the Church is not sincerely taught to all without corruption or diminution.

44. Relying on this hope, which will be increased by your pastoral care, as a pledge of celestial gifts and a sign of Our paternal benevolence, We impart with all Our heart to each and all of you, Venerable Brethren, and to your clergy and people the Apostolic Benediction.

Given at Rome, at St. Peter's, 12 August 1950, the twelfth year of Our Pontificate.

PIUS XII

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1. Conc. Vatic. D.B., 1876, Cont. *De Fide cath., cap. 2, De revelatione.*

2. C.I.C., can 1324; cfr. Conc. Vat., D.B., 1820, Cont. *De Fide cath*., cap. 4, *De Fide et ratione*, post canones.

3. Luke, X, 16

4. Pius IX, *Inter gravissimas*, 28 oct., 1870, *Acta*, vol. I, p. 260.

5. Cfr. Conc. Vat., Const. *De Fide cath.*, cap. 1, *De Deo rerum omnium creatore.*

6. Cfr. Litt. Enc. *Mystici Corporis Christi*, A.A.S., vol. XXXV, p. 193 sq.

7. Cfr. Conc. Vat., D.B., 1796.

8. C. I. C. can. 1366, 2.

9. *A.A.S.*, vol. XXXVIII, 1946, p. 387.

10. Cfr. St. Thom., *Summa Theol.*, II-II, quaest. 1, art. 4 ad 3 et quaest. 45, art. 2, in c.

11. Cfr. Allocut Pont. to the members of the Academy of Science, November 30, 1941: A.A.S., vol. XXXIII, p. 506.

12. Cfr. *Rom.*, V, 12-19; Conc. Trid., sess, V, can. 1-4.

13. January 16, 1948: *A.A.S.*, vol. XL, pp. 45-48.